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Abstract 
Kinga Ella Morsanyi: The development of reasoning heuristics in autism and in typical 
development. 
Reasoning and judgment under uncertainty are often based on a limited number of 
simplifying heuristics rather than formal logic or rule-based argumentation. Heuristics are 
low-effort mental shortcuts, which save time and effort, and usually result in accurate 
judgment, but they can also lead to systematic errors and biases when applied 
inappropriately. In the past 40 years hundreds of papers have been published on the topic 
of heuristics and biases in judgment and decision making. However, we still know 
surprisingly little about the development and the cognitive underpinnings of heuristics and 
biases. 
The main aim of my thesis is to examine these questions. Another aim is to evaluate 
the applicability of dual-process theories of reasoning to the development of reasoning. 
Dual-process theories claim that there are two types of process underlying higher order 
reasoning: fast, automatic, and effortless (Type 1) processes (which are usually associated 
with the use of reasoning heuristics), and slow, conscious and effortful (Type 2) processes 
(which are usually associated with rule-based reasoning). 
This thesis presents eight experiments which investigated the development of 
reasoning heuristics in three different populations: typically developing children and 
adolescents between the age of 5 and 16, adolescents with autism, and university students. 
Although heuristic reasoning is supposed to be basic, simple, and effortless, we have found 
evidence that responses that are usually attributed to heuristic processes are positively 
correlated with cognitive capacity in the case of young children (even after controlling for 
the effects of age). Moreover, we have found that adolescents with autism are less 
susceptible to a number of reasoning heuristics than typically developing children. Finally, 
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our experiments with university students provided evidence that education in statistics 
increases the likelihood of the inappropriate use of a certain heuristic (the equiprobability 
bias). These results offer a novel insight into the development of reasoning heuristics. 
Additionally, they have interesting implications for dual-process theories of reasoning, and 
they can also inform the debates about the rationality of reasoning heuristics and biases. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the heuristics and biases research 
programme and dual-process theories of reasoning. 
}.0. Introduction 
The main aim of my thesis is to examine the development of reasoning heuristics and 
the relationship between heuristics, cognitive abilities (especially woiicing memory, but 
also some other aspects of executive functioning, such as inhibition), and relevant 
knowledge and education, hi the first chapter I provide a review of the literature on 
reasoning heuristics, introduce dual-process theories, and also outline some issues that 
need flirther investigation. 
In Section 1.1.1 introduce the heuristics and biases research programme, including 
some examples of the typical tasks used in this line of research. I also give an overview of 
the mechanisms that have been put forward to account for heuristic reasoning, for example 
the attribute substitution model. I also briefly summarize the ideas of evolutionary 
psychologists, and especially the concept of the modularity of the mind. 
Section 1. 2. introduces dual-process theories of reasoning, the methods used by 
dual-process theorists, and the evidence for dual processes. 
This is followed by a review of some new additions to dual-process theories in 
Section 1.3., for example the idea that besides cognitive capacity and cognitive styles, 
relevant knowledge ("mindware") is also important for analytical reasoning. This section 
also raises some issues about dual-process theories - for example, whether either heuristic 
or analytic processes are really uniform, or whether they just share some common 
properties without necessarily having a common underlying mechanism behind them. I 
finish this section with a brief description of Gigerenzer's adaptive toolbox model, and 1 
also give a summary of Gigerenzer's critique of dual-process theories, and the heuristics 
and biases program. 
The focus of Section 1.4. is on the motivation for my research, and it also gives an 
outline of the subsequent chapters. 
/ . / . What are heuristics? 
This section introduces the heuristics and biases research program, including some 
examples of the typical tasks used in this line of research. I also give an overview of the 
mechanisms that have been put forward to account for heuristic reasoning, and I briefly 
summarize the ideas of evolutionary psychologists, and especially the concept of the 
modularity of the mind. 
I.I.L An introduction to the heuristics and biases research program. 
Reasoning and judgment under uncertainty are often based on a limited number of 
simplifying heuristics rather than formal logic, or rule-based argumentation. Heuristics are 
low-effort "mental shortcuts" which are useful, even essential, for people who live in an 
uncertain world and have to come to decisions within reasonable time limits using only 
restricted information and limited cognitive capacity. Heuristics save time and effort, and 
usually result in accurate judgment, but sometimes fail utteriy and lead to systematic errors 
(i.e., biases) when presented with data outside of their "domain of expertise". 
The first surprising evidence for the inappropriate use of heuristics came from an 
investigation of the statistical intuitions of experts (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). The 
results showed a systematic bias in their judgments: an overconfidence in the replicability 
of results from small samples. This tendency is also present in the general population, and 
it can be illustrated by the hot hand fallacy and the gambler's fallacy (they are also called 
positive and negative recency effects, respectively). 
The gambler's fallacy (see Figure 1.1.) is the belief that, for random events, a run of 
a particular outcome (e.g., a series of heads on the toss of a coin) will be balanced by a 
tendency for the opposite outcome (i.e., tails). Kahneman and Tversky (1972) explained 
the gambler's fallacy in terms of the operation of the representativeness heuristic. They 
argued that people expect the essential characteristics of a chance process to be represented 
in small samples as well. As people expect random sequences to include an equal amount 
of all possible outcomes, they perceive long runs of the same outcome as non-
representative. Consequently, participants wi l l expect runs of the same outcome to be less 
likely than they are. 
Hot hand fallacy Gambler's fallacy 
A basketball player has scored five times in a row, 
and now he's preparing to shoot again. What is most 
likely? 
a) The player will score again, (heuristic 
response) 
b) The player won't score this time. 
c) Both are equally likely, (normative 
response) 
A fair coin is flipped five times, each time landing 
with tails up; TTTTT. What is the most likely 
outcome if a coin is flipped a sixth time? 
a. Tails 
b. Heads (Iieuristic response) 
C. Tails and a heads are equally likely 
(normative response) 
Figure 1.1. The hot handfa/lacy and the gambler's fallacy (also known as positive and 
negative recency effects). 
The hot hand fallacy (sec Figure 1.1.) is the exact opposite of the gambler's fallacy. 
In this case, people have the incorrect expectation that a run of the same outcome will 
continue, although they are observing a random sequence (Gilovich, Vallone & Tversky, 
1985). For example, most basketball fans believe that a player who has just scored several 
times in a row is now more likely to score - because he or she is "hot." However, in actual 
fact, i f anything, players who have had a run of successful scoring attempts are somewhat 
less likely to score next time. Although in this case people observe the same sequence of 
events (i.e., the statistical properties of the sample are identical), they come to the exact 
opposite conclusion than in the case of the gambler's fallacy. Nevertheless, Gilovich et al. 
(1985) explained this illusion by the notion of representativeness as well. Namely, when 
people see runs in players' performance, they interpret this as an evidence for a pattern, 
and refute the notion of randomness, although the sample is too small to make reliable 
predictions. As Ayton and Fischer (2004; see also Gronchi & Sloman, 2008) point out, 
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these explanations only make sense i f we assume that people use their prior beliefs as a 
guide to interpreting random outcomes. Thus, they expect people's performance to reflect 
their skills and not randomness. On the other hand, they do not expect coins to become 
"hot". 
The observation of such systematic biases in reasoning led Tversky and Kahneman 
to the idea that intuition is governed by different principles than dehberate, rule-based 
reasoning. More specifically, intuitive judgment is viewed as an extension of perception to 
judgment (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005) where automatic inferences can lead to cognitive 
illusions, and the framing of problems can have a great effect on the perception of 
problems (see more on framing effects below). 
A panel of psychologists have interviewed and administered personality tests to 30 engineers and 70 lawyers, 
all successful in their respective fields. On the basis of this information, thumbnail descriptions of the 30 
engineers and 70 lawyers have been written.... 
For each description, please indicate the probability that the person described is an engineer, on a scale of 0 
to 100. 
Representative description: Non-representative description: 
Jack is a 45-year-old man. He is married and has four 
children. He is generally conservative, careful, and 
ambitious. He shows no interest in political and 
social 
issues and spends most of his free time on his many 
hobbies which include home carpentry, sailing, and 
mathematical puzzles. 
The probability that Jack is one of the 30 engineers 
in the sample of 100 is %. 
Dick is a 30 year-old man. He is married with no 
children. A man of high ability and high motivation 
he promises to be quite successful in his field. He is 
well liked by his colleagues. 
The probability that Dick is one of the 30 engineers 
in the sample of 100 is %. 
Figure 1.2. The engineers and lawyers problem with a representative and with a non-
representative description. 
Another striking illustration of the neglect of sample sizes, and the effect of prior 
beliefs is the engineers and lawyers problem (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973 - see Figure 
1.2.). In the classic study, participants were told that descriptions have been prepared of 30 
engineers and 70 lawyers (the base rates were reversed in another condition). Then 
participants were shown a description of a person from this sample, and they had to decide 
whether it referred to an engineer or a lawyer. Participants' judgments were mostly based 
4 
on the description, whereas base rates had a significant but very small effect on responses. 
When participants were given a non-representative description (which was not 
characteristic of either a lawyer or an engineer) the average rating of the likelihood of the 
person being a lawyer/engineer was 50%. This indicated that participants tended to 
disregard base rates (which were readily available) even when there was no other 
information provided, histead, i f an individual's description was neither characteristic of 
an engineer or a lawyer they concluded that their group membership could not be 
determined. 
Base rates, however, are just one example of the statistical properties that people 
readily ignore. Probably the most famous example for a task that triggers a reasoning 
heuristic is the Linda problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), a demonstration of the 
conjunction fallacy. The conjunction fallacy violates a fundamental rule of probability, that 
the likelihood of two independent events occurring at the same time (in "conjunction") 
should always be less than, or equal to the probability of either one occurring alone (P(A) 
> P(A & B)). People who commit the conjunction fallacy assign a higher probability to a 
conjunction than to one or the other of its constituents. The most famous demonstration in 
the literature is the Linda problem. 
Linda is 31 years old single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a 
student she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice and also 
participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. 
Please rank the following statements by their probability, using J for the most probable 
and 8 for the least probable. 
a) Linda is a teacher in a primary school. 
b) Linda works in a bookstore and takes Yoga classes. 
c) Linda is an active feminist. 
d) Linda is a psychiatric social worker. 
e) Linda is a member of Women Against Rape. 
J) Linda is a bank teller. 
g) Linda is an insurance salesperson. 
h) Linda is a bank teller and is an active feminist. 
People usually rank the statement (h) "Linda is a bank teller and is an active 
feminist'' above the statement (/)"Linda is a bank teller", thus committing the fallacy. As 
the Linda-problem (and other reasoning heuristics and biases tasks) demonstrate, real-life 
knowledge has a great influence on people's judgments. Ahhough there are many different 
reasoning biases most of them are based on the same effect: the contextualisation of 
problems, that is, the tendency to rely on prior knowledge when solving a reasoning task, 
and to evaluate arguments on the basis of plausibility or soundness (Thompson, 1996). 
This is true even when a person is explicitly instructed to ignore their real-world 
knowledge. 
A famous paradigm for investigating this phenomenon is the belief bias effect in 
syllogistic reasoning. The belief bias in reasoning is a non-logical tendency to accept 
conclusions that are compatible with beliefs more frequently than conclusions that 
contradict beliefs. Consider the following examples in Figure 1.3. (used by Evans, Barston, 
& Pollard, 1983). In these examples the believability and validity of the conclusions are 
systematically manipulated to result in four possible combinations: valid believable, valid 
unbelievable, invalid believable, and invalid unbelievable syllogisms. In general, 
participants tend to accept more believable than unbelievable conclusions (in the above 
study acceptance rates for believable and unbelievable conclusions were 80% and 33%, 
respectively). Participants also showed evidence of logical reasoning, as they accepted 
more valid (73%) than invalid conclusions (41%). Interestingly, the effect of beliefs is less 
pronounced on valid than on invalid problems, giving rise to a logic by belief interaction in 
acceptance rates. With the inclusion of neutral materials for comparison, Evans and Pollard 
(1990) demonstrated that, in general, belief bias is associated with the rejection of 
unbelievable conclusions and is hence a negative or "debiasing" effect. In this study, 
acceptance rates for believable and neutral conclusions were similar. However, there was a 
significant reduction in the acceptance rates of unbelievable conclusions, especially for 
invalid problems. Positive belief bias (increased acceptance of believable conclusions as 
valid) was also demonstrated in another study, but it was restricted to certain types of 
problem (Evans, Handley & Harper, 2001). These results suggest that belief bias is based 
on two different tendencies. The strongest effect consists of a tendency to withhold a 
fallacious conclusion that would typically be made in cases when the conclusion is 
unbelievable, presumably because participants engage in a motivated search for 
counterexamples. A weaker effect is responsible for a tendency to accept believable 
conclusions regardless of their logical validity (for similar findings, see also Klauer, Musch 
& Naumer, 2000). 
Valid believable Invalid believable 
No police dogs are vicious. 
Some highly trained dogs are vicious. 
Therefore, some highly trained dogs are not 
police dogs. 
No addictive things are inexpensive. 
Some cigarettes are inexpensive. 
Therefore, some addictive things are not 
cigarettes. 
Valid unbelievable Invalid unbelievable 
No nutritional things are inexpensive. 
Some vitamin tablets are inexpensive. 
Therefore, some vitamin tablets are not 
nutritional. 
No millionaires are hard workers. 
Some rich people are hard workers. 
Therefore, some millionaires are not rich 
people. 
Figure 1.3. The four types of syllogistic reasoning problems that are used in the belief bias 
paradigm. 
As these examples demonstrate, the tendency to contextualize problems with prior 
knowledge seems both ubiquitous and automatic, and thus has been termed the 
fundamental computational bias (Stanovich, 2003). In addition to contextualisation, people 
also tend to "socialize" problems, and rely on pragmatic cues and inferences even in 
impersonal situations; they are looking for deliberative design and pattern in randomly 
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generated events; and they try to create a coherent narrative of the events of their lives. Of 
course, relying on real-life knowledge and trying to make sense of patterns when solving 
problems is usually the best thing to do. However, being able to disregard previous 
knowledge and to override instinctive tendencies can be very important in certain 
situations, such as when we are leaming about science, or when we have to choose 
between mortgage lenders or savings accounts. 
Reasoning performance is also affected by the way problems are presented (i.e., 
framing). A famous example for this is Tversky and Kahneman's (1981) Asian disease 
problem. 
Problem I: Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, 
which is expected to kil l 600 people. There are two alternative programs. If Program A is 
adopted, 200 people wil l be saved. I f Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability 
that all 600 people wil l be saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved. 
Which do you prefer, Program A or Program B? 
Problem 2: Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, 
which is expected to kil l 600 people. There are two alternative programs. I f Program A is 
adopted, 400 people wil l die. If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 
nobody wil l die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people wil l die. 
Which do you prefer, Program A or Program B? 
Although both versions are identical in terms of the possible outcomes, in the case of 
Problem 1, 72% of the participants preferred Program A, while in the second framing only 
22% preferred Program A. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1981) this is because 
people underweight possibilities that are merely probable as compared to possibilities that 
are certain (this is called the certainty effect). This contributes to the tendency for risk 
aversion in the case of sure gains, and risk seeking in the case of sure losses. Overall, the 
effect is based on a passive acceptance of the formulation given, that is, participants focus 
on gains in Problem I , and losses in Problem 2, instead of considering and integrating the 
information about both gains and losses in both frames which would require more effort 
(Kahneman, 2003). 
Even i f a person does not have any relevant knowledge, they might anchor their 
judgment on, or adjust it to information provided with the problem, regardless of the fact 
that the information might be unreliable or even deceptive (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). 
When anchoring a judgment, people start with an implicitly suggested reference point (the 
"anchor") and give estimates which are close to it. For example, when asked to guess the 
percentage of African nations which are members of the United Nations, people who were 
first asked "Is it more or less than 45%?" guessed lower values than those who had been 
asked i f it was more or less than 65% (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This result was 
replicated in other experiments for a wide variety of different subjects of estimation. 
In summary, reasoning can be affected by many aspects of problems, including 
believability, plausibility, ease of memory retrieval, the context of the problem, etc. These 
problem attributes can divert attention from the underlying logical structure of the 
problem, and trigger heuristic responses. 
1.1.2. Where do heuristics come from? 
According to the most recent conceptualisation of heuristics and biases (Kahneman 
& Frederick, 2002) heuristics are based on attribute substitution. Instead of answering a 
difficult question, people are inclined to answer an easier one. How easy a question is 
depends on the accessibility of the concepts it involves, that is, how easy it is to activate 
and retrieve these concepts from memory in a given context. The intent to judge a target 
attribute initiates a search for a reasonable value. Sometimes the search ends quickly, 
because people have a stored memory of the required response, or they can rely on their 
current experience. In other cases, accessing a relevant response is more complicated. In 
these cases the selection of a particular response crucially depends on its accessibility (i.e., 
how easily it comes to mind). This, in turn, may depend on stimulus salience, associative 
activation, priming, specific training, similarity, cognitive fluency, surprisingness, affective 
valence, etc. 
In this view, in the case of the Linda problem the representativeness of the statements 
is more accessible to participants than the probability of the statements. As a result, 
participants tend to respond to the easier "How representative is the statement to Linda?" 
question, instead of answering the more difficult "How likely it is that the statement is true 
about Linda?" question. In fact, when a group of participants were asked to rate the 
statements according to how representative they are to Linda, and another group of 
participants were asked to rate them according to their probability, the correlation between 
these rankings was almost perfect (.99 - Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). In contrast to this 
interpretation, the conjunction fallacy has been attributed to pragmatic effects stemming 
from the linguistic ambiguities that are inherent in the task (see e.g., Hertwig, Benz, & 
Krauss, 2008). However, removing the linguistic ambiguity is not enough to eliminate the 
effect (Tentori, Bonini & Osherson, 2004). 
Evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; Buss, 1999, 
2000; Pinker, 1997; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992) claim that the fundamental computational 
biases are part of the human inferential machinery because they provide a perfect fit with 
the demands of our natural environment. The famous metaphor pictures the brain as a 
Swiss army knife (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992) with different tools to solve different tasks 
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(i.e., specialised modules to solve specific problems) rather than a general purpose "axe" 
which is powerful, but might be unsuitable to solve certain unique problems. The 
evolutionary psychologists' other claim is a reformulation of Chomsky's (1980) argument 
on the "poverty of the stimulus". The original argument is based on the observation that 
young children learn their native language very quickly, and they are able to use it flexibly 
despite the lack of any attempt from their parents' part to teach them the rules of the 
language in any systematic way. Similarly, young children seem to learn about all 
important aspects of their environment in a very limited time, and without much guidance 
or instruction. These theorists argue that this would be impossible without hard-wired, 
domain-specific learning mechanisms. Finally, the evolutionary psychologists' framing 
argument states that general-purpose learning devices are too slow to enable the quick 
decision-making that was necessary for survival in the wild, and for passing on genes for 
the future generations. In this view, our mental modules make us capable of reasoning 
quickly and effectively. 
According to Stanovich (2003), what evolutionary psychologists fail to take into 
account is that our brains and their specialised modules are "frozen in time", adapted to 
circumstances that existed up to 10, 000 years ago when humans lived in the so-called 
environment of evolutionary adaptedness that existed throughout the Pleistocene (Buss, 
1999). As biological evolution takes place at a much slower pace than cultural 
development, it is no wonder that our brains lag behind the challenges of our days in some 
respect. Many evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, 1992) advocate a 
massive modularity approach where they claim that all inferential processes of our brains 
are adapted to specific functions, and there is no general purpose mechanism that could 
deal with a variety of problems. However, our modem technological society poses many 
challenges that content-specific cognitive modules are unable to deal with, as they require 
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decontextualised representations. To achieve decontextualisation, we need some sort of 
context-independent, domain-general cognitive process. 
In fact, one serious problem with the massive modularity claim is the flexibility of 
human cognition (e.g., Machery, 2008). We can distinguish between three main types of 
flexibility: stimulus independence (the fact that our cognitive processes are very much 
independent of our current perceptions); content flexibility (our capacity to combine 
concepts that are supposed to belong to different modules); and the flexibility of reasoning 
(our ability to change our views). These are hard to explain i f human cognition is based 
solely on rigid modular processing. 
Another problem is the way evolutionary claims have been tested. In a series of 
papers, Cosmides and colleagues (Cosmides,1989; Cosmides & Tooby 1994; Fiddick et 
al., 2000) have used the Wason selection task (Wason, 1966) to test whether humans 
possess a psychological adaptation for cheater detection. Consider this common form of 
the problem. Cards are labelled "A" or "D" on one side and "3" or "7" on the other, and 
you have the following four cards: 
A rule says that " i f there is an A on one side of the card then there is a 3 on the other 
side". The task is to decide which cards need to be turned over to know whether the rule is 
true or false. The common responses are "A and 3", or "A" alone. The correct response is 
"A and 7" (this is the only combination of cards which could refute the rule i f it is not 
true). Overall, about 90% of participants give an incorrect response. 
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In contrast to the poor performance on the abstract version of the selection task, 
participants solve thematic (deontic) versions of the selection task very easily (the first 
demonstration came from Wason and Shapiro in 1971, and was followed by many others). 
For example, consider the following version of the problem (Griggs & Cox, 1982). On one 
side of each card is the name of a drink; on the other side is the age of the drinker. What 
card(s) must be turned over to determine whether the rule is being violated? If a person is 
drinking beer, then the person is over l9-years-o\d. 
In Cosmides and colleagues' studies the problem is presented as a social contract 
infringement. For example, the rule is that " I f a man eats cassava root, then he must have a 
tattoo on his chest". In this case a cheater would be somebody eating cassava root without 
a tattoo on their chest. According to Cosmides, the fact that people solve these versions of 
the selection task very easily points to the operation of a content-specific mental algorithm 
devoted to social contract problems. However, one problem with the use of the selection 
task for investigating deductive reasoning is that in most cases very little reasoning is 
involved when people solve the task (see e.g., Evans & Over, 1996, 2004; Sperber, Cara & 
Girotto, 1995). Moreover, some of the variants of the Wason task that Cosmides used were 
not actually Wason tasks at all. In addition, they were not even appropriate for the purpose 
of discovering a competence for social exchange, because they did not ask participants 
about the truth or falsity of a conditional rule, but merely asked for the selection of cards 
that defined a category (such as "cheater" in the above example), and so were trivially easy 
(Sperber & Girotto, 2002). Sperber and Girotto concluded that Cosmides' hypothesis has 
not been properiy tested experimentally, least of all by Cosmides herself. 
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Finally, the idea of modularity gave a boost to research into developmental disorders 
starting in the late 1980s. For example, a specific deficit of the "theory of mind module" 
had been put forward to account for the core symptoms of autism (i.e., deficits in social 
behaviour, social cognition, and communication - see e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 
1985). However, theory of mind in young children is consistently found to be highly 
correlated with executive functions, even after controlling for age and/or receptive 
vocabulary (e.g., Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995; Pemer, Lang, & Kloo, 2002). Apperiy, 
Riggs, Simpson, Samson, and Chiavarino (2006), using reaction time data, also 
demonstrated that adults do not ascribe beliefs to agents automatically, and yet another 
study (McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007) reported that both older adults and younger adults, 
under conditions of divided attention, showed performance decrements on theory of mind 
tasks. The idea that developmental disorders can be characterized by a distinct pattern of 
intact and impaired cognitive modules has also been challenged on a theoretical basis, as it 
disregards the process of ontogenetic development, and the plasticity o f the brain 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1998; Karmiloff-Smith, Scerif & Ansari, 2003). 
Nevertheless, there is evidence for innate reasoning systems. Research with infants 
suggests that human cognition is founded, in part, on four systems. These systems have 
evolved for representing 1.) objects and their mechanical interactions;2.) agents and their 
goal-directed actions; 3.) sets and their numerical properties (together with addition and 
subtraction); and 4.) space and geometric relationships (Speike & Kinzler, 2007). These 
systems are shared with non-human primates; they appear in the first months of 
development, and they continue to shape the mental lives of adults. These systems, 
however, have their gaps and inaccuracies which make both adults and children prone to 
errors in reasoning about properties of object mechanics, or non-Euclidean geometry(e.g., 
McCIoskey, 1983; Randall, 2005). Although these concepts are resilient, they can be 
overcome by explicit instruction and experience. Moreover, conceptual change does not 
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only occur in academic science. Preschool children change their conceptions of numbers 
when they learn to count (Spelke, 2000), and they change their conceptions of agents when 
they learn about biological processes like eating and breathing (Carey, 2001). Thus, in this 
approach innate learning algorithms form the basis of human cognition. However, these 
innate schemas are reasonably flexible, and they can be modified by learning and 
experiences. 
The ideas of modularity (or innate reasoning algorithms - e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 
1994), and associative processes (e.g., Kahneman & Frederick, 2005) have also been 
incorporated in reasoning theorists' conceptualisation of intuitive inference. Stanovich 
(2004) described The Autonomous Set of Systems (TASS), which is claimed to form the 
basis of heuristic processing, as including implicit learning, overleamed associations, and 
the modular processes for solving adaptive problems. In the next section I introduce dual-
process theories which claim that human reasoning is based on the interaction of quick, 
heuristic, and slow, effortful processes. 
1.2. Dual-process theories of reasoning 
This section introduces dual-process theories of reasoning, the methods used by dual-
process theorists, and the evidence for dual processes. 
1.2. L Distinguishing between two types of reasoning processes 
In many cases people disregard statistical information or the logical structure of 
problems and rely on their immediate impressions or relevant knowledge when they make 
judgments and decisions. This can happen even when they have knowledge of the relevant 
statistical rule, such as in the case of experts (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). To explain this 
contrast between people's normative knowledge and their often non-normative decisions, it 
has been suggested that these different outputs represent the operations o f two separate 
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reasoning systems: a quick and intuitive, and a slow, more deliberate system (e.g., 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). In this section I introduce the ideas of dual-process 
theories. 
Dual-process theories (Evans and Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 1999) are 
based on the idea that besides automatic inferential processes human reasoning also relies 
on general purpose problem solving mechanisms. Thus, they presuppose two systems (or 
more recently, two types of processes - Evans, 2008) that form the basis of human 
reasoning. The original theories pictured the two systems as "two minds in one brain" 
(Evans, 2003). They distinguished between System 1 which is fast, automatic, effortless, 
independent of cognitive abilities, contextually cued, phylogenetically older and shared 
with other animals, and System 2 which is slow, effortful, related to cognitive abilities and 
dispositions, context-independent and uniquely human. 
System 1 processes happen rapidly and mandatorily when their specific triggering 
stimuli are present, they can be executed in parallel with other processes without much 
mental effort, and only their outputs are available for consciousness. In this view the main 
purpose of System 2 (the conscious and effortful system) is to override the default System 
1 responses through the process of decoupling (e.g., Stanovich, 1999, 2006). Decoupling is 
a mechanism that enables people to maintain and manipulate internal representations in the 
presence of distractive interfering stimuli (i.e., it is basically the decontextualisation of 
representations), which is essential for hypothetical thinking. 
A more recent publication (Evans, 2008) does not commit to a two systems approach 
but proposes the name of Type I and 2 processes. The main basis for discriminating 
between these processes is that Type 2 processes require access to a single, central working 
memory resource, while Type 1 processes do not. This implies that Type 2 processes are 
slow, sequential and capacity limited, their fiinctioning correlates with individual 
differences in cognitive ability and they are disrupted by concurrent working memory load. 
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They are also associated with consciousness and intentional, higher order control. In 
contrast to the original idea of System 2 these processes are not considered to be uniquely 
human, and are not necessarily associated with decontextualised, logical reasoning. 
Type I processes in this approach are a collection of implicit processes that can 
operate automatically without occupying working memory space. These are supposed to 
include innate cognitive modules (e.g., for perception, attention, and language processing) 
as well as an associative and implicit learning system that acquires knowledge of the world 
which cannot be retrieved as explicit knowledge but which can directly affect our 
behaviour. There are also habitual and automated behaviour patterns that once required 
conscious Type 2 effort, but that have become Type I with practice and experience. 
Finally, pragmatic processes that rapidly identify and retrieve explicit knowledge for 
conscious processing are also Type 1. 
An important question is how Type I and Type 2 processes interact, and how we can 
tell which one will provide a response to a particular question. In default-interventionist 
models (Evans, 2006; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), Type 2 processing is based on the 
continuous stream of relevant content delivered into working memory by Type I 
processes. Thus, the basis of Type 2 processes is contextualised representations of 
problems, which also cue intuitive answers. Quick, knowledge-based, context-dependent 
responses are usually very useful. However, in some cases they might be in conflict with 
the person's aims, or they can be inappropriate for other reasons. In these situations these 
quick heuristic responses can be overridden by Type 2 processing given that the reasoner is 
aware of the conflict, has sufficient cognitive capacity, and possesses certain mental 
dispositions (Stanovich & West, 2008). This overriding process requires conscious effort, 
and people with the highest working memory capacity wi l l be more likely to succeed (e.g., 
De Neys, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 2005; Handley, Capon, Beveridge, Dennis, & Evans, 
2004; Markovits & Doyon, 2004; Moutier, Plagne-Cayeux, Melot, & Houde, 2006). Such a 
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belief inhibition or decontextualisation process is the basis of decoupling and hypothetical 
thinking (e.g., Stanovich & West, 2000). On the other hand, when there is no conflict 
between beliefs and logic, performance will be unrelated to cognitive capacity (e.g., 
Newstead, Handley, Hariey, Wright, & Farrelly, 2004; Stanovich & West, 2000). \n other 
cases, however, the role of Type 2 processes is merely to rationalize responses cued by 
Type 1 processes (Evans, 1995). Stanovich (2009) used the term serial associative 
cognition with a focal bias to describe a reasoning process which is not purely associative 
and effortless (that is, not completely Type I ) , but consists of the justification of a 
heuristically cued response. This involves conscious, but low-effort processing which lacks 
a real attempt to consider alternatives, instead it is looking for easy ways of justifying the 
most obvious answer. 
Besides default-interventionist models, Evans (2007) also identified so-called 
parallel-competitive models. These models assume that each system operates in parallel to 
deliver a putative response, resulting sometimes in conflict which then needs to be 
resolved. Examples of these kinds of models are Epstein's (1994) rational-experiential 
theory or Sloman's (1996) dual-process account. An interesting feature of these models is 
that they suppose that because both systems deliver a response, when these responses are 
in conflict people will believe two contradictory things simultaneously. This also implies 
that reasoners wil l always take analytic considerations into account, and they wil l always 
be aware when there is a conflict between the responses offered by the two systems. In this 
view errors arise because people fail to inhibit their prepotent heuristic beliefs. This is in 
contrast with the default-interventionist view (e.g., Evans, 1984; Kahneman & Frederick, 
2002) where Type I processes always come first, and they offer a default solution which is 
very often accepted without any further thought, or without people ever becoming aware of 
the relevance of normative considerations. 
18 
In recent publications, De Neys (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; De Neys, Vartanian & 
Goel, 2008) argued that people are able to detect the conflict between heuristically cued 
responses and logic, although they might not be aware of this, or the processing demands 
of the task might prevent them from choosing the normatively correct response. 
Nevertheless, when selecting a heuristically cued response which is in conflict with 
standard logic, participants take longer to respond (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008). An flVIRI 
study also showed activation of the anterior cingulate cortex (which is involved in the 
detection of competing responses) when people selected a response that violated a 
normative rule (De Neys et al., 2008). Ball, Phillips, Wade and Quayle (2006) using 
latency and eye-tracking methods also demonstrated that people took longer to respond, 
and spent more time inspecting problems where logic and belief conflicted, as compared to 
non-conflict problems. 
1.2.2. Evidence for the existence of Type I and Type 2 processes 
As 1 described in the previous section, the ftindamental claim of dual-process 
theories is that human reasoning is based on two distinct types of processes: quick, 
contextualised, and effortless (Type 1) ones, and slow, sequential and effortftil (Type 2) 
ones. The main basis for differentiating between these processes is whether they require 
working memory capacity or not (Evans, 2008). The idea is that reasoning processes which 
rely on working memory capacity are slow, sequential and they need conscious attention, 
whereas automatic. Type I processes are rapid, can be executed in parallel, and they do not 
require mental effort. In order to demonstrate the difference between these processes, a 
number of different methods have been implemented. 
\n speeded tasks, participants have to give a response to a reasoning problem in a 
short period of time determined by the experimenter. Under such conditions the effect of 
certain reasoning biases increases (e.g., the matching bias on the Wason selection task -
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Roberts & Newton, 2001; and the belief bias in syllogistic reasoning - Evans & Curtis-
Holmes, 2005). Giving instructions for fast responding also increases the rate of 
endorsement of fallacies in conditional reasoning (Schroyens, Schaeken, & Handley, 2003; 
although see Evans, Handley & Bacon, 2009). 
Non-verbal process tracing methods such as asking participants to indicate the 
current focus of their attention by mouse-pointing, or using eye-tracking methods can also 
give insight into participants* cognitive processes. For example, owing to these methods 
we know that on the Wason selection task, people spend quite a long time thinking about 
cards that they wil l end up selecting (Ball, Lucas, Miles, & Gale, 2003; Evans, 1996). 
These are often the ones corresponding to well-known heuristics (see Evans, 1998; Evans 
& Over, 2004). Verbal protocol data also indicate that participants are more likely to 
rationalise their initial choices (Wason & Evans, 1975) than to try and consider multiple 
possibilities. 
Looking at individual differences in cognitive ability (usually working memory) and 
cognitive style (i.e., how much an individual is inclined to engage in effortful cognitive 
operations) and how these correlate with participants' responses has also been used in 
many studies. A series of experiments by Stanovich and West (reviewed by Stanovich, 
1999; Stanovich & West, 2000) used this methodology, as well as a number of studies by 
other authors (for example, Capon, Handley, & Dennis, 2003; De Neys, 2006; tClaczynski, 
2000; Klaczynski & Daniel, 2005; Klaczynski & Gordon, 1996; Newstead, Handley, 
Harley, Wright, & Farelly, 2004). These studies show that when people have to solve tasks 
where there is a straightforward, heuristic response, together with a normative, but less 
straightforward option, people higher in cognitive ability, and people who are inclined to 
think hard about problems are more likely to choose the normatively correct answer. 
However, when a contextualised (knowledge-based) representation of the problem leads to 
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a normative solution cognitive ability is not related to participants' reasoning performance 
(Stanovich & West, 1998). 
The influence of cognitive ability on reasoning performance was also demonstrated 
using dual-task manipulations. In a study looking at the effects of beliefs in syllogistic 
reasoning (De Neys, 2006) participants' working memory capacity was burdened with a 
secondary task. When the believability of a conclusion conflicted with its logical validity, 
participants showed worse logical performance. However, there was no effect of cognitive 
load when beliefs and logic cued the same response. Although participants with high 
working memory spans performed better than those with lower spans when there was a 
conflict between logic and beliefs, all reasoners showed similar effects o f cognitive load, 
indicating that the difference between high and lower ability participants was quantitative 
rather than qualitative. De Neys, Schaeken, and d'Ydewalle (2005) also found that 
burdening working memory with a secondary task decreased the efficiency of 
counterexample retrieval in conditional reasoning, although the effect was less pronounced 
for the most strongly associated counterexamples. This indicated that in addition to an 
automatic search component, counterexample retrieval draws on working memory 
resources. 
Instructing participants to reason intuitively/logically can also have an effect on their 
reasoning performance. According to previous studies (e.g., Epstein et al., 1992; Ferreira 
et al. 2006; Klaczynski, 2001) instructing participants to reason logically (e.g., *'take the 
point of view of a perfectly logical person" - Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994) increases the 
mental effort that they invest in the task, and as a result, participants give more normative 
responses. Although the exact mechanism is not known, a possible explanation for this 
effect is that logical instructions sensitise participants to the potential conflict between 
logic and intuitions and/or encourage participants to rely more on Type 2 reasoning 
processes (Stanovich & West, 2008). More specifically, it has been proposed that Type 2 
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or analytic processes can intervene to inhibit reasoning biases and replace them with 
normatively correct reasoning (see Evans, Handley, Neilens, Bacon & Over, in press). 
Evans et al. (inpress) also found that participants with higher cognitive ability comply 
with instructions more readily than lower ability participants. 
In short, a large body of experimental evidence is pointing to the existence of dual 
processes, making a distinction between quick, pre-conscious, effortless, and slow, 
conscious and effortful processes seem reasonable. It also seems that slow, effortful 
processing is more likely to result in a normative solution, and people with higher 
cognitive capacity (i.e., people who are able to invest more effort) are more likely to reason 
normatively. 
1.3. New additions to dual-process theories and alternative approaches 
This section reviews some of the new additions to dual-process theories, for example 
the idea that besides cognitive capacity and cognitive styles, relevant knowledge 
("mindware") is also important for analytical reasoning. This section also raises some 
issues about dual-process theories - for example, whether either heuristic or analytic 
processes are really uniform, or whether they just share some common properties without 
necessarily having a common underlying mechanism behind them. I fmish this section 
with a brief description of Gigerenzer's adaptive toolbox model, and I also give a summary 
of Gigerenzer's critique of dual-process theories, and the heuristics and biases program. 
1.3.1. The effect of knowledge on reasoning, and the revised heuristic-analytic theory 
In contrast to the findings that demonstrate a link between cognitive capacity and the 
ability to override heuristic responses, recently it emerged that a large number of thinking 
biases (including, the conjunction effect, framing effects, anchoring effects, outcome bias, 
base-rate neglect, "less is more" effects, affect biases, omission bias, myside bias, sunk-
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cost effect, and certainty effects) are uncorrelated with cognitive ability when they are 
presented in a between subjects design. Moreover, people with higher cognitive abihty are 
no less susceptible to the effects of beliefs (ICIaczynski, 2000; Newstead et al., 2004; 
Torrens, Thompson, & Cramer, 1999), and they are also prone to egocentric thinking and 
myside bias (Stanovich & West, 2007, 2008). 
To account for these findings Stanovich and West (2008) have suggested that 
cognitive capacity wil l only predict reasoning performance i f the following conditions are 
satisfied. Participants have to have the necessary "mindware" (i.e., relevant knowledge), 
they have to detect the need to override the default heuristic response, and sustained 
inhibition or decoupling has to be necessary to solve the problem. I f any of these is not 
present then there will be no relationship between people's performance on a task, and 
their cognitive abilities. In addition, it is more likely that people wi l l detect the conflict 
between heuristics and normative reasoning i f they are given instructions to think logically, 
i f there are cues in the task that make the conflict salient (e.g., when a within-subjects 
design is used as opposed to a between-subjects design), and when people are predisposed 
to reason careftilly, and to invest mental effort into solving problems (see Figure 1.4. for a 
summary of the model). 
Another recent development in the dual-process field is the revised heuristic-analytic 
theory of Evans (2006a; Evans, Handley & Over, 2003). According to this theory, the three 
basic principles of hypothetical thinking are: I . the singularity principle (people consider 
only one possibility/one mental model at a time); 2. the relevance principle (mental models 
are shaped by preconscious heuristic processes that contextualise problems in a way that 
makes them maximally relevant to current goals); finally 3. the satisficingprinciple 
(analytic processes evaluate the models, but they tend to accept them unless there is good 
reason to reject them, in which case the cycle starts again from the beginning, with the 
consideration of another possibility). 
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Figure 1.4. A summary of Stanovich and West's (2008) model. 
In this conceptualisation, biases are the result of logically relevant information (such 
as base rates, for example) being omitted or logically irrelevant information (such as 
frames or some other salient aspects of the representation) included at the heuristic stage to 
create a believable or plausible model. Other biases, however, are attributed to the 
operation and properties of the analytic system. One important factor is the limited 
capacity of the analytic system. For this reason, people consider only one model at a time, 
and consider evidence in relation to the current model, although they are capable of 
revising or rejecting the model in the light of new evidence. For example, in the case of 
syllogistic reasoning people construct a model of the premises which is motivated by the 
believability of the conclusion, and tend to accept conclusions that could be true given the 
premises, but do not have to be true (i.e., they do not necessary follow in a logical sense -
e.g., Evans, Handley, Harper & Johnson-Laird, 1999). 
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Both Stanovich and West's (2008) and Evans's (2006a) model offers a more 
complex idea of human cognition than their initial conceptualisations of dual processes 
(Evans & Over, 1996; Stanovich, 1999). One aspect of human cognition that both models 
emphasize is that cognitive effort does not always guarantee a normative solution, or even 
an abstract, logical representation of the task. Hypothetical thinking, and mental simulation 
of alternative outcomes might not be possible without Type 2 thinking, but Type 2 thinking 
is also no guarantee for an abstract, logical representation (see Evans, 2006a; Stanovich, 
2009), 
1.3.2. How many systems, and how do they differ? 
Recently, Evans (2006b) also published a paper where he identified a couple of 
problems concerning dual-process theories. One problem is the claim that System 1 is 
ancient, and shared with other animals, whereas System 2 is modem, and uniquely human. 
Probably the most interesting evidence about this issue concerns the belief bias effect. 
Neurological evidence (Goel & Dolan, 2003) indicates that the belief bias arises in frontal 
brain areas associated with semantic memory, thus it is obviously not related to the 
functioning of an ancient part of the brain. Another popular idea in dual-process theories is 
associating System 2 with controlled, and System 1 with automatic processes. As the 
heuristic-analytic theory of Evans (2006a) implies, although analytic processes might 
override heuristic response tendencies, most of the time analytic processing consists of a 
superficial rationalisation process that justifies heuristically cued responses. In these cases 
it is clearly System 1 that is in control of our behaviour. For similar reasons, it is 
inappropriate to think about analytic processes as necessarily abstract and logical. Finally, 
as already acknowledged by Stanovich (2004) in his idea of The Autonomous Set of 
Systems (TASS), heuristics are based on a number of separate cognitive processes with 
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different origins, and probably different neural bases as well, making the idea of a unitary 
heuristic system implausible. 
Even more recent developments in the field also question the unitary nature of the 
analytic system. For example Stanovich (2009) proposed a distinction between the 
algorithmic and autonomous minds, corresponding to the independent effects of fluid 
intelligence (or working memory), and thinking dispositions (as indexed by measures of 
need for cognition, and actively open-minded thinking, for example) on reasoning 
performance. Another possible distinction is between the effects of working memory and 
inhibition. In Stanovich's (e.g., Stanovich, 1999, 2006) conceptualisation decoupling is one 
of the most important roles of the analytic system. Decoupling is a mechanism that enables 
people to maintain and manipulate internal representations in the presence of distracting 
interfering stimuli (i.e., it is basically the decontextualisation of representations), which is 
essential for hypothetical thinking. However, psychometric evidence (e.g., Friedman, 
Miyake, Corley, Young, DeFries, & Hewitt, 2006) indicates that the maintenance of 
information, and resisting interference can be attributed to two closely related, but 
separable executive function components: updating (which is closely related to working 
memory), and inhibition. Although the two components are highly correlated (in the above 
study there was a correlation of /^.62 between the two), they are cleariy not the same. 
In fact, we have evidence from reasoning research that working memory and 
inhibition play a different role in analytic reasoning. In a study with children that 
investigated the belief bias effect (Handley, Capon, Beveridge, Dennis & Evans, 2004) 
where the content was manipulated in such a way that the conclusions were either 
congruent, neutral, or incongruent with beliefs, and either logically valid or logically 
invalid. Participants also received a measure of working memory capacity (the counting 
span task) and a measure of inhibitory control (the stop signal task). On belief-based 
problems, belief bias and logical reasoning were predicted independently by both working 
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memory and inhibition. In contrast, logical reasoning on belief neutral problems was 
predicted by working memory alone. These results indicate that whereas logical reasoning 
in general depends on working memory capacity, inhibition might only be necessary to 
resolve the conflict between beliefs and logic. 
Overall, these results suggest that analytical reasoning performance depends on 
separable aspects of executive functioning, as well as dispositional factors, which makes 
the idea of a unitary analytic system seem less plausible. A similar argument has been 
made about the heuristic system, and it is reflected for example in Stanovich's (2004) 
concept of The Autonomous Set of Systems (TASS). Although at the behavioural level we 
can distinguish between Type 1 and Type 2 processes, it seems unlikely that we can find 
corresponding structures at the level of brain architecture or even of cognitive mechanisms, 
1.3.3. Gigerenzer s critique of dual-process theories 
One of the main opponents and critics of the heuristics and biases research 
programme is Gerd Gigerenzer who proposes a very different approach to the study of 
heuristics. The fast and frugal heuristics approach (e.g., Gigerenzer et al., 1999) makes 
similar claims as evolutionary psychologists in that they propose that our brains consist of 
specialized modules or evolved capacities (such as recognition and recall memory, or 
imitation), which serve as the building blocks for heuristics. These building blocks, which 
can be flexibly combined with each other, form the basis of what they call the adaptive 
toolbox. These theorists claim that our brains are adapted to the demands of our days (not 
to the demands of the Pleistocene) which is evident from the fact that most decisions we 
make lead to satisfactory outcomes. They claim that heuristics outperform (or they are at 
least as effective as) complex statistical models in situations where people need to act fast, 
the probabilities or utilities are unknown, and there are multiple goals and ill-defined 
problems (Gigerenzer, 2008). Although fast and frugal heuristics might not lead to optimal 
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outcomes from the point of view of strict logic or probability theory, they still offer fast 
and good-enough solutions to problems (i.e., they are ecological, rather than logical). 
So, how do we select a heuristic from the adaptive toolbox, or how do we construct a 
new one from the existing building blocks? Heuristic selection can be based on a) 
reinforcement learning; b) social learning (learning from tutors, for example); c) 
evolutionary leaming (Hutchinson & Gigerenzer, 2005). Heuristics can be applied 
consciously or unconsciously, and people tend to check the ecological rationality of 
heuristics from trial to trial, ensuring a good fit with the environment. As only a small set 
of heuristics is potentially applicable in any given situation, this makes the search and 
selection process quick and easy. 
An interesting statement of the fast and frugal heuristics approach is that the more 
unpredictable a situation is the more information needs to be ignored, even i f the 
information costs nothing. For example, the "take die best" heuristic (Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996) is based on the idea that when people search for the best solution, they 
should search according to just one criterion (which is the most important) instead of 
weighing up different types of evidence. Decision trees based on this rule have been 
successfully used in medical settings, for example, to decide coronary care unit allocation 
(Green & Mehr, 1997) and macrolide prescription (Fischer, Steiner, Zucol, Berger, 
Martignon & Bossart, 2002). 
In a recent publication, Gigerenzer (2009) criticised the heuristics and biases 
approach, and dual-process theories, highlighting some important shortcomings. One 
problem he noted (which he called one-word explanations) was the way heuristic processes 
were defined in the heuristics and biases approach. For example, the term "availability" 
has been used to denote the "number" of instances that come to mind, the "ease" with 
which instances come to mind, as well as recency, salience, memorability, and vividness. 
However, when ease and number were actually measured, they were found to differ and, 
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most importantly, to not correlate with the frequency judgments that the term availability 
purportedly explains (Sedlmeier, Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1998). Similarly, the term 
"representativeness" has been used to stand for two opposite phenomena: the gambler's 
fallacy and the hot hand fallacy (see also Section 1.1.1.). The main problem here is that 
although the heuristics and biases approach identified and gave labels to many common 
errors, they failed to uncover the underlying cognitive mechanisms of heuristic reasoning. 
Another issue that Gigerenzer raised was what he called circular restatements. For 
example, from the observation that people are influenced both by the logical form of a 
syllogism and the believability of its conclusion, it does not necessarily follow that these 
effects are based on two reasoning systems: a logical one, and a belief-based one. 
Similarly, framing effects were "explained" by the fact that one of the frames makes the 
solution more "transparent" or "salient." The fact that a representation makes a solution 
transparent is hardly an explanation, however, but rather what needs to be explained. 
Finally, according to Gigerenzer dual-process theories are no more than a "yin-yang list of 
dichotomies" (e.g., associations versus rules, intuitive versus rational processing, etc.) 
which taken together can account for all possible phenomena, again, without specifying the 
underlying processes. 
In sum, the main problem seems to be that although research on heuristics and biases 
identified some important characteristics (mostly weaknesses) of human cognition, and 
gave labels to them, it has not been very successftil in uncovering the underlying cognitive 
mechanisms. Unfortunately, the fast and frugal heuristics approach (i.e., Gigerenzer's own 
theory) suffers from very similar problems. One important issue is that, although this 
approach has been successful in identifying some heuristics that people use, and that can 
lead to good decisions in a fast and fmgal way, Gigerenzer and colleagues (e,g,, 
Gigerenzer, Hoffrage & Goldstein, 2008) emphasize that the heuristics that people wil l use 
in a given situation will largely depend on their individual learning history. Thus, it is hard 
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to predict what sort of heuristic a given individual wil l use in a particular situation. In 
addition, even i f they use a particular heuristic, this can lead to different responses 
depending on the person's individual learning history. 
For example, in the case of the take the best heuristic, people can rely on 
evolutionary learning (which could play a role, for example, in partner choice). However, 
individual learning can also have an effect - although this type of learning is very slow, and 
it can be dangerous too, or even impossible in the case of rare events or when feedback is 
absent or unreliable. Finally, social leaming is probably the fastest and most widely used 
type of leaming. Social leaming can be supported by the "imitate the successful" heuristic 
(e.g., Garcia-Retamero, Takezawa & Gigerenzer, 2006), that is, to imitate the behaviour of 
the most successful member in a social situation, although many other mechanisms can 
play a role too. As this example illustrates, based on the fast and frugal heuristics approach, 
it is very hard to make predictions about people's future behaviour in any given situation, 
as this wil l be affected by such a large number of (both individual and environmental) 
factors. 
1.4. Questions to be answered and the outline of the chapters to follow. 
In Section 1.2 I reviewed evidence suggesting that a distinction between fast and 
effortless, and slow and effortful reasoning processes describes many aspect of human 
reasoning in a meaningful way, and the two types of processes can be distinguished 
between in experiments. However, as I described in Section 1.3., the problem with dual-
process theories is that the underiying processes of reasoning, and especially heuristic 
reasoning, are mostly unknown. In my thesis I am going to investigate three broad topics 
which are all aimed at answering some questions about how heuristics develop. 
According to Stanovich (2004) heuristics can be based on implicit leaming, 
overieamed associations, and the modular processes for solving adaptive problems. 
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Theoretically, it should be possible to distinguish between these different types of heuristic 
by looking at developmental samples. We can expect innate heuristics to appear very early 
in the course of development, and they probably correspond to the mechanisms described 
by Spelke and Kinzler (2007; see Section 1.1.2.). We should also be able to distinguish 
between heuristics that are the result of implicit versus explicit learning. Heuristics based 
on implicit (i.e., associative) learning should be effortless from the start, and they are likely 
to be inaccessible to conscious awareness. By contrast, heuristics that are based on explicit 
learning (e.g., the equiprobability bias), or the ones that require the integration of presented 
information and retrieved knowledge (e.g., the conjunction fallacy) might be effortful to 
begin with, and they should deliver output which is available for consciousness. They 
might also emerge at a later stage of development. 
The prediction that follows from this is that i f we look at a sample of young 
children, some typical heuristic responses should be positively correlated with cognitive 
ability (that is, children of higher cognitive capacity should give more heuristic responses). 
Moreover, older children should use these types of heuristics more than younger children. 
Later on, as these heuristics become "overleamed" (i.e., automatized) the pattem should 
reverse (as at this stage children become able to suppress heuristics voluntarily), and older 
children, and children of higher cognitive ability should give these responses less. In order 
to be able to examine this question, in Chapter 3 I present some experiments where we 
looked at a wide range of heuristics, and children from a broad age range (between the age 
of 5 and 16). However, before doing this I review the literature on the development of 
heuristic reasoning, and developmental dual-process theories in Chapter 2. 
Heuristics are very similar across individuals. At least some typical heuristics 
(such as the matching response in the case of abstract versions of the Wason selection task) 
are produced by a large majority of people. The reason for this is probably that heuristics 
have high adaptive value, as they provide us with appropriate, fast and effortless responses 
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in most everyday situations. An interesting question is whether we can also observe the 
same heuristics in atypical populations, for example in children with a developmental 
disorder. By definition, children with a developmental disorder are less well adapted to 
their environment than typically developing children. Thus, it seems possible that children 
with a developmental disorder produce fewer heuristic responses than typically developing 
children, and as a result in the minority of cases, when heuristic use is maladaptive, they 
should actually give more normatively correct responses than their typically developing 
peers. In order to test this intriguing hypothesis, I decided to investigate heuristic reasoning 
in autism. 
Autism is an interesting disorder from the point of view of reasoning research. One 
of the cognitive theories of autism, the mind-blindness hypothesis which was first 
proposed by Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) states that some of the symptoms of 
autism can be explained by a deficit of the theory of mind (ToM) module. As I described in 
Section 1. 1.2. it is unclear whether a ToM module actually exists or not. However, autistic 
people's difficulty with ToM reasoning seems to suggest that some of the quick and 
effortless (or low-effort) reasoning processes are effortful for autistic people. 
Another relevant cognitive theory of autism is the Weak Central Coherence (WCC) 
theory (Frith & Happe, 1994; Happe, 1999). The WCC theory proposes that typically-
developing individuals tend to engage in global processing, building up a gist-based 
representation, whereas autistic individuals engage in more detailed, local or piecemeal 
processing. As a result, autistic people are less able to process information in context (e.g., 
Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999). From this it seems to follow that autistic children should be 
able to avoid some reasoning heuristics. According to Stanovich (1999, 2006) decoupling 
or decontextualisation is probably the most important function of the analytic system. I f 
contextualisation does not take place in autism (or it takes place to much less extent than in 
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typical development) we can expect that autistic people wil l perform better in situations 
when a decontextualised representation is required for a logical/normative answer. 
Interestingly, the popular image of autism is that autistic people are very objective, 
unbiased, factual and logical. This is even reflected in yet another theory of autism, the 
"extreme male brain theory" (Baron-Cohen, 2002) which proposes that autistic people are 
very good at analysing and constructing systems, whereas at the same time they are less 
able to empathize with other people. Although the cognitive theories o f autism are quite 
diverse, they all seem to predict that autistic people wil l use reasoning heuristics less, and 
show more normative performance in cases where logic and heuristics conflict. In Chapter 
4 I present a review of the cognitive theories of autism. Ln Chapter 5 1 describe two studies 
that investigated heuristic use in children with autism. 
Finally, the third topic that I investigate in my thesis is the role o f knowledge (and 
education) in giving heuristic/analytic responses. I look at this question by comparing the 
performance of students at different stages of their education, and students studying 
different disciplines at a university level. According to Stanovich and West's (2008) 
model, relevant knowledge ("mindware") should have an effect on reasoning. More 
specifically it should decrease heuristic use. By contrast, educational theorists (e.g., 
Fischbein, 1997) propose that education can actually increase heuristic use in some cases. 
Because of these conflicting predictions, and because the role of knowledge and education 
in heuristic use has been largely ignored in reasoning research so far (apart from some 
studies on the effect of training) it seems an interesting question to look at. A corollary of 
the idea that education can increase heuristic use is that some heuristics might appear at 
later stages of development, well beyond childhood. To test for this possibility I use a 
sample of university students in the experiments in Chapter 6. In this chapter 1 also review 
the literature on the role of education and knowledge in reasoning heuristics. 
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Chapter 7 is a summary of the experimental results, and an attempt to evaluate the 
implications of my findings for dual-process theories, and for the broader field of 
reasoning research. In the last chapter 1 also outline some possible future directions of 
research. 
34 
Chapter 2. The development of reasoning skills. 
2.0. Introduction 
\n the previous chapter I introduced dual-process theories of reasoning which is the 
general framework for my investigation. I reviewed evidence suggesting that a distinction 
between fast and effortless, and slow and effortful reasoning processes describes many 
aspect of human reasoning in a meaningful way, and the two types of process can be 
distinguished between in experiments. However, as 1 noted earlier, the problem with dual-
process theories is that the underlying processes of reasoning, and especially heuristic 
reasoning, are mostly unknown. Dual-process theories make claims about the origins of 
heuristic processes (e.g., Stanovich, 2004). However, these claims have rarely been tested. 
The bulk of research into the development of reasoning processes has been done 
with children above the age of 10. I f we accept that heuristics are basic processes that 
develop at a young age, we can expect that by early adolescence they have already 
appeared, making it hard to identify the cognitive processes that played a role in the 
development of heuristics. In order to be able to examine this question, in Chapter 3 I 
present three experiments where we looked at a wide range of heuristics, with the 
participation of children from a broad age range (between the ages of 5 and 16). However, 
before doing this, in this chapter I review the existing literature on the development of 
reasoning abilities. 
In Section 2.1. I describe some heuristics and biases tasks that have been used to 
examine children's reasoning. I also describe three developmental dual-process accounts, 
and also the developmental changes that these theories predict for both logical competence 
and heuristic use. I also highlight the similarities and differences between the predictions 
of these dual-process accounts, and identify the factors (e.g., cognitive ability, 
metacognition) that they consider as the main driving forces of the developmental changes 
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in reasoning abilities. Finally, I describe an alternative (single process) theory of the 
development of reasoning heuristics. 
Section 2.2. summarizes the literature on conditional reasoning. In contrast to dual-
process theorists, who consider contextualisation as a quick, and effortless process which 
usually hinders normative reasoning, the researchers of conditional reasoning propose that 
the retrieval and integration of relevant knowledge during reasoning is often efTortfiil, and 
it is also necessary for logical reasoning, and for hypothetical thinking. Researchers in this 
field also emphasize the importance of the maturation of inhibitory skills in the 
development of children's reasoning abilities. 
Finally, in Section 2.3. I give a summary of the literature on the development of 
reasoning skills. 
2.1. Developmental dual-process accounts, and the expected developmental 
trajectories of reason ing performance 
In this section I describe some heuristics and biases tasks that have been used to 
examine children's reasoning. I also describe three developmental dual-process accounts, 
and also the developmental changes that these theories predict for both logical competence 
and heuristic use. 1 also highlight the similarities and differences between the predictions 
of these dual-process accounts, and identify the factors (e.g., cognitive ability, 
metacognition) that they consider as the main driving forces of the developmental changes 
in reasoning abilities. 
2.7.7. Research into the development of children's reasoning using heuristics and 
biases tasks 
Dual-process theories (Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 1999) 
presuppose two systems (or more recently, Kvo types of process - Evans, 2008) that form 
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the basis of human reasoning. Type 1 (i.e., heuristic) processes are fast, automatic, 
effortless, and they can be executed parallel with other processes. They are independent of 
cognitive abilities, and contextually cued. By contrast. Type 2 (i.e., analytic) processes are 
slow, sequential, effortful, and related to cognitive abilities and thinking dispositions. An 
important function of Type 2 processes is to decontextualise (or "decouple") 
representations, in order to enable hypothetical thinking (e.g., Stanovich, 1999, 2006). 
However, most of the time Type 2 processes are merely used for the justification of 
heuristically cued, contextualised responses (Evans, 2006). 
Developmental research on reasoning has been relatively sparse. One possible 
reason for this might be the implicit assumption that, i f adults perform poorly on 
reasoning and decision-making tasks, children's performance must be even worse 
(Klaczynski, 2009). Another general assumption is that heuristic reasoning is simple and 
it appears early in the course of development, thus most theorists do not expect the 
heuristic system to change considerably with age (although see e.g., Reyna & Farley, 
2006; and Klaczynski, 2009, for exceptions). On the other hand, most theorists agree that 
explicit cognition develops with age, and this assumption has been tested in numerous 
studies. As a result of the almost exclusive focus on logical reasoning in developmental 
studies, there is an illusion that the development of reasoning proceeds from relatively 
illogical to relatively logical (e.g., Piaget, 1976). 
These ideas are also reflected in developmental dual-process theories. In general, 
these accounts assume that (in some form) both Type 1 and Type 2 processes are 
available at all points of development — at least after an eariy age (e.g., Jacobs & 
Klaczynski, 2002; Kokis, Macpherson, Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2002). They also 
agree that the efficiency and prevalence of Type 2 processing increases with 
development, and Type 2 processing is also associated with increases in cognitive 
capacity within a given age group (e.g., Handley, Capon, Beveridge, Dennis, & Evans, 
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2004; Stanovich & West, 2000). However, the evidence concerning age-related changes 
in Type I and Type 2 responding is mixed. Ahhough most evidence indicates age 
increases in normative responses, age can also be associated with increases in non-
normative responses and violations of formal rules of inference. Some studies have found 
that normative responding increased with age on certain tasks, but this increase was not 
apparent on other tasks (e.g., Klaczynski, 2001a; Kokis, et al., 2002). Although heuristic 
responding is expected to decrease with age, some studies have reported the opposite 
pattem. For example, Webley and Plaisier (1998) using a problem similar to Tversky and 
Kahneman's (1981) "lost ticket scenario" (see Figure 2.1.) found that older children 
(between the age of 8 and 12) were increasingly influenced by past investments whereas 
young children (age 5-6) were not. 
Lost money scenario Lost ticket scenario 
Imagine that you have decided to see a play 
where admission is SlO per ticket. As you enter 
the theater you discover that you have lost a SlO 
bill. 
Would you still pay $10 for a ticket for 
the play? 
Yes No 
Imagine that you have decided to see a play and paid the 
admission price of SlO per ticket. As you enter the 
theater you discover that you have lost the ticket. The 
scat was not marked and the ticket cannot be recovered. 
Would you pay S10 for another ticket? 
Yes No 
Figure 2.1. Lost ticket and lost money scenarios (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) 
According to traditional economic analysis, past investments should not influence 
present economic decisions. In Tversky and Kahneman's (1981) lost money/ticket task, 
there are two scenarios which are equivalent in terms of the expected utility and required 
financial investment. However, in one scenario (the lost ticket scenario) people associate a 
past investment with the ticket. In the lost money scenario, the past investment is not 
associated with the ticket. This gives people the impression that the actual price of the 
ticket is $10 in the lost money scenario, whereas it is S20 in the lost ticket scenario. As a 
result, 88% of participants in the original study were willing to pay for the ticket in the 
former, as opposed to only 46% in the latter case. The effect is based on making links 
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between events, that is a kind of contextualisation of the present situation, which seems to 
be absent in the case of young children (in Webley & Plaisier's, 1997, study 80% of the 
children indicated that they would buy the ticket in the lost ticket, and 70% indicated that 
they would buy the ticket in the lost money scenario). Interestingly, on the other end of the 
age scale, older adults are less influenced by past investments as indicated by their 
decreased susceptibility to the sunk cost effect as compared to young adults (Strough, 
Mehta, McFall, & Schuller, 2008). 
An increase in heuristic responding with age has been found in a number of other 
studies as well. Davidson (1995) reported that susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy 
increased during the elementary school years. Another study with elementary school 
children (Jacobs & Potenza, 1991) found that children increasingly relied on their own 
experience and anecdotal evidence as opposed to probabilistic information in making 
decisions about social situations, although in non-social situations the trend was the 
opposite (they increasingly favoured probabilistic information with age). Reyna and Ellis 
(1994) reported that the framing effect (i.e., people are more risky in the domain of losses, 
than in the domain of gains - see Section 1.1.1.) does not emerge until roughly 10 years of 
age. Age increases in the tendency to ignore denominators on ratio problems (see below -
e.g., Brainerd, 1981), and to draw non-logical "transitive" inferences (e.g., "A is a friend of 
B. B is a friend of C. Therefore, A and C are friends"; Markovits and Dumas, 1999) have 
also been reported. 
Klaczynski (2001) investigated early and middle adolescents' and adults' 
performance on three types of task: problems measuring the if-only fallacy (Denes-Raj & 
Epstein, 1994), the denominator neglect (Reyna, Lloyd & Brainerd, 2001), and the sunk 
cost fallacy (Frisch, 1993). The if-only fallacy occurs when behaviours are judged more 
negatively when in hindsight it seems that a negative consequence could have been easily 
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anticipated, and therefore avoided, in one of two logically identical, equally unpredictable 
situations. For example: 
IVhen parking his new car in a half empty parking. Tom's wife asked him to 
park in a spot close to where she wanted to shop. Instead, he parked in a spot 
closer to where he wanted to shop. Wlien he backed out after shopping, the car 
behind him backed out at the same time, and both cars sustained about $1000 
worth of damage. Robert parked his car in the same parking lot when there was 
only one parking place available. When he backed out after shopping, the car 
behind him backed out at the same time, and both cars sustained about $1000 
worth of damage. 
Despite the fact that in these stories Tom and Robert are arguably equally responsible 
for the accidents, participants typically attribute more foolish behaviour to Tom, because 
the circumstances make it look like as i f his conscious decision "caused" the accident (e.g., 
Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). 
An example for the denominator neglect task used in the study is the following: 
You are playing a lottery in which you can win $1000. There are two jars 
from which you can select a winning ticket. In the first jar, there are only 10 
tickets, and 7 of these is the winning ticket. In the second jar, there are J 00 
tickets and 10 winning tickets. 
Which jar, if either, would you select from to have a better chance of winning the 
lottery? 
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a. The jar wifh J winning ticket 
b. The jar with 10 winning tickets 
c. // would not matter to me 
Although the proportions of targets in options "a" and "b" are identical, both children 
and adults often fail to consider differences in denominators and favour the option C 'b") 
with the greatest absolute number of winning tickets. Interestingly, most participants 
choosing the heuristic response are aware that this does not make sense statistically (e.g., 
Pacini & Epstein, 1999). 
Finally, the examples below illustrate Xhe sunk cost effect. 
A. You are staying in a hotel room on vacation. You paid $10.95 to see a movie on pay 
TV. After 5 minutes, you are bored and the movie seems pretty bad. How much 
longer would you continue to watch the movie? 
B, You are staying in a hotel room on vacation. You turn on the TV and there is a 
movie on. After 5 minutes, you are bored and the movie seems pretty bad. How 
much longer would you continue to watch the movie? 
Response options for both scenarios were the following: 
a) stop watching entirely 
b) watch for 10 more minutes 
c) watch for 20 more minutes 
d) watch for 30 more minutes 
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e) watch until the end 
As is the case of the lost ticket scenario (see above), past investments should not 
influence present economic decisions. Because sunk costs (that is, the money paid for the 
movie, in this case) are irretrievable, they should be ignored. Thus, decisions in the two 
situations should be the same. However, participants tend to continue investing in a 
worthless case (i.e., watch the movie longer), when they invested resources in it already 
(i.e., when they paid for watching the movie). 
In ICIaczynski's (2001) study participants were given two problems of each type: two 
if-only, two denominator neglect, and two sunk cost problems. Each problem had three 
response options: a normatively correct one, a heuristic one, and a third option which was 
neither heuristic nor normatively correct. This made it possible to measure heuristic and 
normative responding partly independently. Afler each of the six problems, two "framing" 
instructions were presented. The intent of one instruction ("Think about this situation as 
you normally would.") was to elicit participants' default manner o f processing. The 
purpose of the other instruction ("Think about this situation from the perspective of a 
perfectly logical person") was to elicit analytic processing. Instructing participants to 
think logically increases normative responding (e.g., Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Ferreira, 
Garcia-Marques, Sherman & Sherman, 2006), presumably because the instructions 
increase the amount of mental effort that participants invest in solving the tasks. Another 
possible reason for the effect of instructions is that asking people to think logically 
sensitizes them to potential conflicts between logic and intuitions (Stanovich & West, 
2008; see also Section 1.2.2.). 
The main findings of Klaczynski's (2001) study were the following. Normatively 
correct responding increased with age on all tasks, although it was quite low generally (in 
the "think as you normally would" frame less than one third of the responses were 
normatively correct, even in the case of the older participants). Logical instructions 
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increased normative, and decreased heuristic responding in all age groups. Probably the 
most interesting finding of this study is that heuristic responding remained stable across 
age groups in the case of all of the tasks. The reason for this is that early adolescents often 
chose the neither heuristic nor normative response, but this tendency decreased with age. 
In sum, although logical competence, rule use, and normatively correct responding 
generally increases with development, heuristic use can also increase or remain stable 
across age groups. This results in "messy" developmental trajectories in children's 
performance on heuristics and biases tasks. In the next two sections 1 am going to describe 
three developmental dual-process accounts that have attempted to identify the driving 
forces behind these changes. 
2.1.2. Developmental dual-process theories 
One dual-process account (e.g., Kokis et al., 2002; Stanovich & West, 2000) in line 
with traditional theories of cognitive development (e.g., Piaget, 1976) asserts that 
children's reasoning becomes more analytical, complex, and abstract with age. Although 
these theorists acknowledge that some heuristic responses become more common with 
development, they propose that it might just be the by-product of task characteristics (e.g., 
studies using tasks that require specific knowledge, such as social stereotypes, that are not 
available for children under a certain age) rather than a reflection of actual developmental 
changes in children's reasoning abilities. Similarly, they argue that i f people are not aware 
of a relevant normative rule, they will not be able to use it, even i f they have the necessary 
cognitive capacity to inhibit heuristic responses (Stanovich & West, 2008). Although these 
theorists acknowledge that sometimes acquired beliefs can lead to errors and biases, this is 
restricted to certain types of self-serving "memes" or "memeplexes" (e.g., Blackmore, 
1999, Dawkins, 1993), which are also referred to as "contaminated mindware" (Stanovich 
et al., 2008). These include social rules and stereotypes that members of certain 
43 
communities are expected to identify with without questioning or rationally analysing 
them. 
According to these theorists, in addition to relevant knowledge, the connection 
between age and reasoning performance is mediated by cognitive abilities and thinking 
dispositions (i.e., how much people are inclined to think analytically and open-mindedly 
about problems regardless of their cognitive abilities), and normative responding replaces 
heuristic responses given enough cognitive capacity. They also propose that Type 2 
processes can become automatized with practice, leading to a greater coincidence of 
normative and heuristic responses as people get older. In this view, one of the most 
critical functions of Type 2 processes is to override Type 1 processing. This is based on 
two (possibly related) capabilities of Type 2 processing. One of these is to interrupt Type 
I processing, and to suppress Type I response tendencies (Stanovich, Toplak & West, 
2008). The other one is decoupling (e.g., Stanovich, 1999, 2006). Decoupling is a 
mechanism that enables people to maintain and manipulate internal representations in the 
presence of distracting interfering stimuli, which is essential for hypothetical thinking 
(although Type 2 thinking might be possible without decoupling as well - see e.g. 
Sianovich & West, 2008). 
Recently, Stanovich et al. (2008) suggested a taxonomy of heuristics and biases 
(see Table 2.1.), and reviewed the literature on reasoning development. The first category 
that they described was "cognitive miserliness", which is the tendency to invest as little 
cognitive effort in reasoning and judgements as possible. This can happen by defaulting 
to the response options primed by Type I processing, such as relying on vivid 
information, or attribute substitution (i.e., "answering an easy question instead of a hard 
one'* - Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Another example for cognitive miserliness is serial 
associative cognition with a focal bias - that is, the tendency to deal only with the most 
easily constructed cognitive model of a problem (for example, through displaying framing 
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effects). The next type of bias is "override failure", when sustained decoupling is not 
carried out. This type of bias requires the knowledge of the relevant rules and procedures. 
However, people fail to apply them properiy due to the high capacity demands of tasks 
(e.g., in the case of the belief bias in syllogistic reasoning). When people do not have 
relevant knowledge available, the source of error is "mindware gaps", rather than override 
failure. Mindware gaps are often responsible for fallacies in probabilistic reasoning (e.g., 
in the case of the conjunction fallacy) and critical thinking. Finally, i f people apply biased 
or inappropriate rules to solve a problem, then the source of the error is "contaminated 
mindware". "Contamination" can come from egocentric processing, or "unquestionable" 
belief systems of certain communities. 
Table 2.1. Stanovich et al. 's (2008) taxonomy of heuristics and biases. 
Categories of bias Examples 
1. The cognitive miser a)Default to Type 1 processing Attribute substitution 
b) Focal bias Framing effects 
2. Override failure Failure of sustained decoupling Belief bias, 
denominator neglect 
3. Mindware gaps a) Missing probability knowledge Conjunction errors 
b) Failure to consider alternative Wason selection task 
hypotheses 
4. Contaminated a) Evaluation disabling strategies Confirmation bias 
mindware b) Self and egocentric processing Myside bias 
This taxonomy of biases, however, does not imply some sort of developmental 
sequence. After reviewing the developmental literature on heuristics and biases, 
Stanovich et al. (2008) concluded that children show every one of the biases that have 
been identified in the adult literature. They also emphasize that age-related changes in 
45 
biases mirror the cognitive-ability related differences within a single age group. For 
example, there are developmental increases in the avoidance of belief bias, and analytic 
responding in the selection task, and individual differences in the performance on these 
tasks are related to cognitive abilities in adult samples. On the other hand, egocentric 
processing and framing effects do not show developmental changes, and these biases are 
also unrelated to cognitive ability. Stanovich et al. (2008) are aware of the developmental 
increase in certain heuristics reported in a number of studies. However, in their view the 
literature on developmental trends in the case of these tasks is "too inconsistent and 
sparse to warrant any conclusion at this point" (page 273). In addition, some biases (e.g., 
the conjunction fallacy) require the knowledge of social stereotypes that children might 
be unfamiliar with, thus they fail to display these biases due to their lack of relevant social 
knowledge. In sum, in this approach logical and analytical reasoning is expected to 
increase with age due to increases in cognitive capacity and knowledge of relevant 
normative rules and procedures, although some exceptions are possible. 
Another line of research (e.g., Jacobs & Klaczynski, 2002; Klaczynski, 2001b; 
IClaczynski, 2009) proposes that cognitive capacity and abstract reasoning competence are 
not good predictors of reasoning and decision making in real-life situations. Social, 
motivational, and affective influences, as well as prior beliefs, greatly affect the way 
people reason about problems. They also emphasize that an increasing number of 
heuristics are acquired over the course of development, and the use of these heuristics 
becomes more prevalent with age. This phenomenon appears to be linked to increases in 
knowledge of stereotypes and belief systems (e.g., religion). On the other hand. Type 2 
processing also develops. This approach, however, considers metacognilive abilities (i.e., 
monitoring, evaluating, and controlling information processing), rather than computational 
capacity perse, as the key determinant of normative performance. They propose that 
metacognition starts to shape reasoning around mid-adolescence (IClaczynski & Cottrell, 
46 
2004). Metacognition is mostly independent of cognitive abilities, and it is related to the 
tendency to inhibit heuristically cued responses, and also to consider alternatives 
(Klaczynski, 2005). However, this ability is not always used or ftilly developed even in 
adults. In fact, adults rely on heuristic processing most of the time. Given that people 
prefer cognitively economical strategies, the development of analytic competence must be 
accompanied by developments in tendencies to consciously utilize these competences (see 
also Stanovich and West, 1998, 2000; Stanovich, 1999). That is, analytic reasoning 
critically depends on the acquisition of dispositions to control impulsive actions, and on 
effortful processing (Klaczynski, 2009). 
In this approach, normative reasoning does not necessarily increase with 
development. What is developing is cognitive flexibility, and the variability of heuristics 
and cognitive strategies. One reason for this is that the repertoire of heuristics becomes 
more diverse and more easily activated with age, as memories accrue and as conscious 
strategies are transformed into automatic procedures. That is, people acquire more 
heuristics with development, and these heuristics can be activated more easily with age. 
Additionally, children sometimes seem more rational than adults, because they follow rules 
more rigidly, whereas adolescents and adults integrate rule understanding with contextual 
considerations. Consequently, the decisions they make are more likely to deviate from the 
relevant normative rules (Klaczynski, 2007; Kuhn, 2001). 
In summary, dual-process theorists claim that reasoning performance depends on a 
small number of factors, including cognitive capacity, metacognitive skills, dispositions 
(related to the tendency to invest cognitive effort), and knowledge/beliefs. In one approach 
(e.g., Kokis et al., 2002; Stanovich et al., 2008) the interaction between these factors is 
expected to result in an increase in normative responding with age, and they also predict a 
relationship between cognitive capacity and nonmative responding. According to another 
approach (e.g., Jacobs & Klaczynski, 2002) developmental patterns are less clear, and 
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cognitive capacity is not necessarily a good predictor of reasoning performance. However, 
normative responding is expected to increase after mid-adolescence due to the 
development of metacognitive abilities. 
2.1.3. The links between the development of memory and reasoning: The fuzzy-trace 
theory. 
A third developmental dual-process account is the fuzzy-trace theory (e.g., Brainerd 
& Reyna, 1992, 2001; Reyna & Ellis, 1994; Reyna & Farley, 2006). Fuzzy-trace theorists 
claim that the two processing modes are based on two different memory systems: one that 
contains precise "verbatim" representations (which preserves the surface information of the 
stimuli, and consequently it is more phenomenological - it corresponds to the actual, 
immediate experience of the stimuli), and one that consists of * 'fuzzy gists'' which 
preserve the underlying meaning o f a task (i.e., how we understand and interpret our 
experience). The latter is the primary (default) system which generates automatic 
inferences based on the relational and semantic properties of problems. This system 
flexibly changes with age, as individuals extract new meanings and structures all the time 
from the stimuli they encounter. As verbatim representations rapidly fade, judgment and 
decision making usually relies on gist representations (Reyna & Fariey, 2006). The 
secondary system is only used for solving problems which demand the application of 
specific rules to precise details (e.g., as in mathematics). Importantly, not only the contents 
of long-term memory change with development, but also the reasoning processes based on 
these fuzzy traces. Because of this, reasoning performance cannot be reliably linked to 
cognitive capacity. Fuzzy-trace theory differs from other dual-process models in its focuses 
on levels of rationality and intuition as advanced reasoning (Reyna & Farley, 2006). 
Fuzzy-trace theory also emphasizes two types of "quick and easy" thinking: one, which is 
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similar to the heuristic processing as described by other dual-process theories, and another 
one, which is a form of higher-order reasoning based on gist. 
The difference between the two types of quick and effortless reasoning lies in the 
ability of experts to quickly react to a small number of relevant cues (ignoring verbatim 
detail), whereas impulsive and inexperienced decision-makers react to misleading or 
irrelevant cues. For example, more knowledgeable physicians process fewer dimensions, 
and do this more qualitatively than do those with less knowledge and training. However, 
their decisions are more accurate (Reyna & Farley, 2006). Another example is 
developmental differences in risk-taking. Experimental evidence indicates that young 
children multiply probabilities with the number of prizes, that is, they quantitatively 
combine two dimensions (e.g., Schlottman, 2000). By contrast, older children and adults 
focus on a single dimension: outcomes (e.g., Reyna & Brainerd, 1995), making a more 
mature, risk-averse decision. 
The dissociation of the two systems is demonstrated by: (a) parallel storage of 
verbatim and gist traces (that is, we can remember surface characteristics of stimuli that 
we encountered, for example, font size and colour of a sentence that we have read, and 
independently of this we can also recall the meaning of the sentence); (b) dissociated 
retrieval of verbatim and gist traces; (c) differential survival rates for verbatim and gist 
traces (i.e., verbatim representations diminish with time, whereas "false memories" based 
on the gist increase); (d) retrieval phenomenology (i.e., the retrieval of the actual stimuli 
together with their perceptual properties - true recollection vs. the retrieval of the 
meaning of those simuW - phantom recollection); and (e) developmental variability in 
verbatim and gist memory. There is evidence that the accuracy of children's memory for 
problem information and the accuracy of their solving the same problems are dissociated. 
In addition, age-related changes in one type of memory are independent of changes in the 
other type of performance. In the preschool-to-young-adult age range both verbatim and 
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gist retrieval increases. The general pattern is that initial improvements in verbatim 
memory, during the preschool and early elementary-school years, are more pronounced 
than subsequent improvements (see Reyna, 1996). 
One way of studying the development of memory is to look at the spontaneous use 
of category clustering in free recall. Most children do not spontaneously do this before 
adolescence (e.g., Bjorklund & Jacobs, 1985). Another way of investigating verbatim and 
gist memory is by using the DRM paradigm (the DRM acronym is based on the names of 
Deese, 1959; and Roediger & McDermott, 1995, the developers of the procedure). It is a 
word learning paradigm in which subjects are presented with lists of words in which 
every word is an associate of a critical non-presented word. For instance people are 
presented with bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, snooze, blanket, doze, slumber, snore, nap. 
peace, but are never presented with the word that is related to all of these words sleep. 
The DRM paradigm produces high levels of false recognition and false recall of the 
critical non-presented word. Using the DRM paradigm, Brainerd et al., (2004) found that 
true recollection showed an increase between the age of 7 and 14 years, and the increase 
was more marked between 11 and 14 than between 7 and 11. By contrast, for phantom 
recollection, the increase was more marked between 7 and 11 than between 11 and 14. In 
the DRM paradigm, although the reported information is false, it is congruent with the 
gist of experience. 
This is not to say that false memories in general are more common in adolescence 
and adulthood than in childhood. A repeated finding about spontaneous false memories 
(e.g., remembering drinking a coke rather than water in a restaurant) is that they become 
less common between eariy childhood and young adulthood (for a review, see e.g., 
Reyna, 1996). When people recall past experiences false and true memories might emerge 
mixed together and they can create equal feelings of confidence. On the other hand, clear 
verbatim memories can be used to suppress false memories. Thus, older children and 
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adults are more likely to reject false memories because of their superior retention of 
verbatim traces over time. To put it in another way, verbatim processing supports bodi the 
acceptance of true events and the rejection of false ones that preserve the meaning of 
experience, whereas gist processing supports the acceptance of both true and false events. 
The interactions between the two systems can lead to U-shaped and inverted U-shaped 
pattems of development (as discussed by Brainerd, 2004). 
I f we compare the claims of the fuzzy trace theory with other developmental dual-
process theories, we can conclude that although these theories show marked differences, 
there is still some consistency in the claims they make (other than proposing that two 
separate processes form the basis of human reasoning). First of all, these theorists agree 
that both types of process are available at all points of development, although they go 
through changes, especially between eariy childhood and adolescence (in this review I did 
not discuss the changes in reasoning abilities at old age, but they more or less show the 
reverse of the changes in childhood - see e.g., DeNeys & Van Gelder, 2008). These 
theorists also agree that heuristics are independent of cognitive capacity, and that they 
work outside conscious control. In addition, they propose that Type 1 (i.e., quick, 
contextualised, automatic) processing is the default, but slow and effortful Type 2 
processes can override or suppress them. Finally, they all agree that Type 2 reasoning 
requires the decontextualization of problems (by means of decoupling, metacognitive 
operations, or by relying on the actual stimuli, and suppressing automatic inferences and 
personal interpretations of the problem). 
2.1.4. An alternative (single process) approach to the development of reasoning 
heuristics: the intuitive rules research program 
In this section I am going to briefly summarize a single system account of reasoning 
development, the intuitive rules research program (Stavy 8L Tirosh, 2000). In two recent 
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publications Osman (2004) and Osman and Stavy (2006) criticized dual-process theories 
on the basis that they cannot account for typical patterns of reasoning performance in 
developmental samples. The intuitive rules approach deals with the development of certain 
heuristics (i.e., intuitive rules) which are defined as self-evident and self-consistent 
cognitions (based on Fischbein, 1987). These rules are retrieved without conscious 
intention and they are activated by certain aspects of tasks (note the similarity with the 
ideas of default-interventionist dual-process theories and the fuzzy-trace theory). A 
distinctive feature of this theory is a focus on the importance of saliency, and a distinction 
between bottom-up and top-down saliency. Salient stimuli are arousing, they capture 
attention, and behavioural resources are preferentially directed toward them (Osman & 
Stavy, 2006). Bottom-up saliency is usually based on the similarity between items in a task. 
The more an item differs from other elements of a task, and the more easily a response 
based on that stimulus can be generated, the more salient it is. By contrast, top-down 
saliency is based on the number of times a particular stimulus has been experienced in a 
learning situation. I f a stimulus is strongly associated with a response, it wil l generate a 
response in novel situations, regardless of its relationship to other information provided in 
the task. 
Another interesting aspect of the intuitive rules approach is the distinction between 
implicit, explicit and automatic forms of reasoning, hi dual-process theories implicit and 
automatic reasoning would both be categorised as Type I processes. By contrast, according 
to the intuitive rules approach implicit and automatic processing correspond to the two 
extremes of the same continuum. In this view, implicit reasoning is based on weak 
representations that are not stable, and as a result they influence participants' behaviour 
without arousing the feelings of intention and conscious awareness. However, these 
representations are still capable of influencing explicit processes through priming. Explicit 
representations are stable, strong and distinctive, and as a result, they can be consciously 
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controlled and manipulated in working memory, and are available for declarative 
knowledge. Finally, automatic representations are also strong and stable, and thus 
accessible for consciousness. However, they became so strong through repeated activation 
that they are hard to control or modify (see Cleeremans & Jimenez, 2002; Osman & Stavy, 
2006). Automatic representations are considered to be the final products of cognitive 
development, and they form the basis of skill-based reasoning, and mental flexibility. 
Although the representations change with individuals' experiences, the ways that they can 
be utilized remain stable with development, and for this reason implicit, explicit and 
automatic representations are attributed to a single system. 
Task 1 (congruent) Task 2 (incongment) 
Figure 2.2. Examples for Brecher's (2005) ratio bias task. 
An example for a task which elicits bottom-up saliency effects is the ratio bias 
problem (e.g., Brecher, 2005). In this task the intuitive rule "more A - more B" is invoked. 
In Brecher's experiment participants were presented with a probability task in which they 
had to decide which one out of two boxes would give them a better chance of drawing a 
black counter from a mix of black and white counters (see Figure 2.1.). In this task the 
salient feature is the number of black counters, which is also affected by the proportion of 
black and white counters. In congruent tasks the box that contains more black counters also 
contains black counters in a higher proportion than white counters. By contrast, in the case 
of incongruent tasks the box that contains more black items contains black counters in a 
lower proportion. Task difficulty was also manipulated based on the difference between 
the number of black and white counters in the two boxes. 
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Given that the salient feature is the number of black counters, this task activates the 
"more A - more B " intuitive rule. Babai, Brecher, Stavy & Tirosh (2006) found that 
participants responded to congruent tasks more quickly and more accurately than to 
incongruent tasks. However, response speed and accuracy were also affected by the 
perceptual discriminability between the number of black and white counters. This indicates 
that the status of bottom-up salient task stimuli is dependent on their relationship to other 
presented stimuli. In the case of botlom-up saliency participants are unaware of how the 
relevant intuitive rule got activated, and thus they are unable to control i t . This is not to say 
that they are unaware of the perceptual stimuli that invoked the rule, as these are salient, 
and as such, are in the focus of attention. 
By contrast, top-down salient stimuli activate relevant rules automatically, which 
means that individuals are consciously aware of them, and they also possess meta-
knowledge about them. Osman and Slavy (2006) refer to the "same A same B'' rule as an 
example for an intuitive rule based on top-down saliency. This is also an example for how 
the same rule can be applied on range of different tasks, sometimes leading to correct, 
other times to incorrect responses. For example, Mendel (1998) presented students with a 
problem in which two rectangles were shown. Students were told that the second rectangle 
is a modified version of the first one, where the length of the rectangle was decreased by 
20% and the width was increased by 20% (see Figure 2.2.). Students were asked about the 
perimeters of the two rectangles (i.e., whether they were equal, or whether it was longer in 
the case of one of the rectangles). In this experiment participants had knowledge about the 
relevant rule (i.e., how to compute the perimeter of a rectangle), and the available 
perceptual information was also in line with the rule (i.e., that the perimeter of rectangle I 
was longer). However, instead of relying on either of these, over 70% of participants 
applied the "same A - same B" rule which is related to the acquisition and stabilization of 
the proportion scheme (see Fischbein & Schnarch, 1997). That is, they claimed that the 
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perimeters of the two rectangles were equal, because "adding 20% and removing 20% 
equals to no change". The fact that the justification in itself makes sense explains why it is 
so hard to eliminate biases based on top-down saliency. On the other hand, young children 
tend to respond to similar questions correctly, because they do not possess relevant 
knowledge, and thus they rely on perceptual information (and apply the "more A - more 
B" rule in the present case). This example also shows how saliency is influenced by 
cognitive development and children's knowledge. In addition, this also shows that salient 
features in themselves do not belong to a certain type of cognitive process, as it depends on 
the reasoners' experiences what sort of response they wi l l generate based on given stimuli. 
rectangle 1 rectangle 2 
Figure 2.3. Illustration of Mendel's (1998) rectangle task. 
In the example of the ratio bias task reducing the discriminability between salient and 
non-salient features leads to conflict at the perceptual level. However, it is also possible to 
create conflicts at the level of explicit rule use by presenting students with 
counterexamples. Finally, two intuitive rules can get activated simultaneously by different 
aspects of the same problem, and these can cue conflicting responses. As these examples 
show, the fact that children might experience conflict is, in itself, no evidence for the 
existence of two separate reasoning systems, or two separate types of process (Osman & 
Stavy, 2006). In the case of many tasks there are U-shaped developmental patterns, where 
young children and adults respond similarly, although for different reasons. U-shaped 
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developmental patterns are usually considered to provide evidence for the interaction 
between two systems (i.e., the gist and the verbatim system in the case of the fuzzy-trace 
theory, and automatic retrieval and effortful inhibition processes in the case of conditional 
reasoning - see Sections 2.1 and 2.2.). These patterns, however, are explained by changes 
in children's perceptions of tasks, and in their tendency to apply certain intuitive rules with 
age. 
The application of intuitive rules can be both positively and negatively related to 
cognitive capacity. For example Babai and Alon (2004) reported that the application of the 
"more A-more B" rule decreased with cognitive capacity. On the other hand, the use of the 
"same A-same B" rule (i.e., the equiprobability bias) and the "everything can be divided" 
rule increased with cognitive capacity. Given that the application of these rules can lead to 
both correct and incorrect responses depending on the task, there is no set relationship 
between cognitive capacity and normative responding. In addition, responding on a 
particular task can show U-shaped and inverted U-shaped patterns which is uninterpretable 
with regard to the monotonic increase of cognitive capacity throughout childhood and 
adolescence. 
In summary, the intuitive rules research program claims that children's reasoning 
performance is based on a single system. Representations gain strength with repeated 
exposure, and the procedures based on them can become conscious and eventually, 
automatic. With the strength of representations the awareness of them, as well as the ability 
to control them changes too. Finally, reasoning processes, as well as the intuitive rules that 
are implemented in a given situation change with children's experiences, their explicit 
knowledge, and the way problems are presented. The innaitive rules program can give an 
explanation of some typical developmental patterns in heuristic use (i.e., inverted U-shaped 
patterns), and they can also explain the inconsistent relationships between heuristic use and 
cognitive capacity. On the other hand, there are still some unresolved issues. For example, 
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can these rules be generalized to problems outside of the domain of learning about science? 
Another question is whether we can predict children's performance on novel tasks. It 
seems likely that a person using an intuitive rule erroneously in one context wil l be able to 
use the same rule to generate a correct response in the case of another task, where it is 
appropriate to use it. However, whether children employ a particular rule in the case of a 
task, depends on the context of the task as well, and children's previous experience with 
the task. Thus, it seems hard to apply the intuitive rules approach outside of the school 
environment where children's knowledge and their exposure to certain problems is similar 
within groups. 
2.2. The role of memory retrieval and contextualisation in logical reasoning: The 
case of conditional inferences 
This section gives a summary of the literature on conditional reasoning. In contrast 
to dual-process theorists, who consider contextualisation as a quick, and effortless process 
which usually hinders normative reasoning, the researchers of conditional reasoning 
propose that the retrieval and integration of relevant knowledge during reasoning is often 
efTortful, and it is also necessary for logical reasoning, and for hypothetical thinking. 
Researchers in this field also emphasize the importance of the maturation of inhibitory 
skills in the development of children's reasoning abilities. 
2.2. / The role of the activation and integration of real-life knowledge in everyday 
conditional reasoning 
Although, as we have seen, dual-process theorists agree that contextualised 
reasoning (the retrieval and integration of relevant knowledge with the content of 
problems) is quick and effortless, this idea is not shared by all researchers of reasoning. 
Conditional reasoning is the ability to reason on the basis of if-then" statements, and it 
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is considered to be one of the cornerstones of human cognition. However, the conditional 
inferences that we draw are not always logically appropriate (Evans & Over, 1996; 
Manktelow, 1999). One example is the modus ponens (MP) inference. Let's suppose that 
we are given the following statement: " I f it rains, James gets wet." and the additional 
information that "It rains.'* The logical inference to draw is that in this case James gets 
wet. However, people sometimes fail to draw this conclusion (e.g., Byme, 1989; 
Cummins, 1995; De Neys, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 2002; Markovits & Quinn, 2002; 
Thompson, 1994). The reason for this is that they can think of disabling conditions, which 
prevent James from getting wet, such as that he might have an umbrella with him. In this 
example real-life knowledge blocked a valid inference. On the other hand, background 
knowledge can also be used to reject an invalid inference. For example, let's suppose 
again that " I f it rains, James gets wet.", and also that we know that "James gets wet." We 
might draw the invalid (affirmation of the consequent - AC) inference that "It rains." 
However, we can again rely on our real-life knowledge and come up with an alternative 
cause, such as that "James has a bath." 
The effects of retrieved counterexamples on adults' reasoning are well established 
(for a view see Politzer & Bourmaud, 2002). The outcome of the counterexample search 
directly determines the extent to which inferences will be drawn. The more 
counterexamples retrieved, the less likely that a conclusion will be accepted (De Neys, 
Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 2003; Liu, Lo, & Wu, 1996). Consequently, we could expect 
that people who can retrieve more counterexamples will draw less MP and AC inferences. 
It is also known that the effective retrieval of information from long-term memory is 
related to working memory capacity in the case of both children and adults (e.g., De 
Neys, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 2002, 2005; Janveau-Brennan & Markovits, 1999). 
According to Barrouillet, Markovits and Quinn (2001) during reasoning the memory 
structures that are associated with the content of the problem are automatically accessed 
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and specific elements within this structure are activated (note the similarity with the 
assumptions of default-interventionist dual-process accounts, and the fuzzy-trace theory). 
Moreover, the less strongly a given element is associated with the context of the task, the 
more effort (i.e., cognitive resources) and time are necessary for them to be retrieved. In 
line with this, it has been also shown that higher ability people are more inclined to 
retrieve elements from their long-term memory that are more remotely associated with a 
given context (Verschueren, De Neys, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 2002). In addition, the 
efficiency of counterexample retrieval suffers from dual-task loads, which also indicates 
that working memory is involved in this process (De Neys, 2003). This is presumably 
because using counterexamples requires both an active controlled search process, and the 
integration of the premises with the retrieved counterexamples. When working memory 
capacity is burdened by preload some reasoners do not engage in the demanding process 
of consulting their background knowledge (Verschueren, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 
2005). 
I f conditional reasoning only depended on the successful retrieval and integration 
of real-life knowledge, this would mean that higher ability people would be more 
"logical" on AC problems, but less "logical" on MP problems than lower ability people. 
This is not quite the case. Counterexamples can be selectively retrieved or the retrieval 
process can be blocked depending on the reasoner's cognitive capacity, and whether they 
find the invited inference logically valid. Although the underlying processes are not frilly 
understood, it has been found that for conditionals with many disablers it is more likely 
that disablers will be retrieved inappropriately. In addition, high ability adults (i.e., people 
with higher working memory capacity) are more able to prevent the inappropriate 
retrieval of counterexamples than lower ability adults (e.g., De Neys, Schaeken, & 
d'Ydewalle, 2005; Markovits & Doyon, 2004; Verschueren, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 
2005). This corresponds to the idea that the main purpose of working memory is to 
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maintain information in the presence of distracting stimuli (see e.g., Kane & Engle, 
2002). 
In sum, adults' conditional reasoning seems to depend on the ability to selectively 
retrieve counterexamples depending on the logical status of the invited inference (e.g., De 
Neys et al., 2005; Quinn & Markovits, 2002). High ability people are more able to 
retrieve counterexamples, and they are also more able to discriminate between situations 
when counterexamples are needed, and when they are not. This difference in the ability to 
selectively retrieve knowledge depending on people's cognitive resources results in 
different patterns of relationship between cognitive ability and endorsement rates for MP 
and AC. AC inferences can be successfully blocked by the retrieval of counterexamples, 
so there wi l l be a linear relationship between cognitive ability and drawing AC inferences 
in the case of everyday conditionals. As higher ability people are more likely to 
successfully retrieve counterexamples, they wil l be more likely to reject the fallacious AC 
inference. For MP the pattern is more complex. Low ability people who are not very 
much able to generate counterexamples wil l be likely to (correctly) draw MP inferences. 
People with higher cognitive ability will be able to retrieve counterexamples, so they will 
be more likely to (incorrectly) block this inference. Finally, people with the highest 
cognitive ability will be able to recall counterexamples, but they wi l l also be able to block 
the retrieval of counterexamples, and reason on the basis of logic. This results in a U-
shaped relationship between cognitive ability and the endorsement of MP (De Neys, 
Schaeken & d'Ydewalle , 2003). 
2.2.2. Developmental research on conditional reasoning. 
Everyday conditional reasoning in adults seems to be based on a complex 
interplay between real-life knowledge, cognitive capacity and the understanding of logical 
necessity. Developmental studies have found that the retrieval of background knowledge 
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plays a crucial role in children's conditional reasoning as well. Janveau-Brennan and 
Markovits (1999), for example, reported that the better elementary school children were 
at generating alternatives for a set of conditionals in a pretest, the less they tended to 
accept the AC inference in a subsequent reasoning task. 
As cognitive development increases children's knowledge base and contributes to 
more efficient memory retrieval (e.g.. Kail, 1992), we can expect that the effect of real-
life knowledge wil l be more pronounced as children develop. In line with this prediction, 
a number of studies with preadolescents have found that when children reason with 
familiar everyday conditionals, acceptance rates of the AC and MP inferences show a 
steady decline between the age of 6 and 11 years of age (e.g., Janveau-Brennan & 
Markovits, 1999; Markovits, 2000; Markovits, Fleury, Quinn, & Venet, 1998; Markovits 
etaL, 1996). 
Markovits and Barrouillet (2002) suggested that the development of conditional 
reasoning is based on an interaction between retrieval and inhibition. However, these are 
not attributed to the same mechanism (i.e., working memory). The ability to retrieve 
counterexamples develops eariier, resulting in an initial decline in AC and MP inferences. 
However, after the onset of adolescence, children's inhibitory capacities become 
sufficiently strong to start overriding the impact of disablers. This leads to an increase in 
MP acceptance from eariy adolescence to late adolescence (e.g., Barrouillet, Markovits, 
& Quinn, 2001; Klaczynski & Narasimham, 1998; Markovits, 1995; Markovits & 
Vachon, 1989). 
A direct comparison of elementary school children and adolescents (between the 
age of 10 and 18) showed a U-shaped MP acceptance trend from preadolescence to later 
adolescence; and a stable decrease in AC acceptance from preadolescence to later 
adolescence (De Neys & Everaerts, 2008). In this study the availability of 
counterexamples was systematically manipulated, which made it possible to demonstrate 
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that inference acceptance in the individual age groups depended on the ease with which 
alternatives could be retrieved. On the basis of this we can refute an alternative 
explanation for the U-shaped developmental pattern in drawing MP inference. From a 
Piagetian point of view it would be possible to argue that the reason why children start to 
inhibit the effect of real-life knowledge on MP inferences around the age of 12 is that this 
is the time when they enter the formal operational stage. However, i f adolescents' 
reasoning would be determined purely by their ability to understand formal logic, the 
availability of disablers should not have an effect on their conclusions. Other studies have 
showed that young children (under the age of 12) are able to rely on logical rules during 
reasoning when they are explicitly instructed or trained to do so (e.g., Barrouillet et al., 
2001; Markovits & Vachon, 1989; Morris, 2000). Thus, the developmental patterns in 
conditional reasoning are unlikely to be simply based on changes in children's ability to 
grasp the concept of logical necessity. 
Although logical, hypothetical thinking might not be the Type 2 process that 
people most often engage in, it is still a very important ability that forms the basis of 
understanding modem science, for example. It also gives further insight into the role of 
retrieval and inhibition in reasoning, and also the development of inhibitory control. 
When we use empirically false (contrary to fact) premises, and ask people to reason on 
the basis of the premises, disregarding their beliefs, then they are invited to engage in 
hypothetical thinking. Let's suppose that " i f a feather is thrown at a window, then the 
window will break" is given, accompanied by instructions to reason on the basis of the 
premise regardless of it is being true or false. When the MP inference " i f a feather is 
thrown at a window, wil l the window break?" is made, only i f we can disregard our real-
life knowledge about feathers and windows, will we be able to respond with the logically 
correct inference "the window will break." However, i f we rely on our knowledge, we 
will respond that "the window will not break". On the other hand, giving the correct 
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uncertainty response to the AC inference ( " i f a window is broken, was a feather thrown at 
it?") requires access to information about alternative ways of breaking windows (e.g., 
throwing a brick). The results of Markovits (1995) and Simoneau and Markovits (2003) 
indicate that reducing the use of information that feathers do not break windows tends to 
be accompanied by a reduction in the use of information about other ways of breaking 
windows in both children and adolescents. Specifically, logical instructions with younger 
reasoners increase the proportion of logically correct responding to contrary to fact MP 
and MT forms and also increase the proportion of logically incorrect responses to the AC 
and DA forms. Markovits and Doyon (2004) explained this by suggesting that children 
use their ability to control interference in a global way, that is, they are unable to 
selectively activate relevant knowledge, whilst suppressing irrelevant associations. These 
results show that abstract reasoning can be facilitated by realistic context, that is, the 
development of abstract reasoning seems to be reliant on appropriate access to empirical 
knowledge (Venet & Markovits, 2001). 
Similarly, studies with adults have shown that activating information retrieval 
processes after logic instructions increases the tendency to make empirically appropriate, 
but logically invalid inferences (Markovits & Potvin, 2001). This is due to a failure to 
control the inappropriate activation of information (i.e., because of susceptibility to 
interference). This is supported by the finding that those adults who were more 
susceptible to interference in contrary to fact conditional reasoning were also more 
susceptible to interference on a different (negative priming) task (Simoneau & Markovits, 
2003). Although the instructions to reason logically do not explicitly indicate the 
necessity to inhibit real-life knowledge, the findings with both children and adults show 
that the inhibition of knowledge is the general response to such instructions. Another 
study also demonstrated the separate role of working memory and inhibition in reasoning. 
Handley et al. (2004), using both belief-neutral, believable and unbelievable conditional 
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reasoning problems, found that indices of belief bias and logical reasoning on belief-
based problems were predicted independently by both working memory and inhibition. In 
contrast, logical reasoning on belief neutral problems was predicted by working memory 
alone. A comparison between the developmental and the adult data shows an increasing 
selectivity of inhibition with age. This is considered as a very important aspect of 
cognitive development, and also a very important prerequisite of sound reasoning 
(Markovits & Doyon, 2004). 
In sum, conditional reasoning with both everyday and contrary to fact premises is 
based on an interplay between retrieval and inhibition (e.g., Handley et al. 2004; Janveau-
Brennan & Markovits, 1999). Differences in the development of these two abilities (De 
Neys & Everaerts, 2008; Markovits & Barrouillet, 2002), as well as the relationship 
between susceptibility to the intrusion of real-life knowledge and performance on an 
inhibition measure (Simoneau & Markovits, 2003) indicates that retrieval and inhibition 
are separate abilities. This corresponds to the notion that executive functions (working 
memory, inhibition and set-shifting) are not a unitary construct, although they are highly 
related (Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter & Wager, 2000). 
2.3. Research on the development of children's reasoning abilities - Summary 
In this chapter I have described a number of tasks which (together with other tasks 
that I introduced in Chapter I ) have been used to investigate children's reasoning abilities. 
I have also described the developmental trajectories of children's performance on these 
tasks. Although traditional theories of cognitive development (e.g., Piaget, 1976) assume 
that children's reasoning proceeds from relatively illogical to relatively logical (which has 
been termed "the illusion of replacement"- e.g., Reyna & Ellis, 1994), the actual 
developmental patterns seem to be more complex. For example, some heuristics and biases 
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remain stable with development (see e.g., Klaczynski, 2001), or they even increase with 
age (e.g., Davidson, 1995; Jacobs & Potenza, 1991). 
In Section 2.2. I have introduced three developmental dual-process accounts of 
reasoning. A l l of these theories propose that human reasoning is based on two separate 
systems: one which is effortless and automatic (Type I ) , and another one which is rule-
based and requires conscious attention (Type 2 processes). Moreover, all of these theorists 
agree that both types of process are available at any point of development, although these 
processes can also go through age-related changes (see Table 2.2. for the predicted 
developmental patterns, and the cognitive changes that elicit these developments). They 
also agree that the main function of Type 2 processing is to suppress the automatic response 
tendencies of Type I processes. According to one dual-process account (e.g., Stanovich et 
al., 2008) the main driving force behind age-related changes in reasoning is an increase in 
cognitive capacity which has a general effect on reasoning performance. By contrast, 
Klaczynski et al. (e.g., Klaczynski & Cottrell, 2004) emphasize the role o f real-life 
experiences in reasoning. Klaczynski and colleagues also claim that different experiences 
in different domains of knowledge can result in uneven levels of performance across 
different types of task. Moreover, they predict that children's reasoning performance 
changes considerably during adolescence due to the emergence of metacognitive abilities, 
and generally cognition becomes more flexible and versatile with development. In contrast 
with the above two accounts, the fuzzy-trace theory (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 1992, 2001) 
proposes that the maturation of cognition is characterized by the increasing dominance of 
the primary (gist-based) system, which consists of a collection of people's relevant 
experiences, and makes it possible for people to reason quickly, effortlessly and 
normatively in an increasing range of situations. Although Type 2 reasoning can be used to 
suppress Type I processing, these theorists emphasize that this process is slow, often 
ineffective, and error-prone. 
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Table 2.2. Developmental trajectories predicted by developmental dual-process theories, 
and the cognitive foundations of these changes. 
Developmental Normative Heuristic Development is driven by... 
theories of responding responding 
reasoning 
Stanovich Steadily increases Decreases or increases in cognitive abilit> 
et al. with age, or remains stable although thinking 
remains stable with age dispositions and relevant 
knowledge play a 
role as well 
IClaczynski Can increase, decrease or Can increase. the development of 
et al. remain stable with age. decrease or metacognitive 
although it is expected to remain stable abilities, and thinking 
increase during adolescence with age dispositions, together with 
real-life experiences 
Reyna Increases with age. inverted changes in representations 
et al. or U-shaped U-shaped as a result of experiences; 
pattern pattern increasing reliance on gist 
processing 
Although dual-process theorists agree that contextualised reasoning (the retrieval and 
integration of relevant knowledge with the content of problems) is quick and effortless, this 
idea is not shared by the researchers of conditional reasoning. In this view (at least in the 
case of certain types of problem) contexUialisation is necessary for normative reasoning, it 
is positively related with cognitive capacity (especially working memory capacity), and 
contextualisation also plays an important role in the development of hypothetical thinking. 
On the other hand, they agree with dual-process theories that the retrieval of real-life 
knowledge has to be blocked in some cases, in order to reason in line with standard logic, 
and the ability to suppress the retrieval of counterexamples is related lo cognitive capacity 
(specifically, inhibition). Similarly to Klaczynski (2009) they expect a change in reasoning 
performance during adolescence as a result of the maturation of inhibitory processes. They 
also share some ideas with the fuzzy-trace theory, in that they propose that when reasoning 
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performance is based on a retrieval and inhibition interaction, developmental patterns will 
show (inverted) U-shaped pattems. 
In Section 2.1.4. I also introduced an altemative, single process account of the 
development of reasoning heuristics, the intuitive rules approach (e.g., Osman & Stavy, 
2006). These theorists predict similar developmental pattems as the frizzy trace theory. 
However, they claim that there is no need to presuppose two systems in order to be able to 
explain U-shaped and inverted U-shaped developmental pattems, or the fact that people 
sometimes experience a conflict when they reason about problems. 
In Chapter 3 1 am going to describe some studies which were done with children 
from a broad age range (between the age of 5 and 16). Besides a wide range of reasoning 
tasks (adapted from the heuristics and biases literature), in these studies we also 
administered a number of cognitive ability measures (i.e., measures of IQ, inhibition, 
verbal and non-verbal working memory, fluid intelligence, and set-shifting). The purpose 
of these studies was: 1. to investigate developmental pattems from age 5 to 16 on a range 
of typical heuristics and biases tasks; 2. to see how developmental pattems of the 
performance on these tasks are related to changes in cognitive abilities; and 3. to contrast 
the predictions of difTerent theories and to see which one ( i f either) describes our empirical 
findings most appropriately. As the development of reasoning heuristics is an under-
researched area, and the results of existing studies are inconsistent, the studies that 1 
describe in Chapter 3 were conducted with an exploratory purpose. However, I wi l l also 
contrast the findings of these studies with the predictions of existing theories of reasoning 
development. 
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Chapter 3. The development of heuristic reasoning in childhood 
and adolescence (Experiments 1-3.) 
3.0. Introduction to Chapter 3. 
In this chapter 1 describe three experiments which were carried out with children 
from a wide age range. The studies used typical heuristics and biases tasks (similar to the 
tasks introduced in Chapters I and 2). The purpose of these studies is: 1. to determine the 
developmental trajectories of some well-known heuristics and biases tasks between eariy 
childhood and late adolescence (i.e., between the age of 5 and 16); 2. to investigate the 
relationship between these changes, and some aspects of cognitive functioning (most 
importantly, general intelligence, working memory, and executive functioning); and 3. to 
compare the predictions of different developmental theories of reasoning, and to see how 
well they describe the empirical findings of these studies. 
The first experiment investigates the performance of children between the age of 5 
and 11 on a number of heuristics and biases tasks, in this experiment we also measured 
children's general intelligence (using a short form of the WISC), and their working 
memory. In the second experiment we used the same tasks, but the participants were a 
group of children between the age o f 12 and 16, and in addition to measuring their general 
intelligence and working memory, we also measured their inhibition skills and set-shifting 
ability (the latter three tasks were designed to assess the three main aspects of executive 
functioning - see Miyake et al., 2000). We employed these new tasks because many 
reasoning theorists predict a sudden improvement in reasoning performance around 
adolescence, which is possibly related to the maturation of executive ftinctioning. 
Finally, the last experiment was also carried out with adolescents (between the age of 
12 and 16), but we used a new set of tasks. Moreover, each type of task was presented in 
two different versions: one, where intuitions and normative considerations pointed to 
different responses (i.e., conflict tasks, or experimental tasks - similar to the tasks used in 
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Experiments I and 2), and another version, where there was no conflict between intuitions 
and normative rules (i.e., non-conflict, or control tasks). The purpose of using both conflict 
and non-conflict tasks was to get a clearer picture of how much adolescents are inclined to 
rely on certain normative rules (for example how much they consider base rate 
information) when these are not in conflict with some more salient information (for 
example, stereotypes activated by a person's description). In this experiment we also used 
a new set of individual differences measures. Apart from children's general intelligence 
and verbal working memory scores, we also measured their analogical reasoning ability 
(using the Raven test, picture analogy problems, and scene analogy problems). 
3.1. Experiment I: Changes in reasoning performance on some typical heuristics 
and biases tasks betiveen the age of 5 and II. 
Dual-process theories of reasoning (e.g., Evans & Over, 1996; Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002; Stanovich, 1999 - see also Chapter 1 for a more detailed review and 
evaluation) presuppose two distinct processing modes. System I processes are fast, 
automatic, effortless, independent of cognitive abilities, and contextually cued, whereas 
System 2 processes are slow, effortful, related to cognitive abilities and dispositions, and 
context independent. Most of the time, the two systems offer the same solution to problems 
(Klaczynski, 2001; Moshman, 2000; Stanovich, 1999). This is because heuristics are very 
useful and effective when used in the right situation. In addition, System 2 processes can 
become automatized through practice; thus, they can function in the manner of heuristics. 
Nevertheless, there are so-called conflict problems where heuristic and normative 
responses are mutually exclusive (this is the case in the typical tasks used in the heuristics 
and biases literature). In these cases, the heuristic response is assumed to be the default 
because it is fast and automatic (Evans & Over, 1996). Moreover, heuristic responding 
remains predominant in all age groups (Klaczynski, 2001). According to default 
interventionist models (Evans, 2006; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), the heuristic system 
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delivers contextualized representations of problems and cues intuitive responses to them. 
However, these quick heuristic responses can be overridden by analytic processing given 
sufficient cognitive capacity and certain mental dispositions (Stanovich & West, 2000). In 
another approach (e.g., Klaczynski, 2001, Sloman, 1996), the two systems function 
independently and deliver their own solutions to problems. Then metacognitive skills and 
inhibitory processes are needed to allow System 2 responses to shape behaviour instead of 
the quick and effortless processes of System I . (See more on this in Section 1.2.1.). 
The focus of this experiment is on the development of heuristic and analytic 
responding and specifically on the relationship between cognitive capacity and these types 
of responses among children. Although research in this area is limited, dual-process 
theories have nevertheless been applied to the development of children's reasoning (see 
also Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3.). In general, these accounts assume that (in some form) both 
processing modes are available at all points of development—at least after an early age 
(e.g., Jacobs & Klaczynski, 2002; Kokis et al., 2002). They also agree that the efficiency 
and prevalence of analytic processing increases with development and it is associated with 
increases in cognitive capacity within a given age group (e.g., Handley et al., 2004; 
Stanovich & West, 2000). 
The evidence concerning age-related changes in heuristic and analytic responding is 
mixed. Some studies have found that analytic responding increases with age on certain 
tasks, but this increase is not apparent on other tasks (e.g., Klaczynski, 2001; Kokis et al., 
2002). Although heuristic responding is expected to decrease with age, some studies have 
reported the opposite pattem. There are three mainstream developmental dual-process 
accounts that have attempted to explain these findings. One of these accounts (e.g., Kokis 
et al., 2002) assumes a reduction in heuristic responding with age driven by increases in 
cognitive ability. The other accounts (e.g., Klaczynski & Cottrell, 2004; Reyna & Ellis, 
1994) propose that some heuristic responses wi l l become more prevalent with age 
regardless of cognitive ability. However, all dual-process theorists agree that heuristics are 
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independent of cognitive capacity. In addition, they all propose that analytic reasoning 
requires the decontextualization of problems (by means of decoupling, metacognitive 
operations, or the extraction of gist representations). 
Nevertheless, there is some reason to suppose that the contextualization of problems 
(the retrieval and application of relevant knowledge) might not be automatic and effortless 
(see Section 2.2. for a review and discussion of the evidence from the research on 
conditional reasoning). Working memory has been found to be linked to effective retrieval 
of information from long-term memory in the case of children (e.g., Janveau-Brennan & 
Markovits, 1999). According to Barrouillet et al. (2002), during reasoning the memory 
structures that are associated with the content of the problem are automatically accessed 
and specific elements within this structure are activated. The less strongly a given element 
is associated with the context of the task, the more effort (i.e., cognitive resources) and 
time are necessary for it to be retrieved. In addition, there is evidence that abstract 
reasoning is facilitated by realistic content (see Section 2.2.2.). Despite the abstract nature 
of the premises, the development of abstract reasoning has been found to be reliant on 
appropriate access to empirical knowledge (Venet & Markovits, 2001). Similarly, in adults 
working memory capacity is related to the successful activation of relevant background 
knowledge when people reason with familiar causal conditionals (De Neys, et al., 2005), 
and higher ability people are also more inclined to retrieve elements from their long-term 
memory that are more remotely associated with the given context (Verschueren, et al., 
2002). Thus, there is evidence that cognitive abilities (i.e.. System 2 processes) not only 
play a role in abstract, hypothetical, logical thinking but they are also needed for reasoning 
about contextualized problems. 
Taking into consideration all of the above, there are three contrasting predictions that 
can be made about the relationship between cognitive capacity and children's reasoning. 
Dual-process theories claim that heuristic and analytic responses are the result of 
independent processing modes. One dual-process account (e.g., Kokis et al., 2002) 
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presupposes a negative relationship between cognitive capacity and heuristic responding, 
whereas other accounts (e.g., Klaczynski & Cottrell, 2004; Reyna & Ellis, 1994) claim that 
there will be no relationship between the two at all. As a third possibility, because heuristic 
responding is based on the contextualization of problems, we can predict that it wil l be 
dependent on general cognitive resources. Although the relationship between the different 
processing modes and cognitive capacity has been examined widely in adult populations, 
and to some extent in adolescent samples as well, so far it has not been investigated in the 
case of children. This is possibly because most theorists consider heuristic processing to be 
basic and hardwired, and the apparent emergence of new heuristics with development is 
attributed to knowledge acquisition, rather than to the development of new ways of 
combining information (see e.g., Stanovich et al., 2008; an exception from this trend is the 
fuzzy trace theory where the emergence of heuristics is attributed to the development of 
gist memory systems). 
In this study, we examined primary school children's performance on reasoning and 
decision-making problems on which there are clearly classifiable heuristic and analytic 
responses. In addition, a series of measures of cognitive capacity were included to 
determine which of the approaches described above accounts for the development of 
children's thinking the most adequately. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 84 school children recruited from two local primary schools. Our 
sample consisted of 42 girls and 42 boys, between 5 years 2 months and 11 years 7 months 
of age, with a mean age of 8 years 6 months. We had roughly equal numbers of children 
from all year groups of primary school (i.e., 10-15 children from Year I to Year 6). The 
schools received goodwill payment for participating in the study. 
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Materials 
Cognitive capacity measure: Participants completed a short form of the Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Children-Ill (WISC-III; Wechsler, 1991) consisting of the 
Vocabulary and Block Design subtests. This particular short form is reported to have the 
highest validity and reliability compared with any other two subtest short forms of the 
WISC (Sattler, 1992). Because we were interested in the children's absolute computational 
capacity rather than their IQs, we used the raw scores on the tasks for our analyses. We 
also used the counting span task, a working memory measure with a processing and 
storage component (see also Handley et al., 2004). The task consists of a processing 
component that requires counting the number of coloured dots presented on a computer 
screen and a storage component that involves the storage of the products of a series of 
these counting operations. Children were presented with a series of cards on a computer 
screen, each card showing a number of blue and red coloured dots in a randomly 
determined irregular pattern. The children's task was to count out loud the number of red 
dots from each card. Participants received a practice set of two cards followed by three 
trials consisting of two cards, three trials of three cards, three trials of four cards, and three 
trials of five cards. That is, there were four levels of difficulty, and three series of trials at 
each level. After each series of trials the children had to recall the number of dots on each 
card in the order they were presented. Al l children worked through all of these trials, 
regardless of performance. A working memory global score was calculated by adding up 
the number of instances when the child recalled the number of dots on the preceding cards 
in the correct order. In the Handley et al. (2004) study the span score was used as a 
measure of performance (where children have to complete at least two series of trials 
correctly at each level, so that they get a span score for that level, and to move on to the 
next level). The disadvantage of this method is that it is conservative and it can possibly 
underestimate children's actual working memory capacity. Thus, we decided to use the 
global score in the present study. That is, children were given one point for each series of 
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trial where they were able to recall the results of the preceding operations in the correct 
order, regardless of their performance on previous series of trials. We used the combined z 
scores of the WISC and the counting span task as an indicator of cognitive capacity. 
Reasoning and decision-making tasks: The four types of reasoning and decision-making 
tasks we used are known to elicit a high proportion of heuristic responses in the case of 
adults. We used two conjunction fallacy tasks, two if-only fallacy tasks, tv^o sunk cost 
fallacy tasks, and four syllogistic reasoning tasks. The tasks were adapted from Epstein, 
Lipson, Holstein, and Huh (1992), Klaczynski and Cottrell (2004), Kokis et al. (2002), and 
Tversky and Kahneman (1983), and they were developed to ensure that they were 
appropriate for a developmental sample. We presented the stories as a PowerPoint slide 
show that included photographic illustrations, and the text was read by the experimenter. 
Participants were given a booklet with the response options for each task, and they 
responded by circling what they believed to be the most appropriate response. Before 
asking the children to circle the most appropriate response, we gave them a brief summary 
of the story to lessen the memory requirements of the task. In the case of three problems 
(the if-only fallacy, sunk cost fallacy, and syllogistic reasoning tasks), there were three 
response options: normative, heuristic, and ''other." On the conjunction fallacy task, there 
were only two response options: heuristic and normatively correct. Al l o f the tasks we used 
were so-called "conflict" problems; that is, heuristic and normative responses were 
mutually exclusive. We formed a heuristic, normative, and "other" composite score by 
converting the raw scores on the reasoning and decision-making tasks to z scores and 
adding these up. In what follows, we give a short description of each type of task (the rest 
of the tasks can be found in Appendix A). 
The conjunction fallacy (adapted from Tversky &, Kahneman, 1983) violates the 
simplest and most fundamental rule of probability, that the likelihood of two independent 
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events occurring the same time (in "conjunction*') should always be less than or equal to 
the probability of either one occurring alone. However, reasoners generally fail to take this 
into consideration when the conjointly presented information meets their expectations 
more than just one piece of information alone. Here is an example of one of the 
two tasks that we used to measure the conjunction fallacy: 
Sarah is 12. She is very talkative and sociable. She goes to drama classes and she learns 
to play the guitar. She wants to be a pop singer or an actress. 
(The following part was included in order to give children a chance to practice allocating 
liking ratings to the statements. As they had to circle a single answer in the case of the 
other tasks, it seemed necessary to highlight that they had to respond to this task in a 
different way.) 
Now, let's see an example first. Mark the sentence which you think is more likely to be 
tme with number 1 and the one which is less likely to be true with number 2. 
(a) Sarah doesn 7 have many friends. 
(b) Sarah likes music. 
Now read the following statements. Your task is to mark the statement which is the 
most likely to be true with number 1, the next one with number 2, and so on. Mark 
the statement which is the least likely to be true with number 4. 
(a) Sarah has lots of CDs and DVDs. 
(b) Sarah likes to cook. 
(c) Sarah has many friends at school. 
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(d) Sarah likes to cook and she collects pop magazines. 
Children who considered sentence (d) more likely to be true than sentence (b) 
committed the conjunction fallacy and were given a heuristic point. Those who considered 
the second sentence more likely to be true than the last one were given a normative point. 
In the case of this task, there was no third response option. 
The if-only fallacy (EpsiQin, Lipson, Holstein, & Huh, 1992) is based on 
counterfactual thinking. Counterfactual thoughts are thoughts about ''what might have 
been," and they usually emerge when something bad happens (Byrne, 2002). They help 
people to leam from their experiences, but they also lead to cognitive biases such as the if-
only fallacy, which gives the person the illusion that a certain negative outcome was 
inevitable under given circumstances and so could have been foreseen and prevented from 
happening. A task that cues this kind of reasoning that we used in the current study is the 
following: 
Tom went camping with his family and he put his bike inside the caravan. His mother 
told him to put his bike on the roof rack like his sister did, but he didn 7 listen to her. As 
luck would have it, Tom's bike got broken. Now listen to the next story. Robert went 
camping with his family and he put his bike inside the caravan. He had to put it in there 
because there was a kayak on the roof rack. As luck would have it, Robert's bike got 
broken. What do you think about the two stories? 
(a) Tom made a worse decision than Robert. 
(b) Robert made a worse decision than Tom. 
(c) It wasn 7 their fault, it was just bad luck. 
The third response is considered to be the normatively correct one (Epstein et al., 
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1992). A heuristic response here is i f one thinks that the first boy made a worse decision 
than the second one. It is easier to understand why this response is not normatively 
correct i f we put the question this way: "Who made a better decision?" In this case, the 
majority of participants would agree that neither of the boys made a better decision, and 
they would be inclined to choose the normative response (ICIaczynski & Cottrell, 2004). 
An "other" response is to say that the second boy made a worse decision than the first 
one. 
The sunk cost fallacy (adapted from ICIaczynski & Cottrell, 2004) occurs when 
people base their current decisions on inconsequential past decisions. A goal in which 
people invested much time, money, and/or effort turns out to be worthless and not 
desirable anymore. In this situation, they can choose between investing even more personal 
resources in the goal to reach it anyway ("throwing good money after bad") or they can 
abandon it, letting the previously invested resources go to waste (but at the same time 
saving further investments in a worthless goal). A task that cues the sunk cost fallacy is the 
following: 
You bought a cinema ticket from your pocket money. You paid £5. You start to watch 
the movie, but after 5 minutes you are bored and the film seems pretty bad. How much 
longer would you continue to watch it? 
(a) 10 more minutes 
(b) 30 more minutes 
(c) watch until the end 
Now listen to the next story. You ve got a free cinema ticket voucher and you go to the 
cinema and get a ticket for it. You start to watch the movie, but after 5 minutes you are 
bored and the film seems pretty bad. How much longer would you continue to watch it? 
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(a) 10 more minutes 
(b) 30 more minutes 
(c) watch until the end 
As sunk costs are not retrievable anymore, they should be ignored. Therefore, 
decisions in the two situations should be the same whether one paid for the ticket or 
not. This is considered to be the normative answer. The "waste not" heuristic (Arkes 
& Ayton, 1999) dictates that people continue to watch the movie longer i f they paid for 
the ticket. An "other" response is i f one decides to watch it longer when the ticket 
was for free. 
The syllogistic reasoning tasks (adapted from Kokis et al., 2002) required children to 
judge whether different types of inferences—modus ponens (MP), modus tollens (MT), 
denial of the antecedent (DA), and affirmation of the consequent (AC)—led to valid or 
invalid conclusions (which were either believable or unbelievable). The tasks measure the 
belief bias (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983), which is the tendency to accept believable 
conclusions and reject unbelievable ones irrespective of logical validity. Participants 
solved an MP ( i f p, then q; p, therefore q), an MT ( i f p, then q; not q, therefore not p), an 
AC ( i f p, then q; q, therefore p), and a DA ( i f p, then q; not p, therefore not q) syllogism. 
MP and MT are valid syllogisms, so the normative answer to them is to accept the 
conclusion. AC and DA, however, are invalid syllogisms, and the normatively correct 
answer to them is "not certain." Apart from the normative point, children were also given 
a belief point whenever they accepted a believable conclusion or rejected an unbelievable 
one. Al l of these syllogisms were conflict problems; that is, there was a conflict between 
the believability and the validity of the conclusion. Thus, higher amount o f belief-based 
responses on these tasks indicated lower adherence to logical necessity. 
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Before starting the task, children were given instructions emphasizing that they 
needed to accept the premises as true even i f they sounded strange or fiirmy, and then they 
needed to think about whether the conclusion followed from the premises or not. They had 
three response options from which to choose: "yes," "no," and "not certain." The 
instructions stated that children needed to circle "yes" i f they thought that the conclusion 
definitely followed from the premises, they needed to circle " n o " i f they thought that the 
conclusion did not follow from the premises, and they needed to circle "not certain" i f 
they thought that it was possible that the conclusion followed from the premises but there 
was still a possibility that it did not. These options were illustrated on an example problem. 
Then the following script was read out for the children: 
Scientists have discovered a planet in our galaxy which has animals and plants living on 
it. This planet is similar to Earth in many respects, but there are some differences as 
well. I give you some questions. Please choose the answer which describes the animals 
and plants living on this planet the best. 
Children were given two practice problems first, after which they solved the actual 
tasks. Here is an example for an unbelievable valid syllogism: 
On this planet flowers have thorns on them. 
Daffodils are flowers. 
Does it follow that on this planet daffodils have thorns on them? 
yes no not certain 
Children were given a normative point i f they circled "yes," they were given a belief 
point i f they circled "no," and they were given an "other" point i f they circled "not 
certain." 
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Procedure 
Participants took part in two testing sessions, each lasting approximately 25 minutes. 
Session 1 consisted of two conjunction fallacy tasks, two counterfactual reasoning tasks, 
two sunk cost fallacy tasks, and four syllogistic reasoning tasks. Participants were tested in 
groups of five to eight. Session 2 consisted of the counting span task and the Vocabulary 
and Block Design subtests of the WISC-III. On the second occasion, participants were 
tested individually. 
Results 
In order to analyze age trends in giving heuristic, normative, and "other" responses to 
the reasoning and decision-making tasks, we divided our sample into three age groups. The 
age groups correspond to years 1-2, 3-4, and 5-6 in the British primary school system. The 
mean age of the children was 6 years 7 months in age group 1, 8 years 6 months in age 
group 2, and 10 years 5 months in age group 3. Table 3.1. presents the mean number of 
heuristic, normative and "other" responses on the tasks across the three age groups. There 
appears to be a tendency for heuristic responding to increase, and normative and "other" 
responding to decrease with age across the tasks. 
ANOVAs conducted on the number of heuristic, normative and "other" responses on 
the syllogistic reasoning task across age groups indicated a main effect o f age in the case of 
the heuristic responses F(2,83)=5.24, p<.OI, r}p^=.\2, and the "other" responses 
/^(2,83)=4.61, /?<.05, r}p^= .10 , but the main effect of age for the normative responses was 
not significant, F(2,83)=3.07, /7=.052. In the case of the sunk cost fallacy, the main effect 
of age on "other" responses was significant F(2,83)=3.68, p<.05, ^^^=.08, but it was not 
significant for the heuristic, F(2,83)=l.7, p= 19, or the normative responses, F(2,83)=25, 
p=.7S. On the if-only fallacy task there was a significant main effect of age on the heuristic 
F(2,83)=6.72, /><.01, 14, and the normative F(2,83)=4.8, /K.05, tjp^=.\ 1, but not on 
the "other" responses F(2,83)=.39, p=.6S. The main effect of age on the heuristic and 
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normative responses in the case of the conjunction fallacy task was significant 
F(2,83)=8.73,/7<.0I, /7p^=.l8, for both response types. 
Table 3.1. The mean proportion of heuristic, normative and "other" responses on the 
different tasks across the three age groups. 
Age group 1 
(n=30) 
Age group 2 
(n=26) 
Age group 3 
(n=28) 
Syllogistic Heuristic .29 (.26) .48 (.25) .48 (.25) 
reasoning Normative .36 (.23) .22 (.20) .35 (.26) 
"Other" ,35 (.21) .30 (.26) .17 (.19) 
Sunk cost Heuristic .42 (.42) .45 (.38) .59 (.33) 
fallacy Normative .27 (.36) .32 (.34) .30 (.32) 
"Other" .31 (.38) .23 (.26) .11 (.21) 
If-only Heuristic .18 (.25) .40 (.38) .50 (.38) 
fallacy Normative .65 (.27) .50 (.40) .40 (.35) 
"Other" ,17 (.23) .10 (.20) .10 (.28) 
Conjunction Heuristic .68 (.31) .86 (.30) .96 (.13) 
fallacy Normative .32 (.31) .14 (.30) .04 (.13) 
Overall Heuristic .39 (.31) .55 (.33) .63 (.27) 
Normative .40 (.29) .30 (.31) .27 (.27) 
"Other" .28 (.27) .21 (.24) .13 (.23) 
We also conducted an ANOVA on the heuristic, normative and "other" composite 
scores (i.e., the sum of the z scores of heuristic, normative and "other" responses on the 
different tasks) across age groups, and this indicated a main effect of age on each type of 
response F(2,83) =13.82,/7<.01, /7/=.25; F(2,83)=5.29,/?<.01, ///=.12, and F(2,83) =5.24, 
p <.01, v / = . 12, respectively. Tukey post-hoc tests revealed that the children in age group 1 
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gave significantly fewer heuristic responses and significantly more normative responses 
than the children in age group 2. In addition, children in age group 1 gave significantly 
more "other" responses than children in age group 3. No other specific post-hoc contrasts 
were significant. 
Thus, the discrete ANOVA analyses indicated significant age-related changes on the 
different types of responses for most of the reasoning and decision-making tasks, and the 
non-significant trends were also in the same direction. The analyses on the composite 
scores showed a tendency for heuristic responding to increase, and normative and "other" 
responding to decrease with age. The post-hoc comparisons indicated that the changes in 
heuristic and normative responding occurred mostly between the ages of 6 years 7 months 
and 8 years 6 months, whereas the changes in "other" responding took place gradually 
between the ages of 6 years 7 months and 10 years 5 months. 
Relationships between the individual differences measures 
The next set of analyses examined the relationship between age (in months) and 
cognitive ability (as indicated by the counting-span task, and the short form of the WISC-
III). First we calculated the reliability of the counting-span tasks by performing a split-half 
correlation between odd and even trials between each set level, and then we used the 
Spearman-Brown formula to give an estimate of the reliability of the task. The reliability 
of this measure was 0.77, which is at an acceptable level. 
Table 3.2. Correlations between the individual differences measures. 
r 2. I 
1. age in months 
2. working memory .66** 
3. WISC score .78** .78** 
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Next we combined the WISC score and the working memory score into a single 
variable, by computing the combined z score for these measures. The vocabulary subtest of 
the WISC is a good indicator of crystallized intelligence, whereas the block design and the 
working-memory tasks are measures of fluid intelligence (see e.g., Blair, 2006). The 
shared variance between the two scores (i.e., the WISC score, and the counting span score) 
was also indicated by a considerable correlation between the two measures (see Table 
3.2.). We also found a significant correlation between age and the combined cognitive 
ability measure (r=.78,/7<.001 ). 
Relationships between age, cognitive ability and the type of responses given 
As a next step we examined the correlations between the individual differences 
measures and the three types of responses (heuristic, normative, and "other") on the 
reasoning and decision-making tasks (the results are displayed in Table 3.3.). Heuristic 
responding on three tasks (the exception being the sunk cost fallacy) increased 
significantly with age. Moreover, heuristic responding on all tasks was positively 
correlated with cognitive abilities. Normative responding was either unrelated to age and 
cognitive abilities (as in the case of the syllogistic reasoning and the sunk cost fallacy 
task), or it was negatively correlated with both age and cognitive abilities. In the case of 
the conjunction fallacy, there were only two response options, thus, the decrease in 
normative responses was probably a by-product of children's increasing preference for the 
heuristic response. However, in the case of the if-only fallacy the decrease in normative 
responses had to be at least partly independent of the increase in heuristic responses, as 
there were three response options. The number of "other" (i.e., atypical) responses 
decreased with development on both the syllogistic reasoning and the sunk cost fallacy 
task, but it was unrelated to age and cognitive abilities in the case of the if-only fallacy 
task. 
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In sura, we found evidence for a general increase in heuristic responding with age 
and cognitive abilities, accompanied in some cases by a reduction in normative responding 
(if-only fallacy and conjunction fallacy) or the absence of any increase (sunk cost and 
syllogistic reasoning tasks). 
Table 3.3. Correlations between age, cognitive ability and response types across tasks. 
Age in months Cognitive ability 
Syllogistic heuristic responses .27* .31** 
reasoning normative responses -.06 -.03 
"other" responses -.24* -.32** 
Sunk cost heuristic responses .18 .32** 
fallacy normative responses .03 -.04 
"other" responses -.27* -.36** 
If-only heuristic responses .34** .38** 
fallacy normative responses -.30** -.32** 
"other" responses -.06 -.10 
Conjunction heuristic responses .37** .42** 
fallacy normative responses -,37** -.42** 
The positive correlation between heuristic responding and cognitive ability is 
inconsistent with the predictions of dual-process theories which either assume a reduction 
in heuristic responses with increasing cognitive capacity (e.g., Kokis et al., 2002), or no 
relationship (Klaczynski & Cottrell, 2004; Reyna & Ellis, 1994). However, because 
cognitive capacity is strongly correlated with age, at this point it is not clear whether 
cognitive capacity and heuristic responding are genuinely correlated, or whether age is the 
mediating variable. 
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Correlations between heuristic responding across the reasoning and decision-making tasks 
As a next step we focused on the relationship between heuristic responding across the 
different tasks. We found a significant correlation between belief bias and committing the 
conjunction fallacy. In addition, heuristic responding on the if-only task was significantly 
correlated with heuristic responding on the sunk cost, and the conjunction fallacy tasks (see 
Table 3,4). Overall we found some evidence that giving heuristic responses on one task is 
related to giving heuristic responses on other tasks. This was also confirmed by the fact 
that the Cronbach alpha computed on an overall index of heuristic responding across all 
tasks was .52, which can be considered a satisfactory level of reliability (Rust & 
Golombok, 1999). 
Table 3.4. Intercorrelations between heuristic responses on the reasoning and decision-
making tasks. 
T 2. 1 4. 
I. Belief bias 
2.Sunk cost fallacy .17 
3. If-only fallacy .06 .29** 
4. Conjunction fallacy .32** . 17 .27* 
Predictors of heuristic responding 
Finally, in order to decide whether the positive correlation between heuristic 
responding and the cognitive ability measures we observed was genuine or was mediated 
by age we ran a regression analysis with the heuristic response composite score as the 
dependent variable and the individual differences measures (age and cognitive capacity ) as 
predictors. Before doing this we combined the WlSC score and the working memory score 
into a single variable, by computing the combined z score for these measures. 
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A linear regression analysis revealed that when age and cognitive abihty were both 
entered simultaneously, cognitive capacity (fi=.52 p<.00\) but not age (fi=.05 p-32), was a 
significant predictor of heuristic responding. These two variables accounted for one third 
of the variance in heuristic responding (^^=29), which was significant (F(2,81) = 18.29, 
y7<.001). When age was entered first, it explained 19% of the variance, whereas cognitive 
ability predicted a significant additional 10%. In contrast, after cognitive ability was 
entered first (/?^=.30), entering age did not increase flirther the proportion of variance 
explained (see Appendix SI for a supplementary table for these analyses). Thus, the 
regression analysis confirmed that the emergence of these heuristics with age was 
genuinely related to increases in cognitive capacity. 
Discussion 
In this study we looked at developmental changes in giving normative, heuristic, and 
"other" responses to four different reasoning and decision-making problems. We found 
that in general heuristic responding increased with age, and the number of normative and 
"other" responses decreased between the ages of 5 and 11. 
it is not surprising that the number of atypical ("other") responses decreased with 
development. However, the fact that normative responding also decreased, and that the 
number of heuristic responses increased with age is more striking. Although certain dual-
process theories (e.g., Klaczynski & Cottrell, 2004; Reyna & Ellis, 1994) are able to 
account for these findings, the evidence that the increase in heuristic responding was 
positively associated with increases in cognitive capacity goes against the predictions of 
each version of dual-process theories presented in the introduction. These approaches 
propose that heuristic responses are the products of automatic processing, therefore they 
are activated and applied independently of a general processing mechanism. 
However, our results are in line with some findings from the area of conditional 
reasoning that indicate a relationship between reasoning about contextualized problems 
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(specifically, the retrieval and integration of relevant knowledge) and working memory 
capacity (e.g., De Neys et al., 2005; Janveau-Brennan & Markovits, 1999). The effortful 
nature of the retrieval of relevant knowledge from long-term memory might explain why 
the belief bias and heuristic responding on the conjunction fallacy problems were related to 
cognitive ability. 
To sum up our results, there is evidence that cognitive capacity (and System 2 
processes) not only play a role in abstract, hypothetical, logical thinking, but are also 
needed for the contextualization of problems. The reason that this has been overlooked for 
so long is probably that this relationship between reasoning about familiar topics and 
cognitive capacity may be demonstrated only under special conditions (i.e., dual-tasking; 
Cho, Holyoak & Cannon, 2007) or in the case of children (Janveau-Brennan &. Markovits, 
1999), or elderly people (McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007); that is, in cases where 
participants' cognitive capacity is relatively limited. Since normal adults generally find 
these problems easy, differences in their cognitive capacity will be unrelated to making 
these "heuristic" inferences (although it does not necessarily imply that these processes are 
completely undemanding of cognitive capacity in the case of adults). On the other hand, 
adults giving normative responses have to consciously inhibit the easily available heuristic 
responses, and engage in further processing in order to produce a normative response. This 
is supported by the fact that normative responding in the case of adults and adolescents has 
been found to be related to cognitive capacity and thinking styles (Stanovich, 1999). 
If we accept the above argument, a novel and interesting question emerges. 
Namely, at some point in development the contextualisation processes involved in heuristic 
reasoning should become virtually effortless. Given the relationship be^veen 
contextualisation and general cognitive resources, we can expect that the automation of 
contextual processing should be driven by the maturation of cognitive and executive 
systems. As we described in Chapter 2, some executive components continue to develop 
into adulthood whereas others reach a mature state during adolescence (see e.g., Huizinga 
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et al., 2006). Building on these assumptions, in Experiment 2 we administered the same 
tasks as in Experiment I together with measures of executive functioning to a sample of 
adolescents between the age of 12 and 16. 
3.2. Experiment 2: The development of heuristic reasoning in adolescence and its 
relationship to executive funct ioning 
The main aim of Experiment 2 was to extend the investigation of Experiment 1 to an 
older age group, namely a group of early and mid-adolescent children between the ages of 
12 and 16. A number of reasoning theorists predict that reasoning performance should 
change during adolescence (see also Section 2.1.2.). According to KJaczynski (e.g., 
Klaczynski & Cottrell, 2004) metacognitive abilities develop by the age of 14, As a result, 
adolescents' thinking is more flexible than children's thinking, and they are able to 
compare and integrate multiple options, instead of just responding on the basis of their 
intuitions and feelings, or following rules rigidly (e.g., Klaczynski, 2007), On the other 
hand, Klaczynski and colleagues also note that heuristic responding remains predominant 
even in the case of adults, and normative responding does not necessarily increase with 
development (e.g., Klaczynski, 2007), 
Fuzzy-trace theorists (e,g., Brainerd et al., 2004) claim that gist (i.e., contextualised) 
processing increases most profoundly between the ages of 7 and 11 (in line with the results 
of Experiment I), whereas verbatim processing (i.e., the decontextualised, fact-based 
representation of problems) shows a marked increase between the ages of 11 and 14. 
Verbatim processing can suppress gist processing, leading to a reliance on facts and precise 
details instead of flizzy gists. This results in inverted U-shaped patterns of performance on 
tasks where contextualisation leads to inappropriate responses. Similarly, studies that have 
investigated age-related changes in everyday conditional reasoning showed that in the case 
of inferences, where performance was based on an interplay between the retrieval and 
inhibition of contextual information (e,g,, Markovits & Barrouillet, 2002) performance 
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initially increased then decreased. More specifically, the ability to retrieve 
counterexamples increases during childhood, but after the onset of adolescence (i.e., 12-13 
years of age) children start to inhibit logically inappropriate counterexample activation in 
the case of the MP inference (DeNeys & Everaerts, 2008). Even in the case of late 
adolescents, MP acceptance depends on the efficiency of the inhibition process (see 
Section 2.2.2.). 
Other theorists, who expect reasoning abilities to steadily improve with development 
also propose that reasoning performance should change considerably during adolescence. 
Piaget (e.g., Piaget, 1976) claimed that children reach the formal operational stage around 
the age of 12, which is the time when they start to understand and apply the rules of formal 
logic. Stanovich and colleagues (e.g., Stanovich et al., 2008) also predict that children's 
performance should get closer to the normative standards, but in this view the basis of 
these changes is children's increasing cognitive capacity. Although people with higher 
cognitive capacity do not always perform belter on reasoning tasks, this usually happens 
when there is no detectable conflict within tasks, for example when participants are 
unaware of the relevant normative rule (Stanovich & West, 2008). According to Stanovich 
et al. (2008) this often happens in the case of tasks that require probability knowledge. 
However, children's probability knowledge should considerably increase during 
adolescence. Moreover, the tasks used in the present study employ a within-subjects design 
which makes the conflict between intuitions and logic more transparent. 
Apart from examining age trends in reasoning performance, another aim of this study 
was to explore the links between reasoning performance and the development of cognitive 
abilities during adolescence. Stanovich et al. (2008) propose that children's increasing 
working memory capacity is the most important driving force behind the increases in 
logical competence. In fact, many studies have found a relationship between working 
memory capacity and logical reasoning. However, it is less clear whether working memory 
alone can explain logical performance on tasks where there is a conflict between logic and 
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intuitions. For example, De Neys (2006), using a dual-task manipulation, demonstrated 
that cognitive load selectively impairs performance on conflict problems, whereas 
performance on non-conflict problems was unaffected by cognitive load. By contrast, 
developmental studies found that performance on both conflict and non-conlict tasks was 
related to working memory capacity. However, performance on conflict tasks was 
additionally predicted by measures of inhibition (see e.g., Handley et al., 2004; Simoneau 
& Markovits, 2003). 
Working memory and inhibition are two out of the three components of executive 
functions (EFs) which Miyake et al. (2000) identified. The third component is shifting (or 
set-shifting) which is the ability to flexibly switch between mental sets, representations or 
rules. Although moderately correlated, working memory, set-shifling, and inhibition are 
separable constructs, and they predict performance differentially on different tasks that are 
designed to measure EFs (Miyake et al., 2000). Developmental research revealed that EFs 
have a protracted course of development, beginning in early childhood and continuing into 
adolescence. Moreover, different EF-components show distinct developmental trajectories. 
A recent study (Huizinga, Dolan, & van der Molen, 2006) found that set-shifling and 
performance on the stop-signal task have reached mature levels by adolescence, while 
working memory and basic processing speed followed a more protracted course of 
development into young adulthood. 
Based on the predictions of reasoning theorists, children's reasoning abilities can be 
expected to change when they reach adolescence. More specifically, some theorists predict 
that children become more logical (e.g., Stanovich et al., 2008), or that their thinking 
becomes more flexible and more subject to metacognitive control (e.g., KJaczynski, 2007), 
or that they become more able to inhibit irrelevant associations (e.g., Brainerd et al., 2004; 
De Neys & Everaets, 2008) around the age of 12 or 14. These changes have been variously 
attributed to the development of working memory capacity, inhibition, or metacognitive 
skills. To test these predictions in Experiment 2 we administered the same heuristics and 
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biases tasks as in Experiment 1 together with measures of working memory, general 
intelligence, inhibition and set-shifting ability to a group of adolescents between the ages 
of 12 and 16. Experiment 1 indicated that giving "heuristic" responses (i.e., the responses 
that are considered to be heuristic in the case of adults) increased with age between the 
ages of 5 and 11. Heuristic responding in this age group was positively correlated with 
cognitive ability, and heuristic responses became dominant around the age of 9. Based on 
the predictions described above, it can be expected that in the adolescent group heuristic 
responding will gradually become effortless (independent of cognitive ability), whereas 
normative responding will become positively correlated with cognitive capacity (especially 
working memory) or measures of executive functioning (especially inhibition), as children 
will start to inhibit inappropriate responses at this age. Consequently, the number of 
normative responses should increase. Finally, it was expected that heuristic responding will 
either decrease or remain stable during this period, and the number of atypical (i.e., 
"other") responses will also decrease (see e.g., IClaczynski, 2001). 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 49 children (31 boys) from a Plymouth secondary school. The mean age 
of the participants was 13 years 9 months (age range: 11 years 11 months to 15 years 8 
months). 
Materials and procedure 
The same reasoning tasks were used as in Experiment I, together with the same short form 
of the WISC-Iil (Wechsler, 1991) consisting of the Vocabulary and Block Design subtests. 
As before, the raw scores on the tasks (indicating raw computational capacity, rather than 
IQs) were used for the analyses. In addition, as in Experiment 1 the counting span task (a 
working memory measure with a processing and storage component) was also 
administered. In this study the stop-signal task, a measure of inhibition (based on Handley 
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et al., 2004), and a set-shifling task (based on Miyake, Emerson, Padilla & Ahn, 2004) 
were also administered. 
The stop signal task is a computerised measure of inhibitory control. The task was 
selected because Handley et al. (2004) found that it was a good predictor of reasoning 
performance in the case of children. The task consists of two types of trial; primary task 
trials and stop signal trials. On primary task trials a fixation point was presented on the 
screen for 500 ms followed by the presentation of an X or an O. The child responded by 
pressing an X button or an O button on one of two button boxes. On stop signal trials the X 
or the O is presented along with a tone (the stop signal). On these trials the child is 
instructed to withhold their response. The tones were presented randomly at 200, 300, 400 
or 500 ms before the child's mean reaction time (MRT) to primary trials. Because the tone 
delay is set relative to the MRT for each child, the inhibitory demands are independent of 
the response time to primary trials and approximately equivalent for each participant. 
Children completed a practice block of trials first. These trials familiarised the child with 
the task while establishing the MRT that was used for setting the tone delays for 
subsequent blocks of trials. The main measure of performance on the task was accuracy on 
the stop signal trials. 
Set-shifting requires shifting back and forth between multiple tasks, operations, or 
mental sets (Monsell, 1996). Recent work suggests that when switching to a new operation, 
it may be necessary to overcome proactive interference due to having previously 
performed a different operation on the same type of stimuli (see Miyake et al., 2000). 
Thus, individual differences in set-shifting ability may not be a simple reflection of the 
ability to engage and disengage appropriate task sets per se, but may instead involve the 
ability to perform a new operation in the face of proactive interference. The colour-shape 
task (based on Miyake et al., 2004) used in the present study required participants to switch 
between classifying shapes and classifying colours, and the dependent variable was the 
MRT on switch trials divided by the MRT on non-switch trials. On each trial, a random 
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cue indicating which subtask to perform was presented just before the stimulus and 
remained on the screen until the participant responded. Children responded by pressing one 
of two button boxes. Each button box corresponded to one of the colours, as well as one of 
the shape categories. 
Participants took part in two testing sessions. Session 1 took about 15 minutes, and 
participants solved the reasoning tasks. Participants were tested in small groups. After 
listening to the instructions given by the experimenter they worked through the tasks 
individually. Session 2 consisted of the counting span task, the Vocabulary 
and Block Design subtests of the WISC-Ill, the stop-signal task, and the set-shifting task. 
This session took about 40 minutes, and children did the tasks on a computer (apart from 
the Wise subtests), supported by the experimenter. 
Results 
First, in order to analyze age trends in giving heuristic, normative, and ''other" 
responses to the reasoning and decision-making tasks, the sample was divided into two age 
groups. The age groups correspond to Years 7-8, and 9-10 in the British school system. 
The mean age of the children was 12 years 9 months in the younger age group, and 14 
years 9 months in the older age group. 
The number of heuristic, normative, and "other" responses given by the two age 
groups on the different tasks were compared using independent samples / tests (see Table 
3.5.). In the case of the syllogistic reasoning tasks the t tests indicated no change in terms 
of heuristic and normative responding. However, there was a marginal increase in "other" 
responses across age groups. In the case of the sunk cost tasks the number of heuristic and 
other responses remained stable with development, but there was a marginal increase in 
normative responding. On the if-only tasks there was no difference between age groups in 
any type of response. There was also no change in responding on the conjunction fallacy 
tasks. Finally, the overall proportion of heuristic, normative, and other responses given to 
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the four different types of task was analysed. Again, there was no evidence of age-related 
change. 
Table 3.5. Proportion of heuristic, normative and "other" responses on the different types 
of reasoning tasks across age groups. 
Younger group 
(n=23) 
Older group 
(^=26) /(47) P 
Syllogistic Heuristic responses .46 (.23) .40 (.27) .73 .47 
reasoning Normative responses .39 (.21) .36 (.20) .60 .55 
"Other" responses .16 (.03) .24 (.18) 1.78 .08 
Sunk cost Heuristic responses .24 (.30) .21 (.29) .76 .74 
fallacy Normative responses .54 (.30) .71 (.35) 1.81 .08 
"Other" responses .11 (.21) .06 (.16) .95 .35 
If-only Heuristic responses .52 (.35) .56 (.41) .33 .75 
fallacy Normative responses .43 (.31) -42 (.39) .11 .91 
"Other" responses .04 (.14) .02 (.10) .70 .49 
Conjunction Heuristic responses .93 (.17) .98 (.10) 1.13 .27 
fallacy Normative responses .07 (.17) .02 (.10) 1.16 .27 
Total Heuristic responses .54 (,14) .54 (.14) .21 .84 
Normative responses .36 (.12) .38 (.15) .06 .95 
"Other" responses .I0( .I3) 11 (.09) .04 .97 
Relationships betiveen the individual differences measures 
The next set of analyses examined the relationship between age (in months), 
cognitive ability (as indicated by the counting-span task, and the short form of the WISC-
III), and executive functioning (as measured by the stop-signal, and the set-shifting tasks). 
94 
Before computing correlations between these measures, we calculated the reliability of the 
stop-signal task, and the set-shifting task. We computed Cronbach's alpha for both tasks 
(including the correct trials only). In the case of the stop-signal task performance was 
indexed by the mean number of correct responses to the stop signal trials collapsed across 
the different delays. Consequently, when computing Cronbach's alpha for this task, we 
included the stop-signal items only (regardless of signal delay) which resulted in r =.90. In 
the case of the set-shifting task the score was computed by dividing the mean RT on switch 
trials by the mean RT on non-switch trials. Thus, we computed Cronbach's alpha for both 
the switch {r=.91) and non-switch {r=.96) trials separately. 
Table 3.6. displays the correlations between age and the cognitive ability and 
executive functioning measures (note that higher set-shifting cost indicates worse 
performance). Working memory significantly increased with age, but there was no age-
related change on the other measures. Similarly to Experiment I, WISC scores correlated 
significantly with working memory scores. There was some indication of a relationship 
between the WISC scores and the measures of executive functioning, but it did not reach 
significance (possibly because of the relatively small sample size). This was in line with 
the idea that the executive function measures tapped into different aspects of cognitive 
functioning than the measures of cognitive capacity. Similarly, the three measures of 
executive functioning were positively related, but the correlations did not reach 
significance. This corresponds to the idea of the relative independence of different aspects 
of executive functioning (see e.g., Huizinga et al., 2006; Miyake et al., 2000). 
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Table 3.6. Correlations between age and the cognitive ability measures. 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. age in months — 
2. Wise .23 — 
3. working memory .37' .49" — 
4. inhibition .24 .25 .15 — 
5. set-shifting cost -.19 -.20 -.25 -.16 — 
Relationships between the individual differences measures and heuristic responding. 
As a next step the correlations between the individual differences measures and 
heuristic responding on the reasoning and decision-making tasks were analysed (the results 
are displayed in Table 3.7.; correlations between normative and "other" responses and the 
individual differences measures are displayed in Appendix S2 Table I). As in Experiment 
I we used the combined z scores of the WISC subtests and the working memory task as an 
indicator of cognitive capacity. Due to the relatively small sample size we also discuss the 
possible implications of marginally significant correlations. 
In the case of the syllogistic reasoning task neither heuristic nor normative 
responding changed with age. However, the number of "other" responses increased with 
age. Moreover, there was a tendency for children with higher inhibition scores to give less 
belief-based and more "other" responses on this task. 
In the case of the sunk cost fallacy normative responding significantly increased with 
age, whereas the number of "other" responses (which is the opposite of the heuristic 
response) significantly decreased. In addition, giving heuristic responses was negatively 
correlated with cognitive capacity, whereas children displaying higher cognitive flexibility 
(as indicated by a lower cost of set-shifting) tended to give more normatively correct 
responses. 
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Response patterns on the if-only fallacy task did not change with age, but atypical 
"other" responses (which were the opposite of heuristic responses) were negatively 
correlated with cognitive ability, and positively correlated with set-shifting cost. Moreover, 
children with higher inhibition scores tended to give more heuristic and less normative 
responses on this tasks. 
Table 3.7. Correlations between the individual differences measures and heuristic 
responding on the different tasks. 
Age Cognitive ability Inhibition Set-shifting cost 
Belief bias -.19 -.18 -.25^ .07 
Sunk cost fallacy -.06 -.14 -.32- .08 
If-only fallacy .10 .18 .25^ .08 
Conjunction fallacy .29' .30* .15 .20 
Total heuristic responses .07 .09 -.08 .21 
worse performance.) 
The tendency to commit the conjunction fallacy significantly increased with age, and 
it was also positively correlated with cognitive ability. To check if this correlation between 
cognitive ability and committing the fallacy still held after controlling for age, partial 
correlations were computed. After controlling for the effect of age the correlation between 
cognitive ability and conjunction fallacy responses dropped below significance (r(43)=.23, 
p=A4y 
Finally, we also analysed the relationship between overall heuristic, normative and 
"other" responding and the measures of age, cognitive ability and executive functioning. 
Normative responding was negatively correlated with set-shifting cost. This relationship 
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was also confirmed by a regression analysis (see Appendix S2 Table 4). Set-shifting cost 
explained 11% of the variance in normative responding (F( l , 47)= 5.44, /7<.05). However, 
it is worth noting that there was no significant correlation between either heuristic or 
normative responding on the different tasks (see Appendix S2, Tables 2 and 3), so although 
in the dual-processes literature it is common practice to combine different measures of 
heuristic/normative responding based solely on theoretical considerations (see e.g., Kokis 
et al., 2002) in the case of the present study this does not seem to be justified, at least 
empirically. 
Discussion 
Although comparisons between the young adolescent and mid-adolescent group 
using / tests indicated virtually no change in reasoning performance, the analysis of 
response patterns with a more sensitive measure (i.e., correlations) did show some 
evidence of age-related change. Using very similar tasks to the present study, and with the 
participation of children from a similar age group, Klaczynski (2001) found that normative 
responding on the sunk cost and if-only tasks increased with age, whereas heuristic 
responding remained stable, and the number of "other" responses decreased, ki line with 
this, in our sample the number of heuristic responses on the sunk cost fallacy task remained 
stable, whereas normative responding increased and "other" responding decreased. 
Heuristic responding on this task was unrelated to cognitive ability, and negatively 
correlated with inhibition scores, which could be interpreted as a sign that the automatic 
and effortless tendency to give heuristic responses needs to be suppressed in order that 
children can give the normatively correct response on this task. However, it is worth noting 
that a lack of correlation between heuristic responding and cognitive ability does not 
necessarily imply that producing the response is completely effortless. Rather, it indicates 
that children, regardless of their cognitive ability, are able to produce the response (that is, 
they all have the necessary capacity to do this). Additionally, there was a marginally 
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significant correlation between cognitive flexibility (i.e., set-shifting ability) and normative 
responding which indicated that children who are able to flexibly switch between concepts 
are more likely to give the normatively correct response, possibly because they are less 
likely to rigidly overuse the "waste not" rule (see Arkes & Ayton, 1999). 
Results on the if-only tasks also correspond to the findings of KJaczynski (2001) in 
some respects. Heuristic responding on this task remained stable with development, and 
although the number of "other" responses remained stable, giving these atypical responses 
correlated positively with the cost of set-shifting, and negatively with the ability to inhibit 
impulsive response tendencies. That is, children who show a reversed if-only effect 
performed lower on the measures of executive functioning. Although other correlations 
only approached significance in the case of this task, it is interesting to note that the 
correlations between heuristic and normative responding and inhibition seem to be 
reversed compared to what most theorists would predict (i.e., children higher in inhibition 
tended to give more heuristic responses, whereas children lower in inhibition tended to 
give more normative responses). A possible interpretation of these trends is that judging 
past actions on the basis of the outcome that they lead to may require some sort of 
cognitive effort even in adolescence. Although hindsight bias seems to develop early (e.g., 
Bemstein, Atance , Lofhis & Meltzoff, 2004), counterfactual thinking develops relatively 
late in childhood (e.g., Beck, Robinson, Carroll & Apperly, 2006), and even in adulthood 
people find it hard to consider more than one possibility at a time (e.g., Evans, 2006; Evans 
etal.,2003). 
Similarly to Experiment I, in the eariy to mid-adolescent age group the tendency to 
commit the conjunction fallacy was positively correlated with both age and cognitive 
capacity (although the correlation with cognitive capacity fell below significance after 
controlling for age). Moreover, virtually every child in the older age group (98%) 
committed the conjunction fallacy, indicating that participants, regardless of cognitive 
ability, were susceptible to the fallacy. Stanovich and West (1998) found that people with 
99 
higher cognitive capacity were less likely to commit the conjunction fallacy than lower 
ability people. De Neys (2006) also demonstrated that giving normatively correct 
responses on the conjunction fallacy task required more time than giving heuristic 
responses (i.e., response times were significantly lower for incorrect responses). De Neys 
also used a dual-task manipulation to demonstrate that experimentally restricting 
participants* working memory capacity leads to higher levels of heuristic responding on 
the conjunction fallacy task. However, Stanovich and West (2008) using between-subjects 
versions of the task with university students found that the conjunction fallacy was more 
likely to occur in the case of high, as opposed to lower ability students. They argued that 
this was because in a between-subjects design the conflict between the normative rule and 
participants' intuitions is virtually impossible to detect (although this does not explain why 
the fallacy should be more common across high ability participants). Stanovich and West 
(2008) also cited Kahneman and Tversky (1982) who reported that statistically 
sophisticated psychology graduate students were aware of the conjunction rule they had 
violated (thus, in Stanovich & West's terms they possessed the relevant mindware but did 
not detect the necessity for override). However, statistically naive undergraduate students 
failed to endorse the conjunction rule. 
It is important to note that in the studies that found a relationship between cognitive 
ability and resisting the conjunction fallacy, participants were university students, and the 
proportion of correct responding was only around 10%. Apart from the possibility that 
even university students do not endorse the conjunction rule, based on the present 
developmental data (the results of this experiment together with Experiment 1) it can be 
proposed that the reason for the high failure rates might result from the fact that 
committing the fallacy is not fully automatic even in the case of adolescents. Given that 
producing the normatively mcorrect response seems to require a certain amount of effortful 
thinking, it is no surprise that virtually none of the participants in the present study 
invested further effort into (or considered the possibility of) suppressing this response. 
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In the case of the syllogistic reasoning task there was no relationship between age or 
the measures of cognitive capacity and executive functioning, and giving heuristic or 
normative responses, apart from a marginally significant negative correlation between 
children's inhibition scores and their giving heuristic responses. However, the number of 
"other" (i.e., neither belief-based, nor logical) responses significantly increased with age. 
In this task children were instructed to reason on the basis of logical validity, ignoring the 
believability of the premises. It is possible that between the age of 12 and 16 adolescents 
become increasingly capable of inhibiting their beliefs, without necessarily being able to 
work out the logically valid solution. This is somewhat supported by the fact that "other" 
responses were given more often by children with higher inhibition scores. 
Finally, although the overall number of heuristic, normative or "other" responses did 
not change with development (which is no surprise, looking at the mixed age trends on the 
different tasks), there was a significant correlation between overall normative scores and 
set-shifting ability. Due to the lack of significant relationships between normative 
responding on the different tasks this finding could be considered as an artefact. However, 
i f this relationship is meaningful, this could indicate that giving normative/analytic 
responses on these tasks requires mental flexibility and the consideration of multiple 
possibilities. In fact, set-shifting ability explained 11% of the variance in normative 
responding. This finding seems somewhat related to the idea that adolescents' thinking 
becomes increasingly flexible around the age of 14 (e.g., Klaczynski, 2009), although 
neither normative responding, nor set-shifting ability increased with age in the present 
sample. Thus, instead of claiming that flexibility increases with age, it could be argued that 
once heuristic responding becomes automatic (which happens with an increasing range of 
tasks as children get older) the role of mental flexibility increases, as this makes children 
more able to consider altemative responses besides the easily available heuristic response. 
Mental flexibility might also provide a way of giving a non-heuristic response without 
necessarily having to fully inhibit the heuristic response. Interestingly, although most 
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reasoning theorists predict that cognitive ability and inhibition play a crucial role in 
normative responding, there was little evidence for this in the present investigation. It is 
possible that inhibition plays a more important role once heuristic responses become 
automatic (which might be related to the increasing ease of memory retrieval, which, in 
turn, could be related to the age-related increase in processing speed, or processing 
fluency), and well-practised, and come with a greater level of fluency and confidence. 
Similarly to Huizinga et al. (2006) we found that children's performance on the 
working memory task significantly increased during adolescence, whereas their inhibition 
and set-shifting performance remained reasonably stable between the age of 12 and 16 
(possibly because children already reached their final level of performance on these tasks). 
Moreover, like Huizinga et al. (2006) we also found that our measures of executive 
functioning were not very strongly correlated with each other, which lends some support to 
the notion of the relative independence of working memory, inhibition and set-shifting. 
To sum up the most important conclusions of this study, instead of finding evidence 
that children over 12 reach a mature level of cognition (see e.g., Piaget, 1976), their 
performance on different tasks showed mixed patterns. This is also supported by the fact 
that, unlike in Experiment 1, where the same tasks were administered to a group of 
younger children, in the present study there was no relationship between giving heuristic 
responses on the different tasks (see Appendix S2 Table 2). Importantly, heuristic 
responding either remained stable or increased with age in the case of the set of tasks that 
were employed. Moreover, children with higher cognitive ability did not perform any 
better on these tasks than children with lower ability, although other aspects of executive 
functioning (i.e., inhibition and set-shifting) seemed to enhance normative responding. 
These findings are not very easy to reconcile with some of the claims that dual-process 
theorists make about the development of reasoning abilities. On the other hand, the present 
findings are in line with research on executive functioning that shows a protracted 
development of certain EF skills that continues into young adulthood. 
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3. 3. Experiment 3. The development of heuristic reasoning in adolescence, and its 
relationship with analogical reasoning ability. 
Although some developmental reasoning theorists predict an increase in normative 
responding during adolescence, Experiment 2 showed mixed findings with little change in 
normative responding between the ages of 12 and 16, whereas heuristic responding 
increased with age in the case of the conjunction fallacy task. In Experiment 3 we 
followed up on some of the results of Experiment 2 by using syllogistic reasoning and 
conjunction fallacy problems. 
The tasks used in this experiment were different from the tasks used previously, 
and we also have not included sunk cost and if-only fallacy problems (the reason for this 
is that these tasks are related to emotional processing which makes the results harder to 
interpret, and also makes the use of normative standards in judging the responses harder 
to justify). 
In addition to the syllogisms and the conjunction fallacy problems, we used some 
tasks from the heuristics and biases literature which are related to probabilistic reasoning: 
the positive/negative recency effects, and the two versions of the engineers and lawyers 
problem (see Section 1.1.1.). As in the previous experiments, we used modified versions of 
the classic problems in order to make them more appropriate for children and adolescents. 
In this experiment we also introduced a methodological innovation, which consisted of 
manipulating the presence of conflict between intuitions and logical structure (see Figure 
3.1.). 
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Engineers and lawyers problem - representative description 
Conflict 
A group of tourists visit the Eiffel tower in 
Paris. There are 15 old people in the group and 3 
young ones. The tourists can choose between taking 
the lift or climbing up the tower (which takes half an 
hour). Only one person wants to climb up the tower. 
Do you think it is more likely that it's on old person, or 
that it's a young one? 
• It's more likely that it's a young person, 
(representative) 
• It's more likely that it's an old person, (base rate) 
• Both are equally likely. 
Non-conflict 
In a bird-watching club there are 6 women and 30 men. 
After a nice bird-watching trip a member of the club decides on 
going to a pub to watch a cricket-match. Who do you think is 
going to the pub? 
• A man. (representative/base rate) 
• A woman, (other) 
• Both are equally likely 
Engineers and lawyers problem - non-representative description 
Conflict 
Laura is a member of a sailing club and she 
also sings in a choir. She has 20 friends in the sailing 
club and 4 friends in the choir. Now she's going to 
Spain with a friend. Do you think it is more likely that 
she goes to Spain with somebody from the sailing club 
or with somebody from the choir? 
• It's more likely that i f s somebody from the choir, 
(other) 
» It's more likely that it's somebody from the sailing 
club, (base rate) 
> Both are equally likely. 
Non-conflict 
In a chocolate factory 10 people's offlces are in Building A, 
and 2 people are working in Building 3. They are working on a new 
chocolate drink, and they want to decide who should try the drink 
flrst, so they organize a raffle. Do you think it is a person who 
works In building A or is it a person who works in Building B who's 
going to try out the drink first? 
• It's more likely that it's somebody w h o works in Building A. 
(base rate) 
• It's more likely that it's somebody w h o works in Building B. 
(other) 
• Both are equally likely. 
Positive/negative recency 
Conflict 
Sarah and Jack have four sons already. Now 
they are going to have another baby. Do you think it is 
more likely that the new baby is a boy or that its a 
girl? 
• It's more likely that it's a boy. (positive recency) 
• It's more likely that it's a girl, (negative recency) 
• Both are equally likely. 
Non-conflict 
The Black Eagles basketball team are playing a match 
against the Deer Devils. Both teams won all their games so far in 
this season. Basketball experts say that both teams are in very 
good shape, and that ifs impossible to tell in advance who will win 
the match tonight. The last eight times when Deer Devils played 
against Black Eagles, Deer Devils won 4 times, and Black Eagles 
also won 4 times. Who do you think will win the match tonight? 
• It's more likely that the Black Eagles will win. (response 1) 
• It's more likely that the Deer Devils will win. (response 2) 
• Both are equally likely. 
Conjunction fallacy 
Conflict 
Sue is a very intelligent woman, who works in a 
hospital. She wears glasses and a green uniform. Her 
bookshelves in her office are full of medical books. Mark the 
fallowing statements with number 1 to4 according to how 
likely they are. (1: most likely, 4: least likely) 
Sue is a plumber, (non-representative 1} 
Sue is a doctor, (representative) 
Sue /5 a doctor and a mechanic, (representative + 
non-representative 2) 
Sue is a mechanic, (non-representative 2) 
Nan- conflict 
Brian has a studio, where he works alone. He is a 
very creative man, and he likes to experiment with colours. 
He takes his work to exhibitions, and sells some of them too. 
Mark the following statements with number J to 4 according 
to how likely they are. (1: most likely, 4: least likely) 
Brian is an aerobics instructor, (non-representative) 
Brian is a painter, (representative) 
Brian is an aerobics instructor and an accountant. 
(representative + non-representative 2} 
Brian Is an accountant, (non-representative 2) 
Figure 3.1. Examples of the conflict and non-conflict versions of the conjunction fallacy 
task, the two types of engineers and lawyers task, and the positive/negative recency 
problem. 
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The problems used in the heuristics and biases tradition typically involve a 
conflict between people's intuitions and a statistical rule (e.g., the conjunction rule), or 
statistical information (e.g., base rates). As a result, an increase in correct responses 
necessarily implies a decrease in incorrect responding. According to Ferreira, Garcia-
Marques, Sherman and Garrido (2006) this is problematic, because no response is 
"process pure". For example, giving a normatively correct response does not imply that 
the participant relied solely on Type 2 thinking when they gave that response. Using 
conflict tasks alone does not make it possible to separate out the contribution of automatic 
and rule-based processes to each response. For example, in the case of the engineers and 
lawyers problem with a representative description (see Figure 3.1.) there is evidence that 
participants' responses are influenced by the conflicting base rate information, even 
though their responses are more strongly influenced by the description o f the person 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). Ferreira et al. (2006) applied the process dissociation 
framework to investigate judgments under uncertainty in order to separate the 
contributions of automatic and controlled processes. The procedure makes use of a 
facilitation paradigm by including a condition in which automatic and controlled 
processes act in concert (we called it the non-conflict condition), as opposed to an 
interference condition (which we called the conflict condition) in which the two processes 
act in opposition. Assuming that both processes contribute to performance and operate 
independently, estimates of each can be obtained by comparing performance across the 
two conditions. Ferreira et al. (2006) used a formula to estimate the contribution of 
automatic and rule based processes to performance on the tasks. Instead o f adopting the 
formula used by Ferreira and colleagues, in the present study we looked at performance 
on the conflict and non-conflict problems separately, hi contrast with the previous studies 
we investigated normative performance (instead of heuristic responding) on both versions 
of the task, and we also looked at the difference between normative performance on 
conflict and non-conflict problems (i.e., we subtracted normative responding on conflict 
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problems from normative responding on non-conflict problems). In this way we gained an 
estimate of how susceptible participants are to salient information that interferes with 
normative performance. 
In sum, we used five different types of task, each measuring a different reasoning 
heuristic (the two different versions of the engineers and lawyers problem, the 
positive/negative recency effect, the conjunction fallacy, and the belief bias). We used 16 
syllogistic reasoning problems, and we had four different tasks measuring each of the 
other heuristics. That is, there were 16 judgment tasks altogether. In the case of the 
judgment tasks there were two sets of problem. Problems with the same content were 
presented in one set in a conflict version, and in the other set in a no-conflict version. We 
used a between-subjects design where children solved the non-conflict version of two 
tasks out of the four tasks of the same type, and the conflict version of the other two. 
Thus, they never solved both the conflict and non-conflict version of the same problem, 
and each heuristic was measured by two conflict and two non-conflict problems. We 
computed the effect of heuristic pull by comparing the proportion of children who chose 
the normative response in the non-conflict tasks and in the conflict versions of the same 
tasks. The ful l list of judgment tasks can be found in Appendix B, and the syllogistic 
reasoning problems are included in Appendix C. (Instructions can also be found in the 
appendices.) 
A final question addressed by the present experiment is the relationship between 
analogical reasoning and heuristic responses. Analogy enables us to reason about novel 
phenomena, to identify relevant information on the basis of relational similarity, and to 
transfer knowledge from an initial learning context to future environments (e.g.. Hummel 
& Holyoak, 2005). Analogy is a conceptual strategy in which a source object is represented 
as similar to a target object and correspondences are mapped between the two, based on the 
similarity of relations in each. During the mapping process both analogues have to be 
represented and manipulated in working memory (e.g., Holyoak & Thagard, 1989). These 
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operations require considerable cognitive effort. Although even 3-year-olds can solve 
simple analogical problems, this ability develops considerably during childhood (Halford, 
1993). 
A recent developmental study (Richland, Morrison & Holyoak, 2006) with participants 
from several age groups (3-4, 6-7, 9-11, and 13-14 years of age) systematically manipulated both 
relational complexity (i.e., the number of distinct units of information that must be processed in 
parallel while being maintained in working memory in order for a reasoner to complete a task -
Andrews & Halford, 2002), and featural distraction in an analogy task based on finding 
correspondences between simple visual scenes (line drawings). Pre-tests confirmed that the 
critical relations (e.g., "chasing") were recognized by even the youngest children. Richland et 
al.'s results revealed that the development of the ability to reason analogically interacts with both 
relational complexity and featural distraction, with both of these sources o f difficulty having a 
greater impact on younger than older age groups. In addition, younger children were especially 
likely to make the error of choosing a perceptual/semantic distractor (e.g., matching a cat to 
another cat when these did not play parallel roles). These findings suggest that changes in 
analogical reasoning with age depend on the interplay among increases in relevant knowledge, 
the capacity to integrate multiple relations, and inhibitory control over featural distraction (cf 
Diamond, 2006). Similar conclusions have been reached based on studies with adults (Cho, 
Holyoak & Cannon, 2007). For example, a dual-task study demonstrated that either a verbal 
working memory load or an executive load disrupts analogical reasoning (Waltz, Lau, Grewal & 
Holyoak, 2000), increasing featural relative to relational mapping. It has also been found that 
people become more susceptible to interference effects at older ages (Viskontas et al., 2004). 
Patients with damage to the prefrontal cortex (a neural substrate of executive functions) are poor 
at analogical reasoning, especially in the presence of distraction (ICrawczyk et al., 2008; 
Morrison et al., 2004). 
Kahneman and Frederick (2002) propose that heuristic responses are the result of 
attribute substitution, and others (e.g., Stanovich, 1999; Klaczynski, 2001) suggest that the 
107 
reason that heuristics can lead to biases is that sometimes they are inappropriately 
overgeneralized. Based on these claims, it could be hypothesized that heuristic reasoning 
might be reliant on processes similar to that underlying analogical inference. On the other 
hand, analogical reasoning is demanding of executive resources, and it requires the ability 
to control interference, and to decouple representations (i.e., to maintain representations in 
the presence of distraction). According to Stanovich (1999, 2006) decoupling is one of the 
main functions of Type 2 processes. Based on this conjecture, we could expect analogical 
reasoning to be closely related with Type 2 reasoning and the ability to inhibit heuristic 
responses (i.e., to resist the interference stemming from salient, but irrelevant information). 
Experiment I demonstrated that a number of (and possibly all) reasoning heuristics 
increase with age, and producing them requires conscious effort in the case of children 
between the age of 5 and 11. In Experiment 2 we found that during adolescence the use of 
some heuristics shows different developmental patterns. Children committed the 
conjunction fallacy more often as they got older, whereas other heuristics remained stable 
with development. As noted by Klaczynski (e.g., 2009), and as predicted by the fiizzy-trace 
theory (e.g., Reyna & Ellis, 1994) normative/heuristic responding on these tasks and 
cognitive capacity were unrelated. Finally, executive function skills (i.e., inhibition and 
set-shifting ability) seemed to be related with reasoning performance on these tasks, 
although the direction of this relationship was inconsistent across tasks. Building on these 
findings we can expect that susceptibility to heuristics in the present study will either 
remain stable, or it will increase with age. We can also expect that susceptibility to 
heuristics wil l be related to analogical reasoning performance. Stanovich (1999, 2006) 
proposed that decoupling is the most important Type 2 process, and he related this process 
with the ability to resist heuristic processing. That is, in this view, analogical reasoning 
ability should be negatively correlated with susceptibility to heuristics. On the other hand, 
analogical reasoning is closely related with executive functioning. Based on the findings of 
Experiment 2, we could expect a mixed relationship between executive 
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functions/analogical reasoning and heuristic reasoning (i.e., both positive and negative 
relationships are possible, as well as a lack of relationship). 
Method 
Participants 
76 children (43 girls) between the age of 11 and 16 years took part in the study. 
Participants were recruited from two Plymouth secondary schools. In order to study age 
effects we divided our sample into two age groups (43 younger children with a mean age 
of 12 years, and 34 older children with a mean age of 14.9 years). 
Materials 
Judgment tasks: Each type of heuristic was measured by two conflict and two non-conflict 
tasks. Examples of the conflict and non-conflict versions of each task can be found in 
Figure 3.1. Children were given a normative point for choosing a response that 
corresponded to the statistical information given in the task, or the logical structure of the 
task. In the case of conflict tasks normative responses were in conflict with a salient cue, 
whereas in the case of non-conflict tasks normative responses were supported by salient 
cues. 
The first task was the engineers and lawyers problem with a representative 
description. \n the non-conflict version of this task base-rates and representativeness 
pointed to the same response, whereas in the other version they were in conflict. In the case 
of a conflict people tend to favour the representative option instead of the response that 
corresponds to the base-rates, which is considered to be the normative response 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). 
The second task was the engineers and lawyers problem with a non-representative 
description. This task looked at the tendency to disregard base-rates when participants are 
provided with irrelevant information. The non-conflict version involved scenarios that 
emphasized a random selection of a person/object from two groups (with no individuating 
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information). In the conflict version there was no indication of randomness, and the two 
groups had different characteristics (although these differences were not informative.) 
Kahneman and Tversky (1973) found that in this situation people are inclined to disregard 
base rates (which would be the normative response) and judge the probability of both 
outcomes as equally likely. 
The third task investigated the positive/negative recency effect. In the non-conflict 
version of the task the event to be predicted followed a sequence where both possible 
outcomes occurred with equal probability. In the conflict version the event to be predicted 
followed a sequence where only one outcome occurred several times. The positive recency 
(or hot hand) effect consists of expecting the same outcome that repeatedly occurred to 
happen again. The negative recency effect (or gambler's fallacy) is to predict the end of the 
sequence, and to expect the occurrence of a different outcome. The normative response is 
to say that both possible outcomes are equally likely. 
Tlie conjunction fallacy task required children to rate the probability of a 
representative event, two non-representative events, and the conjunction o f either one of 
the non-representative events and the representative event, or the two non-representative 
events happening the same time. In the non-conflict version of the task children committed 
the fallacy i f they judged the probability of one of the non-representative events happening 
alone to be smaller than the probability of the conjunction of the two non-representative 
events happening the same time, bi the case of conflict tasks children committed the 
fallacy i f they rated the conjunction of the representative and non-representative event as 
more likely to be true than the non-representative event alone (the non-representative event 
included in the analyses was the same for both the conflict and non-conflict version of the 
same task, although these were administered to a different group of participants). Children 
who did not commit the fallacy were given a normative point. 
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Syllogistic reasoning tasks: There were 16 problems, and the validity and believability of 
the tasks were systematically manipulated. There were 8 non-conflict problems (4 valid 
believable, and 4 invalid unbelievable syllogisms), and 8 conflict problems (4 valid 
unbelievable and 4 invalid believable syllogisms). Participants were given a normative 
point i f they accepted a valid or rejected an invalid conclusion (regardless o f believability). 
Examples for each type of task can be seen in Figure 3.2.). 
Valid Invalid 
Believable All nurses are sabs. 
All sabs are caring. 
Therefore, in this village all nurses are caring. 
Yes No, not necessarily 
All funny people ore bocs. 
All bocs are comedians. 
Therefore, in this village all comedians are funny. 
Yes No, not necessarily Unbelievable All politicians are mids. 
All mids are shy. 
Therefore, in this village all politicians are 
shy. 
Yes No, not necessarily 
All quiet people are curs. 
All curs are salesmen. 
Therefore, in this village alt salesmen are quiet. 
Yes No, not necessarily 
Figure 3.2. Examples for the different types of syllogistic reasoning problems. 
Measures of cognitive capacity: as in the previous experiments we used the short form of 
the Wise as a measure of general intelligence, and the counting span task as a measure of 
working memory. In addition, we used Set I of the Advanced Progressive Matrices test 
(Raven, Raven & Court, 1998). Set 1 of the APM consists of 12 items, and it is usually 
used as a practice and screening set for the fu l l test, and draws upon all the intellectual 
processes sampled on the ftill test (although it does not extend to the highest complexity 
levels). The WISC provides an estimate of both general knowledge and computational 
capacity, whereas the Raven test is an indicator of abstract reasoning ability. Moreover, the 
APM can be considered as a non-thematic test of analogical reasoning (measuring the 
ability to create and maintain temporary relationships in working memory, although there 
is no distraction present). 
Measures of analogical reasoning ability: the picture analogy task was adapted from 
Krawczyk et al. (2008). The instructions can be found in Appendix D. These problems 
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were presented as pictures in the format A:B::C:?.(e.g., sandwich: lunchbox :: hammer: ?). 
Participants had to complete the analogy with one of four answer choices presented as 
separate pictures beneath the problem. In distractor problems, the four response options 
contained the correct solution (e.g., toolbox), together with a perceptual distractor (e.g., 
gavel), a semantic distractor (e.g., nail), and a picture unrelated to the C term (e.g., ribbon). 
In non-distracior problems, the two distractors were replaced by two additional unrelated 
items. The first two problems (a distractor and a non-distractor one) were for practice and 
were not included in the analyses. These were followed by another 8 distractor and 8 non-
distractor problems (in a fixed random order). See Figure 3.3. for examples of a distractor 
and a non-distractor problem. The particular items used in the distractor and non-distractor 
conditions were counterbalanced across participants within each group. 
A B 
Figure 3.3. Non-distracior and distractor versions of a picture analogy problem (A. 
non- distractor; B: distractor). 
The scene analogy task was adapted from Richland et al. (2006). The problems consisted 
of a pair of pictures (source and target analogues, arranged vertically). In each picture four or 
five objects appeared in simple relationships (see Figure 3.4.). Two or three of these objects were 
involved in a critical relationship, such as "hanging" (e.g., a baby monkey hanging on an adult 
monkey, which was hanging on the trunk of an elephant). An arrow pointed to one of the objects 
in the source scene (e.g., the adult monkey), and participants had to find the object corresponding 
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to this object in the target scene (e.g., a girl, given that a doll is hanging on a girl who in turn is 
hanging on a tree). There were 20 problems, five in each of four conditions that systematically 
varied the number of relation tokens that needed to be mapped, one or two (e.g., one or two 
tokens of the "hanging" relation in each picture), and the presence or absence of an object in the 
target scene that was either featurally similar to (distractor condition) or dissimilar to (non-
distracior condition) the object to be mapped in the source scene (e.g., a monkey in the target 
picture that visually and semantically resembled the adult monkey in the source, versus a cat that 
did not resemble the object in the source). The particular pairs of scenes used in each of the four 
conditions were counterbalanced across participants within each group. The instructions used can 
be found in Appendix D. 
Procedure 
Children were administered the judgment and the syllogistic reasoning tasks, and the 
analogy problems (including the Raven test) first. Due to the limited availability of the 
children from one school (n=33), the syllogistic reasoning problems were not administered 
to them. The working memory and general intelligence measures were administered at a 
later session. Both sessions took approximately 40 minutes. 
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Figure 3.4. Different versions of a scene analogy problem: (A) one relation/non-distractor, 
(B) one relation/distractor; (C) two relations/non-distractor; (D) two relations/distractor. 
Results 
Age-, conflict- and content-effects on the judgment tasks 
2x2 mixed ANOVA analyses were run for each type of task with age group as a 
between-subjects variable and problem type (conflict/non-conflict) as a within-subjects 
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variable. The difference in normative responding across conflict and non-conflict tasks was 
analysed. In the case of non-conflict tasks both normative considerations and the use of 
salient cues result in the same (normative) response. By contrast, in the case of conflict 
tasks participants giving a normative response have to be able to suppress the interference 
resulting from salient, conflicting information. That is, analysing the difference between 
normative responding on the conflict vs. non-conflict tasks makes it possible to estimate 
the amount of interference (i.e., "heuristic pull") that participants experience in the case of 
a heuristic-normative conflict. A supplementary table for the following analyses is 
Appendix S3 Table 1. 
The first task was the engineers and lawyers problem with a representative 
description. Table 3.8. displays the proportion of children who chose each type of 
response. The ANOVA indicated that children chose the normative response 
(corresponding to the base rates) more often in the case of non-conflict tasks than in the 
case of conflict tasks (f(l,73)=149.IO,p<.OOI, ///=.67). That is, conflicting representative 
information had a large effect on children's responses. There was no effect of age or a 
conflict by age group interaction ( f s<2.07, ps>. 15). 
Table 3.8. The proportion ofparticipants choosing each type of response across age 
groups and conflict conditions on the engineers and lawyers problem with a representative 
description. 
Conflict Non-conflict 
repr. base rate equally repr. / non-repr. equally 
(non-repr.) likely base rate likely 
Younger .74 (.34) .15 (.26) .11 (.21) .78 (.35) .09 (.22) .13 (.27) 
(n=42) 
Older .68(.32) .16(.24) .I6(.24) .81 (.25) .01 (.09) .18(.04) 
(n=34) 
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The second task was the engineers and lawyers problem with a non-representative 
description (see Table 3.9. for descriptives). Data from 15 children had to be ehminated 
because they were given a different version of this task by mistake. The ANOVA indicated 
a significant effect of conflict (F(l,58)=30.51,/7<.001., 35). That is, children took base 
rate information less into consideration in the case of conflict tasks, when they were 
provided with some irrelevant individuating information. Additionally, there was a 
significant effect of age (F(l,58)=6.51,y3<.05, ///=.10). This showed that older children 
took base rate information more into account than younger children. 
Table 3.9. The proportion of children choosing each type of response across age groups 
and conflict/non-conflict tasks on the engineers and lawyers problem with a non-
representative description. 
Conflict Non-conflict 
other base rate equally other base rate equally 
likely likely 
younger .38 (.37) .24 (.33) .38 (.37) .15 (.23) .56 (.44) .29 (.35) 
older . 14 (.22) .40 (.29) .46 (.37) .04 (. 14) .77 (.33) . 19 (.24) 
The third task investigated the positive/negative recency effects (see Table 3.10. for 
descriptive statistics). A between-subjects t test indicated that children displayed no 
preference for giving either positive or negative recency responses (/(75)=1.07,/?=.29). 
Consequently, we merged the two types of response into a single heuristic score. As a 
result, normative and heuristic responses were mutually exclusive in the case of this task. 
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Table 3.10. The proportion of participants giving normative/non-normative responses on 
the positive/negative recency problems across age groups and conflict/non-conflict tasks. 
Conflict Non-conflcit 
Positive/negative equally likely other equally likely 
recency 
Younger .44 (.43) .56 (.43) .22 (.37) .78 (.37) 
Older .34 (.40) .66 (.40) .03 (.12) .97 (.12) 
The ANOVA on the normative (as well as the heuristic/"other") responses indicated 
a main effect of conflict (F(l,73)=32.87,/7<.001., ;/p^=.31) and a main effect of age 
(F(l,73)=4.0l,/7<.05, v/=.05). There was no age by problem type interaction. Older 
children were more likely to give the correct equally likely response, and all the children 
gave less correct responses in the case of conflict tasks. 
Table 3.11. The proportion ofparticipants choosing each type of response on the 
conjunction fallacy problems across age groups and conflict/non-conflict tasks. 
Conflict Non-conflict 
conjunction fallacy normative conjunction fallacy normative 
younger .89 (.21) .11 (.21) .32 (.32) ,68 (.32) 
older .82 (.33) .18 (.33) .45 (.37) .55 (.37) 
In the case of the conjunction fallacy task (see Table 3.11.) data from 18 children 
had to be eliminated because they either responded by circling a single response or they 
rated multiple responses as equally likely. As in the case of the positive/negative recency 
task, heuristic and normative responses were mutually exclusive. The ANOVA indicated 
that children were more likely to commit the conjunction fallacy i f the conjunction 
contained a representative event than when it consisted of two non-representative events 
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(F(l,55)=80.49,/7<.00l, / / / = 59). There was no age effect or age by problem type 
interaction. 
Performance on the syllogistic reasoning problems 
This task was completed by only 44 out of the 77 students who solved the other tasks 
(this was because participants from one school were only available for a limited time). 28 
children were from the younger group (mean age 12.1 years) and 16 children were from 
the older group (mean age 14.6). Due to the fact that there were only two response options 
available, belief-based and logical responses in the case o f the conflict tasks, and belief-
based/normative and other responses in the case of non-conflict tasks were mutually 
exclusive (see Table 3.12). The ANOVA on the normative responses showed a significant 
effect of conflict (F(l,43)=72.25,p<.001, ///=.63) which indicated that participants gave 
less normative responses when there was a conflict between logical structure and 
believability. The effect of age, and the conflict by age interaction were not significant 
(Fs>1.85,/7S>.18). 
Table 3.12. The proportion of belief-based and logical responses across problem types and 
age groups on the syllogistic reasoning problems. 
Conflict Non-conflict 
Belief-based Normative Belief-based/normative Other 
Younger (n=28) .78 (.22) .22 (.22) .79 (.20) .21 (.20) 
Older (n=16) .64 (.25) .36 (.25) .77 (.17) .23 (.17) 
Analogical reasoning performance 
A supplementary table for the following analyses is Appendix S3 Table 2. The first 
analysis was a comparison between younger and older children's performance on the 
Raven test. This test was solved by 71 out of the 75 children in the sample. The 
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independent samples / test indicated that older children {M=7.91, SD=2,33) performed 
significantly better than younger children (M=6.39, SD=2.92; /(69)=2.44, p<.05). 
The next analysis investigated children's performance on the picture analogy tasks 
(see Table 3.13). This task was solved by 75 out of the 76 children in the sample. The 2x2 
mixed ANOVA with distraction (present/absent) as a within-subjects and age group as a 
between-subjects variable indicated a significant effect of distraction ,73)=I00.95, 
/7<.00l, ;//=.58). There was no effect of age. 
Table 3.13. The proportion of correct responses on the distractor and non-distractor 
picture analogy problems across age groups. 
non-distractor distractor 
younger .94 (.10) .71 (.19) 
older .94 (.09) .73 (.23) 
A comparison between the proportion of perceptual, semantic and "other" (neither 
perceptual, nor semantic) errors across age groups (see Table 3.14) indicated no difference 
between younger and older children. Paired samples / tests indicated that participants made 
significantly more semantic than perceptual (/(74)=9.71,p<.001) or "other" (/(74)=7.65, 
/7<.001) errors. 
Table 3.14. The proportion of different types of errors on the picture analogy problems. 
perceptual semantic other 
younger .02 (.03) .12 (.09) .04 (.06) 
older .02 (.03) .I2(.10) .03 (.06) 
The following analyses concern students' performance on the scene analogy tasks 
(see Table 3.15.). A 2x2x2 mixed ANOVA with relational complexity (one/two relations) 
and distraction (non-distractor/distractor) as within-subjects variables, and age groups as 
beuveen-subjects variables indicated main effects of relational complexity (F(l,73)=22.88, 
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/7<.001, /;/=.24), distraction (F(l,73)=48.92,p<.001, /;/=-40), and age (F(l,73)=5.68, 
p<.05, ///=.07), and a relational complexity by distraction interaction (F(l,73)=8.96, 
p<.01, / / / = . 11). That is, children performed worse on the scene analogy problems when the 
tasks required them to map two relations simultaneously, and they also performed worse in 
the presence of distraction. Older children generally performed better on these tasks. 
Finally, when they had to do a single mapping, children's performance decreased in the 
presence of distraction. By contrast, when they had to map two relations, the presence or 
absence of distraction did not have a further effect on their performance. 
Table 3.15. The proportion of correct responses on the scene analogy problems across age 
groups, distraction conditions and relational complexity. 
One relation Two relations 
Non-distractor Distractor Non-distractor Distractor 
younger .83 (.19) .63 (.26) .70 (.24) .57 (.26) 
older .92 (.16) .69 (.23) .75 (.17) .70 (.22) 
A comparison between the number of perceptual, relational and "other" (neither 
perceptual nor relational) errors made by the two age groups on the scene analogy 
problems (see Table 3.16) indicated that older children made less "other" errors than 
younger children (/(73)=2.03, /K .05) . Additionally, the number of "other" errors was 
significantly less than the number of perceptual (/(74)=4.88, ^<.00l) and relational errors 
(/(74)=3,77, p<.OOI), whereas there was no difference between the number of relational 
and perceptual errors. 
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Table 3.16. The proportion of perceptual, relational and other errors on the scene analogy 
problems across age groups. 
perceptual relational other 
younger . 1 2 ( . l l ) .13 (.07) .07 (.11) 
older .10 (.09) .10 (.06) .03 (.04) 
Finally, Table 3.17. displays the correlations between the different measures of 
analogical reasoning. For this analysis the distractor and non-distractor items across 
relational complexity levels on the scene analogy problems were combined. The 
reasonable sized correlations between tasks indicated that analogical reasoning on the 
different problems was underlain by similar processes, although the lower correlations 
across tasks as compared to within tasks indicated that there were some task-specific 
processing requirements as well which were not shared by all analogical reasoning tasks. 
Although there was no significant relationship between the non-distractor versions of the 
picture and scene analogy problems, performance on the distractor versions of these 
problems were related. 
Table 3.17. Correlations between the different measures of analogical reasoning. 
2. 3. 
1. picture analogy non-distractor " 
2. picture analogy distractor .41** — 
3. scene analogy non-distractor .18 .25* 
4. scene analogy distractor .32** .31** .54** — 
5. Raven .40** .40** .41** .41** -
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Relationships between the measures of individual differences in age, cognitive capacity, 
and analogical reasoning performance 
Table 3.18. displays the correlations between age, working memory capacity, 
general intelligence, and analogical reasoning ability (the combined z scores of students' 
performance on the three analogy tasks). A^ s for these measures vary between 50 and 70 
due to sofhvare problems, experimenter errors or the fact that some participants were not 
available for a second testing session (see details below). 
There was a positive correlation between age and the measures of intelligence and 
analogical reasoning, but unlike in Experiment 2 there was no relationship between age 
and working memory. Working memory scores were positively related with the measures 
of intelligence, and analogical reasoning. The positive correlation between analogical 
reasoning and working memory is in line with results reported in the analogical reasoning 
literature (e.g., Waltz et al., 2000). General intelligence and analogical reasoning ability 
were also correlated with each other. 
Table 3.18. Correlations between age, working memory, general intelligence, and 
analogical reasoning ability. 
r 2. 3. 4. 
1. age 
2. counting span . 18 (n=59) 
3. Wise .42" (n=66) .42'' (n=59) 
4. analogical reasoning .28*(n=70) .37** (n=54) .59" (n=59) 
Relationships between performance on the Judgment and reasoning tasks 
Table 3.19. displays the correlations between susceptibility to the different types of 
biases (i.e., we computed the difference between normative responding on the conflict vs. 
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non-conflict version of each task by subtracting the conflict normative score from the non-
conflict normative score). That is, higher scores indicate greater susceptibility to the biases. 
A^ s for these correlations vary between 32 and 75 due to some children failing to 
respond to some tasks, and due to the fact that children from one school were not 
administered the syllogistic reasoning tasks. In the case of the positive/negative recency 
tasks we considered positive and negative recency responses together, because children did 
not seem to display a preference for either bias on these tasks (see above). 
Table 3.19. Correlations between susceptibility to different biases. 
T 2. I 4^  
1. Engineers and lawyers 
problem, representative 
2. Engineers and lawyers .34** (n=60) 
problem, non-representative 
3. Positive/negative recency .08 (n=75) .08 (n=60) 
4. Conjunction fallacy .07 (n=57) -.20 (n=45) -.35** (n=57) 
5. Syllogistic reasoning .38**(n=45) .46** (n=45) -.09 (n=45) .10 (n=32) 
There was a positive relationship between susceptibility to giving heuristic responses 
to the different versions of the engineers and lawyers problem, and these were also 
positively correlated with susceptibility to the belief bias on the syllogistic reasoning 
problems. Additionally, there was a negative relationship between susceptibility to the 
conjunction fallacy and to the positive/negative recency effect. In contrast with the results 
of Experiment 2 where there was no evidence for a relationship between giving heuristic 
responses to different tasks, the present method seems to be more appropriate for detecting 
similarities across tasks. However, the fact that there are both positive and negative (as 
well as non-significant) relationships across tasks is in line with the results of Experiment 2 
inasmuch as they suggest that the underiying processes can be different across tasks. 
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Finally, we also looked at the correlations between age, cognitive capacity and 
analogical reasoning and susceptibility to heuristics (that is, the difference between 
normative responding between non-conflict and conflict tasks - see Table 3.20.). 
Susceptibility scores were unrelated to age and cognitive ability. However, there was a 
positive relationship between susceptibility to the representativeness heuristic on the 
engineers and lawyers problem. 
Table 3.20. Correlations between susceptibility to different biases and age and the 
measures of cognitive capacity. 
Age Cognitive ability Analogical reasoning 
Engineers and lawyers 
problem, representative 
.04 (n=75) .12 (n=58) .36**(n=69) 
Engineers and lawyers 
problem, non-representative 
.15 (n=60) .04 (n=53) .17 (n=57) 
Positive/negative recency . 16 (n=75) . 13 (n=58) -.06 (n=69) 
Conjunction fallacy -.22 (n=57) -.15 (n=43) -.14 (n=5I) 
Syllogistic reasoning -.20 (n=45) -.08 (n=44) -. 17 (n=44) 
Discussion 
The main purpose of Experiment 3 was to further investigate the changes in heuristic 
responding during adolescence using a new set of tasks, and a novel method that makes it 
possible to estimate more precisely the effect of salient, distracting information on 
reasoning performance. Additionally, the relationships between analogical reasoning and 
susceptibility to heuristics were also analyzed. The fact that children tended to give fewer 
normative responses to conflict than to non-conflict tasks indicates that we were successful 
in measuring the effect of heuristics on using normative information. 
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An important finding of this study is that although susceptibility to heuristics 
remained stable with age, children's general intelligence, and their performance on the 
scene analogy problems, and on the Raven test improved with age. This is in line with the 
idea that normative competence increases during adolescence (e.g., Stanovich et al., 2008). 
However, this increase in competence is not obvious from children's performance on 
traditional heuristics and biases tasks (see e.g., JCIaczynski, 2009). In fact, there was no 
relationship between susceptibility to heuristics and cognitive capacity. On the other hand, 
children were more likely to rely on base rates/probability information in the case of the 
non-representative version of the engineers and lawyers task, and in the positive/negative 
recency problems as they got older. This could be the result of children's increasing 
knowledge about how to make use of probabilistic information. 
In contrast with Experiment 2, in the present experiment we found some evidence for 
relationships between susceptibility to the different biases (a positive relationship between 
susceptibility to heuristics on the engineers and lawyers problems, and on the syllogistic 
reasoning task, and a negative relationship between susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy 
and the positive/negative recency effect). This probably indicates that the measure of 
heuristic pull that we used in the present study was a more sensitive and purer measure of 
heuristic reasoning than conflict tasks alone. However, as in Experiment 2, the 
relationships were mixed, and they could not easily be explained by the individual 
differences variables that we investigated (i.e., age, cognitive ability, and analogical 
reasoning). 
A final question that this study aimed to answer was whether there is a relationship 
between analogical reasoning and heuristic responding. Based on dual-process theories 
(e.g., Stanovich, 1999, 2006) we could expect that suppressing heuristic reasoning (i.e., the 
decoupling of representations) should be similar to analogical reasoning, which also 
requires the reasoner to extract the structure of the tasks, and maintain temporary links 
between representations in the presence of distraction. On the other hand, the description 
125 
of attribute substitution (e.g., Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) which defines heuristic 
reasoning as making links between similar situations, and using existing knowledge to 
answer novel problems sounds very similar to a description of analogical reasoning (see 
e.g., Hummel & Holyoak, 2005). These two possibilities might be reconciled i f we suppose 
that initially heuristics are based on effortful processing, and a conscious attempt to 
integrate information from different sources (as indicated by the results o f Experiment 1), 
and thus are positively related to participants' analogical reasoning ability. However, with 
practice heuristics become automatic and autonomous, and at this stage conscious effort is 
needed to inhibit the inappropriate use of heuristics, and thus we can expect a negative 
relationship between heuristic use and analogical reasoning. Finally, there could be a 
transition phase between these two stages, when participants are able to produce heuristic 
responses without much effort, but they are unable to suppress these responses. It is also 
possible that participants do not suppress an effortlessly produced heuristic response 
because they are unaware of the relevant normative rule (or they are unaware that the rule 
applies in the given situation). The present study provided evidence for a positive 
relationship between susceptibility to a certain heuristic (i.e., the representativeness 
heuristic in the case of the engineers and lawyers problem) and analogical reasoning 
ability, and there were also some tasks where there was no relationship between 
susceptibility to a heuristic and analogical reasoning. However, there was no evidence for a 
negative relationship between heuristic reasoning (or susceptibility to heuristics) and 
analogical reasoning (i.e., decoupling). Thus, although it is possible that decoupling plays a 
role in reasoning performance on heuristics and biases tasks in the case o f adult 
participants, there was no evidence for such a link in our adolescent sample. 
In sum. Experiment 3 demonstrated an increase in logical/statistical competence in 
the case of some tasks, and we also found an increase in general intelligence and 
performance on the Raven test and the scene analogy problems. At the same time and 
within the same population, the number of heuristic responses on conflict tasks remained 
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stable, and there was little evidence for an improvement in detecting the conflict between 
intuitions and normative rules, regardless of children's age or cognitive capacity. Finally, 
analogical reasoning was positively related to susceptibility to a certain heuristic which is 
the opposite of what we could expect based on an influential dual-process account of 
reasoning development (Stanovich et al., 2008). 
3.4. General discussion (Experiments 1-3.) 
The three experiments described in this chapter demonstrated that dual-process 
theories in their original form (e.g., Evans & Over, 1996; Stanovich 1999) which identify 
heuristics and normative rules with two separate reasoning systems (i.e, heuristic = Type 1 
- automatic, effortless and simple; and normative = Type 2 - conscious, effortful and 
complex) cannot be generalised to children. In fact. Experiment I showed that in the case 
of children (between the age of 5 and 11) Type 2 reasoning leads to responses that are 
traditionally considered to be heuristic (i.e., Type I) . Our analyses also warn against the 
interpretation of the lack of correlation between cognitive capacity and reasoning 
performance as an indication that the reasoning process is effortless. Although there was 
no relationship between cognitive capacity (as measured by a composite score of the WISC 
and working memory) and heuristic reasoning in Experiment 2, there was some evidence 
for relationships between reasoning performance and executive fiinctioning (as measured 
by the inhibition and the set-shifting tasks). Similarly, in Experiment 3 we developed a 
more sensitive measure of heuristic pull/susceptibility to heuristics, and whilst this was 
unrelated to cognitive capacity, it was related to analogical reasoning performance (which 
indexes the ability to make links between decoupled representations) - at least in the case 
of one task. 
One aim of this series of studies was to explore the developmental trends in heuristic 
reasoning between the age of 5 and 16. The results of Experiment 1 showed an increase in 
heuristic responding between the age of 5 and 11 on 4 out of 5 tasks (with the exception of 
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the sunk cost fallacy). At the same time both normative and "other" responding tended to 
decrease on these tasks. This increase in heuristic responding was positively correlated 
with children's cognitive capacity, and we proposed that this was because of the effortful 
nature of the contextualisation process (or memory retrieval process) that is involved in 
producing these responses. 
Experiments 2 and 3 showed that after the initial increase in heuristic responding 
during mid-, and late childhood, there is little change in heuristic responding between the 
ages of 11 and 16. However, i f there was a change, heuristic responding tended to increase 
rather than decrease (which would be predicted by an influential developmental dual-
process account - see e.g., Stanovich et al., 2008). In Experiment 2 there was an increase 
in the conjunction fallacy. Al l other heuristics remained stable across the young and mid-
adolescent age groups. Although there was evidence for an increase in working memory 
capacity (in Experiment 2), and in WISC scores, and analogical reasoning performance (in 
Experiment 3), the changes in cognitive abilities were mostly unrelated to (or 
inconsistently related to) changes in reasoning performance. 
Many theorists predict a change in children's reasoning abilities when they reach 
adolescence. Some theorists propose that children become more logical (e.g., Stanovich et 
al,, 2008), or that their thinking becomes more flexible and more subject to metacognitive 
control (e.g., Klaczynski, 2007), or that they become more able to inhibit irrelevant 
associations (e.g., Brainerd et al., 2004; De Neys & Everaets, 2008) around the age of 12 
or 14. These changes have been variously attributed to the development of working 
memory capacity, inhibition, or metacognitive skills. We found little direct supporting 
evidence for these claims, apart from the increase in analogical reasoning performance 
which requires the inhibition of distracting stimuli. However, it is still worth noting that as 
the processing demands of contextualisation become relatively lower after mid-childhood, 
there should be more cognitive resources available for other operations. Nevertheless, this 
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is clearly not reflected in children's performance on the heuristics and biases tasks that we 
administered in our studies. 
These results are similar to the patterns described by Klaczynski (2009) in a recent 
review paper. Adopting his argument, these mixed results can be considered as the 
consequences of differences in individual children's experiences, their emotional 
responses, and beliefs. This interpretation is also consistent with the fuzzy-trace theorists* 
claim that reasoning depends on the gist of experiences that individuals extract from the 
events that they encounter (which is based on their past experiences). These results can 
also be reconciled with the latest model of Stanovich and West (2008) which places a great 
emphasis on individual's knowledge of relevant normative rules, as well as the necessity of 
recognizing the applicability of these rules to individual cases. (Thus, this model differs 
from the other two approaches in its emphasis on the role of Type 2 rather than Type I 
processes). However, the problem with all of these claims is that they provide little help 
with predicting individuals' future behaviour. Ironically, the latest developments of dual-
process theories are very similar to the ideas of the fast and frugal heuristics approach. For 
example, Gigerenzer, et al. (2008) emphasize that the heuristics that people use in a given 
situation will largely depend on their individual learning history. Thus, it is hard to predict 
what sort of heuristic a given individual wil l use in a particular situation. In addition, 
according to this approach, even i f they use a particular heuristic, this can lead to different 
responses depending on the person's individual learning history. 
Overall, the results of Experiments 1-3 highlight the dynamic nature of the 
development of reasoning heuristics, and they also question the validity of approaches that 
identify normative responding with intelligence and cognitive effort, and heuristic 
responses with sloppy, low-effort reasoning. The present findings contradict the view 
which considers heuristics to be based on hardwired cognitive processes that are part of the 
basic human cognitive architecture. Instead they point to the role of cognitive 
development, experiences, and learning in the emergence of reasoning heuristics. Starting 
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from these assumptions we can hypothesize that the development of reasoning heuristics 
might be delayed or could show atypical patterns in children with developmental disorders, 
as their cognitive development (or at least some aspects of it) are usually delayed, and they 
might lack some experiences that typically developing children have access to. 
A particularly interesting group in this respect is autistic children. On the one hand, 
individuals with autism are claimed to suffer from executive functioning problems (see 
e.g.. Hil l , 2004 for a review), that is, in dual-process terms they have a Type 2 deficit. On 
the other hand, mainstream cognitive theories of autism, such as the weak central 
coherence theory (e.g., Happe & Frith, 2006), and the "extreme male brain" theory of 
autism (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 2002) propose that individuals with autism have a 
decontextualised thinking style, and they are very good at detecting regularities, and 
extracting rules which is more in line with a Type 2 advantage. Chapter 4 gives a review of 
the literature on the cognitive theories of autism, and the existing research on reasoning in 
autism. Chapter 5 presents two experiments investigating the development of reasoning 
heuristics in autism. 
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Chapter 4. Cognitive theories of autism, and research on 
reasoning in autism. 
4.0. Introduction to Chapter 4. 
The main aim of this chapter is to give a brief introduction into autism (and the 
cognitive theories of autism), to review the literature on reasoning and autism, and finally 
to explain how research with children with autism can possibly lead to a better 
understanding of the development of reasoning heuristics. In relation to the cognitive 
theories of autism, I will also discuss the issues of specificity, uniqueness, and universality 
(i.e., whether autism arises from a domain-specific factor or if there are multiple factors 
involved; whether these factors are unique to autism or if they are also involved in other 
developmental disorders; and whether these factors are present in every individual with 
autism or just in the majority). 
4.1. Autism and the cognitive theories of autism 
Autism is a behaviourally defined disorder, characterised by impairments in social 
communication, social interaction, and social imagination, together with a restricted range 
of interests, stereotyped and repetitive behaviours, and mannerisms (see e.g., DSM-IV). 
These behavioural symptoms are present in very early childhood, before the age of 3. 
Many children with autism (50 - 70%) have additional learning disabilities (i.e. an IQ 
lower than 70), while 'high-functioning' autistic children have IQs in the normal range. 
For some children with autism, language is limited or absent altogether. The term Asperger 
syndrome is usually used in the case of children with no apparent language delay. The 
prevalence of the broad spectrum of autistic disorders is around 5-6 per 1000 (Le Couteur 
& Baird, 2003). 
Autism is defined by behavioural symptoms, and it can be caused by different 
factors. In a minority of individuals with autism (between 6-10%) there is a specific 
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medical cause. This is more common in autistic individuals with a more serious learning 
disabihty (Fombonne, 1999). There is also evidence for a genetic origin, where multiple 
genes are likely to be involved. In monozygotic twins the chance of concordance for 
autism is 60%, with a higher chance of a social impairment (Rutter, Silberg, O'Connor & 
Simonoff, 1999). Autism is also characterised by pervasive neurobiological abnormalities, 
which are not confined to particular regions of the brain (Belmonte, Cook, Anderson et al., 
2004). 
The core impairments and behaviours of autism vary greatly from person to person, 
as well as within a single individual. As autism is a developmental disorder, symptoms can 
be expected to change over time (Wing, 1988). In general, social and communicative 
symptoms improve significantly with time, whereas restricted and repetitive behaviours are 
more stable. This suggests that there might be different developmental trajectories for each 
of the symptom domains (Charman, Taylor, Drew et al., 2005). For these reasons, it is hard 
to precisely diagnose individuals within the autism spectrum, which is reflected in the 
(often inconsistent) use of various terms (i.e., autism, Asperger's syndrome, pervasive 
developmental disorder, etc.). 
Individuals with autism sometimes possess some special skills (usually in the areas 
of music; drawing; mathematics; rote memory; constructional skills or manipulation of 
mechanical objects). These skills might be above the individual's general level of 
functioning, however, they usually do not exceed the level of what could be expected 
based on the individual's chronological age. Only in the case of high functioning 
individuals with no intellectual impairment can we expect some abilities well above 
chronological age (Baird, Cass & Slonims, 2003). 
4. L I. The theory of mind deficit hypothesis of autism 
The most widely used test of theory of mind (ToM) is the unexpected transfer test, 
which was devised by Wimmer and Pemer (1983). Participants watch a sequence of 
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events, where (as a result of an unexpected transfer of an object) one of the characters will 
have a false belief about the location of the object. Participants then have to make a 
judgement as to where the character will look for the object, and in order to give the 
correct answer they have to infer the mental state of the character (i.e., "the character 
believes that..."). The majority of children pass the false belief task when they are about 4 
years old (Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001). The first experiment to show that children 
with autism had a problem with solving the task was Baron-Cohen, Lesile and Frith (1985) 
who found that 80 percent of children with autism failed, and they concluded that these 
children had a ToM deficit. However, 20% of the sample did pass the task, which indicated 
that the deficit was not universal in autism (Happe, 1994). A meta-analysis by Happe 
(1995) also showed that ToM was strongly associated with verbal mental age and false 
belief in children with autism, and participants with a verbal mental age of 9 and above 
were almost certain to be able to pass. 
In fact, individuals with high functioning autism with no general 
intellectual/language impairment can pass even second order false belief tasks (e.g., Baron-
Cohen, 1989). interestingly, as a response to this and similar findings, many researchers 
concluded that individuals with autism do have a ToM deficit; however, the tests most 
commonly used are not sensitive enough, or inappropriate to show this. For example, Frith, 
Happe and Siddons (1994) suggested that autistic passers of ToM tasks might have used 
non-mentalistic methods, and arrived at the correct solutions without actually inferring 
mental states, hi order to overcome these problems, a range o f "advanced" tests of ToM 
were developed specifically for the high functioning autistic population. These include the 
Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore & Robertson, 1997), the Recognition of Faux 
Pas Test (Baron-Cohen, O'Riordan, Stone, Jones & Plaisted, 1999), and the Strange 
Stories test (Happe, 1994). Although even high functioning individuals tend to perform 
less well on these tasks relative to typically developing controls, they do not fail entirely 
(e.g., Baron-Cohen etal., 1997). 
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In sum, it seems that most individuals with autism have some problems with 
inferring the mental states of others in certain situations. This is no surprise, as the 
diagnostic criteria of autism involve problems with social interactions, social 
communication, and social imagination, thus, autistic people, by defmition, have social 
impairments. However, it is less clear where these problems stem from. For example, 
performance on the false belief task does not only correlate with children's verbal abilities, 
but it is also related to their executive functioning (e.g., Carlson, Moses & Hix, 1998; 
Pemer & Lang, 1999), and their ability to deal with relational complexity at the tertiary 
level (that is, to integrate three variables in a single cognitive representation - see e.g., 
Andrews, Halford, Bunch, Bowden, & Jones, 2003), The false belief task was also 
criticised on the basis that it is not only a confounded measure of ToM, but that the ability 
to reason about false beliefs is not even necessary for somebody to have a theory of mind 
(Bloom & German, 2000). Similar questions can be raised about "advanced" measures of 
theory of mind. Bull, Phillips, and Conway (2008) used dual-task manipulations of 
executive functions (inhibition, updating and switching) to investigate the role of these 
control functions in mental state and non-mental state tasks. They used the Eyes test 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1997) and the Strange Stories test (Happe, 1994), together with 
control tasks that were very similar, but did not require the ability to reason about false 
beliefs. The Eyes test showed specific dual-task costs when concurrently performed with 
an inhibitory secondary task. By contrast, interference effects on the Stories task were 
general, occurring on the control tasks as well, and across all types of executive function, 
indicating that the processing demands were not related to the ToM component of the task. 
The original conceptualisation of ToM deficit in autism (Baron-Cohen, 1995) 
involved the idea that ToM was based on modular processing, and the ToM module was 
selectively impaired in autism. Based on the above evidence, it seems clear that 
performance on almost all ToM tasks requires executive skills as well. However, the 
question remains whether there is also a modular/automatic and inborn component of 
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ToM. There is evidence from brain imaging research (e.g., Saxe, Schuiz & Jiang, 2006) 
that certain parts of the brain are selectively implicated in belief attribution in adults. In 
addition, the behavioural evidence for the ability to quickly and effortlessly infer other's 
mental states in complex social situations, and the fact that even babies and animals are 
able to attribute belief-like states to others (see Apperiy & Butterfill, 2009 for a review) 
seems to suggest that there should be some aspects of ToM reasoning which are 
independent of language and executive functions. Although we could expect that 
individuals with autism will be impaired in this aspect of ToM, there is no experimental 
evidence so far to support this. 
In a number of influential publications, Karmiloff-Smith and colleagues (e.g., 
Karmiloff-Smith, Scerif & Ansari, 2003; Thomas & Kanmiloff-Smith, 2002) criticized the 
idea that certain "cognitive modules" can be selectively impaired, and double dissociations 
might occur in developmental disorders. They based their argument on the following 
claims. Although there are specialised areas or cognitive modules in the adult brain, these 
emerge from a developmental process of modularization. This process is based on some 
innately specified starting points, but at the early stages of development, these are only 
domain-relevant, rather than domain-specific. The modularization process unfolds during 
development, and also as a result of specific environmental interactions. In the case of 
individuals with developmental disorders the effects of genetic mutation during early 
development are likely to be widespread across the developing system. Instead of neatly 
segregated patterns of intact and impaired cognitive modules, it is more likely that all 
domains develop atypically, although some domains may be more affected than others due 
to their particular problem space. For example, although individuals with Williams 
syndrome (WS) are better at verbal than non-verbal tasks, their language is not intact. 
Moreover, their language development follows an atypical developmental trajectory. As a 
result of the dynamic nature of development (for example, the changes in the regulation of 
gene expression over time), and the effects of environmental interactions, it is also likely 
135 
that the patterns of strengths and weaknesses within the same developmental disorder 
change over time. For example, children with both WS and Down syndrome (DS) show 
equal delay in language development, despite DS adult language being significantly worse 
than that of the WS adults'. 
In sum, although it seems clear that individuals with autism are generally impaired 
in ToM reasoning, the nature and severity of their actual problems can vary widely, 
depending on the individual's cognitive abilities, and verbal skills. As autism is a 
developmental disorder, and its diagnosis is based on behavioural symptoms rather than its 
aetiology, it is possible that these impairments in different individuals are the results of a 
number of different factors, and it might not be possible to give a single explanation for 
these. At the very least it seems highly unlikely that these symptoms can be explained by 
the impairment of a single ToM module. 
4.1.2 The weak central coherence theory 
Another influential cognitive account of autism is the Weak Central Coherence 
(WCC) theory (e.g.. Frith & Happe, 1994; Happe, 1999). One of the key strengths of this 
theory is that it explains some of the non-social, as well as the social features of autism. 
The WCC theory proposes that typically developing individuals tend to engage in global 
processing, building up a gist-based representation, whereas autistic individuals engage in 
more detailed, local or piecemeal processing. The WCC theory is supported by evidence 
that autistic children show very good performance on tasks that require attention to local 
features, such as the embedded figures (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Shah & Frith, 1983) 
and block design tests (Shah & Frith, 1993). The key feature of both the block design and 
the embedded figures tests is that a global pattem includes smaller constituent components. 
For individuals in the neurotypical population, the global figure is more salient than its 
constituent parts. Frith (1989, 2003) argues that individuals with autism show better 
performance on these tasks because they lack the cognitive drive to attend to the "big 
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picture" (i.e., they exhibit WCC) and as a result they can process local parts without global 
interference. In fact, there is evidence for a local to global interference in autism, which 
might result from a deficiency in inhibiting further processing of irrelevant details, that is 
executive function deficits (Rinehart, Bradshaw, Moss, et al., 2000 - see also Section 
4.1.3.). 
Happe (1996) found that participants with autism were less susceptible to visual 
illusions (e.g., Ponzo, Muller-Lyer, Titchener) than other groups. Happe claimed that this 
was because individuals with autism processed the stimuli in a piecemeal manner without 
integrating individual features with the context. However, later research showed that 
participants with autism were susceptible to the illusions when they were asked, for 
example, "which line looks longer", but not when asked "which line is longer" (Brosnan, 
Scott, Fox & Pye, 2004). 
In the domain of verbal processing, there is evidence that individuals with autism are 
less able than typically-developing children to benefit from sentence context in 
disambiguating the meaning of homographs (e.g.. Frith & Snowling, 1983; Jolliffe & 
Baron-Cohen, 1999, although see Brock, Norbury, Einav & Nation, 2008). Other evidence 
suggests that autistic people are impaired in generativity (i.e., using their knowledge 
spontaneously and flexibly in novel situations; Peterson & Bowler, 2000). Autistic people 
appear to exhibit reduced processing of similarities between stimuli; instead, they are 
better at processing differences (Plaisted, 2001), although this characteristic may be 
restricted to perceptual processing. Autistic people also seem to have difficulty 
understanding metaphors and other types of non-literal language, such as irony (e.g., 
Pexman, 2008). Importantly, it appears that these effects cannot be attributed to deficits in 
the automatic inferences involved in text comprehension or to the lack of activation of 
relevant knowledge (Saldana & Frith, 2007). 
The WCC theory has, however, been criticized based on evidence that in the 
general population various tasks that supposedly measure central coherence are not 
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correlated with each other (Pellicano, Maybery & Durkin, 2005). Moreover, some studies 
suggest that people with autism are able to process information globally when they are 
instructed to do so, although they process information locally when no such instructions 
are offered (e.g., Mottron, Burack, Stauder & Robaey, 1999). A recent study using 
different versions of the Block Design task demonstrated that locally oriented processing in 
autistic participants did not imply a deficit in forming global representations (Caron, 
Mottron, Berthiaume & Dawson, 2006). Af^er reviewing a large number o f empirical 
studies of coherence, Happe and Frith (2006) concluded that the finding o f a local bias was 
robust. On the other hand, the findings regarding weak global processing are mixed. Happe 
and Frith also concluded that the local bias was not a side effect of executive dysfunction 
or theory of mind deficits, and that it could be overcome through conscious effort. 
At the biological level, it has been suggested that WCC in autism might be the 
result of abnormal neuronal connectivity (due to either structural or functional differences). 
The suggested mechanisms include a lack of synchronisation in activation between 
relevant brain areas (Brock, Brown, Boucher & Rippon, 2002), reduced long-range and 
increased short-range physical connectivity (Just, Cherkassky, Keller & Minshew, 2004), 
or numerous and inefficient feedback connections resulting in a lack of top-down 
modulation of eariy sensory processing and a lack of integration of sensory processing 
with cognitive monitoring (Frith, 2003). These ideas are supported by a growing number of 
functional imaging studies showing reduced coruiectivity and a lack of top-down 
modulation particulariy between the frontal cortex and other brain regions (e.g. Bird, 
Catmur, Silani, et al., 2006; Just, Cherkassky, Keller, et al., 2007). A l l of these theorists 
predict that the abnormal connectivity of different parts of the brain would result in a 
preserved or enhanced ability for detail-focussed, piecemeal processing. What is unclear, 
however, is whether abnormal neuronal connectivity is universal in autism or i f it is only 
present in a subgroup of autistic individuals. For example. White, O'Reilly and Frith 
(2009) have suggested that this might be only characteristic of those individuals with 
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autism who have macrocephaly (that is, increased head/brain size which is present in 
approximately 20% of the autistic population). 
In sum, the strengths of the WCC theory include that it offers explanations for both 
some social and some non-social aspects of autism (for example, the restricted range of 
interests and repetitive behaviours, and autistic people's problems with understanding non-
literal language). Another strength of the theory is that there are some very robust findings 
from the area of visual-spatial processing supporting it. However, it seems like the 
preference for local processing does not imply an inability to process information globally. 
The fact that explicit instruction increases global processing suggests that WCC (at least in 
the case of some autistic individuals) might result from executive function deficits (see 
Section 4.1.3.). Together with the evidence that WCC possibly arises due to abnormal 
neural connectivity in a subgroup of individuals, this raises the possibility that WCC in 
autism might emerge for different reasons in different individuals. 
4.1.3. The executive dysfunction theory of autism 
Similarly to the WCC theory, and in contrast with the ToM deficit hypothesis, the 
executive dysfunction account of autism (e.g., Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1991) is 
intrinsically domain-general. This theory was based on the observation that some 
symptoms of autism (i.e., the need for sameness, the tendency to perseverate, the need to 
be prompted in order to initiate certain behaviours or to switch set, and autistic individuals' 
problems with impulse control) are very similar to those shown by individuals with 
Dysexecutive Syndrome (Baddeley & Wilson, 1988). Such individuals have problems with 
executive functioning (EF) usually due to the damage of the prefrontal cortex (PFC), 
although PFC damage does not necessarily imply EF deficits (Shallice & Burgess, 1991), 
while some people with damage outside the PFC do show impairments (e.g., Levisohn, 
Cronin-Golomb & Schmahmann, 2000). Interestingly, the PFC is also thought to be related 
to ToM reasoning, and, thus, PFC might be a shared brain site for these functions (see 
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Apperiy, Samson & Humphreys, 2005, for an overview), although this might stem from 
the intrinsic executive demands of most ToM tasks. 
Executive function is defined as the ability to maintain an appropriate problem-
solving set for attainment of a future goal which involves planning, the inhibition of 
prepotent but irrelevant responses, and flexibility of thought and action (Ozonoff, 
Pennington & Rogers, 1991). According to Miyake et al. (2000) the three main 
components of EFs are working memory, inhibition, and set-shifting (the ability to flexibly 
switch between mental sets, representations or rules). The executive dysfunction account 
of autism was first suggested by Ozonoff et al. (1991) who found that 96% of the autistic 
participants in their study performed below the mean scores of the control group, which 
they interpreted as an evidence for a universal EF deficit in autism. However, later studies 
did not replicate this finding. For example, Pellicano, Maybery, Durkin and Maley (2006) 
reported that executive problems were only found in 50 % of their sample (note that they 
defined a deficit as performance at least one standard deviation below the mean of the 
control group). 
A large number of studies reported EF deficits in autism (see e.g.. H i l l , 2004 for a 
review). However, according to Hill (2004) the interpretation of these findings is 
problematic. One issue is that several different tasks (and even different versions of the 
same tasks) have been used to assess EFs, and the comparison groups also varied widely 
across studies. The way tasks are presented can also affect the performance of autistic 
participants (for example, in the case of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task participants with 
autism showed greater deficit when the task was presented on a computer - Ozonoff, 
1995). The differences between autistic and control participants often disappear when ful l -
scale IQ or verbal IQ is controlled for. Individuals with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder, Schizophrenia, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder and Tourette syndrome perform 
similarly to autistic individuals on some tests of executive function. Therefore, studies 
140 
trying to differentiate disorders on the basis of performance on EF tasks have yielded 
mixed and inconsistent results (see Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007 for a review). 
In addition to these problems, there is little evidence for a widespread EF deficit in 
preschool children with autism (Hill , 2004), although this might be because young children 
in general do not perform very well on EF tasks. However, Frith (2003) speculated that EF 
deficits in autism might emerge at a later point in development, as a result of poor pruning 
(i.e., the elimination of faulty connections between neurons). On the other hand, Ozonoff 
and Jensen, (1999), as well as Happe, Booth, Charlton and Hughes (2006) reported age-
related improvements in EF in autism relative to typically developing control groups. 
An interesting issue is the relationship between EF and ToM. Some researchers 
have argued that ToM is required for executive control (e.g., Pemer, Lang & Kloo, 2002), 
whereas others suggested that theory of mind tasks could be reduced to executive 
processes (e.g., Russell, Maulhner, Sharpe, & TidsweH , 1991). According to Apperly, 
Samson and Humphreys (2009) both EF and language play an important role in the 
emergence of ToM, and EF continues to play an important role in ToM even in the case of 
adults. Pellicano (2007) in a group of young children found evidence that some children 
with autism failed ToM tasks, but performed well on EF tasks, while no children had the 
opposite profile. This supports the idea that EF is necessary (although not sufficient) for 
the emergence of ToM. On the other hand, it is still possible that ToM might play a role in 
the performance of certain EF tasks. 
In sum, it seems that the EF hypothesis can explain many of the characteristics of 
autism. However, it has several limitations. Most importantly, not all individuals with 
autism show executive problems and those who do may have differing profiles of EF. 
Moreover, executive difficulties are not unique to autism. It is also hard to disentangle the 
complex relationships between EF, verbal abilities, and general intelligence. 
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4.1.4, The extreme male brain theory of autism 
Baron-Cohen's (2002) extreme male brain (EMB) theory of autism proposes that 
WCC, and the deficits in ToM can be explained as the features of an extreme male brain 
with a strong drive for systemising, and an impaired ability for empathising. Empathising 
is the drive to understand the emotions and thoughts of others, and to respond to these with 
an appropriate emotion. This makes it possible to predict a person's behaviour, and to care 
about how they feel. Systemising is the drive to analyse and understand the variables and 
rules that govern the behaviour of a system, and the drive to construct systems (which can 
be mechanical, natural, abstract or other). Systemising makes it possible to predict the 
behaviour of systems, and to control them. The main claims of the EMB theory are the 
following. There are reliable sex differences in ToM and WCC, as well as between 
empathising and systemizing in the general population. Autistic individuals' performance 
on these tasks/characteristics is at the extreme male end of a continuum. Finally, both 
systemizing and empathising skills are dependent on a single biological factor (pre-natal 
testosterone secretion), which also implies a negative correlation between these 
characteristics. 
Baron-Cohen and colleagues developed two questionnaires that measure 
empathising (EQ) and systemising (SQ) skills in the general population, and a third 
questionnaire, which measures both (Autism Spectrum Quotient, AQ - Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin & Clubley, 2001). The idea is that "autistic traits" are 
present in the general population, and adults with high-functioning autism or Asperger 
Syndrome are just an extreme on that dimension. Baron-Cohen and colleagues claim that 
males tend to score higher on AQ than females, and high functioning autistic individuals 
tend to score higher than typical males. They also claim that scientists tend to score higher 
than non-scientists. On the other hand, AQ scores are not diagnostic in themselves. 
The bulk of evidence for the EMB theory comes from the Cambridge f f Project. 
Baron-Cohen and colleagues followed the development of a sample of around 500 children 
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whose foetal testosterone (fT) levels were measured through amniocentesis. They found 
that fT levels were negatively correlated with the frequency of eye-contact in males at 12 
months (Lutchmaya, Baron-Cohen & Raggatt, 2002a), fT was also negatively correlated 
with vocabulary development between 18 and 24 months (Lutchmaya, Baron-Cohen & 
Raggatt, 2002b). At 4 years fT was associated with poorer quality of social relationships 
and narrow interests, and at 8 years it was positively correlated with the child version of 
the Syslemising Quotient. Between 6 and 10 years of age children's scores on the child 
version of AQ and on the Childhood Autism Spectrum Test (CAST, which is a diagnostic 
tool) were significantly correlated, although the correlation was not very strong (i^.25). 
Boys scored higher on both tests than girls, although the effect size was very small for the 
CAST. fT levels were positively associated with scores on both tests when groups were 
combined and also within the sample of boys, but fT levels were not associated with CAST 
scores in the case of girls. There was no difference between genders on the block design 
test, and fT was unrelated to block design performance. Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hil l , 
Raste and Plumb (2001) also reported that in an adult sample women scored higher on the 
Eyes test, whereas men performed better on the embedded figures test. 
On the other hand, the findings of researchers outside Baron-Cohen's lab are more 
mixed. Jarrold, Butler, Cottington, and Jimenez (2000) found a negative relationship 
between ToM and embedded figures performance in the case of university students. 
However, they did not find evidence for sex differences on these tasks. By contrast, 
Morgan, Maybery and Durkin (2003) reported that social and non-social autistic 
characteristics were independent in preschool children with autism. Carroll and Kin Yung 
(2006) conducted a big study with university students, and compared the performance of 
male and female science and non-science students. Some of their findings were in line with 
the EMB theory. For example, men had significantly higher AQ scores, and they scored 
lower on the Eyes test, and the Social Skills Inventory, whereas they scored higher on the 
block design test, and the Mechanical Reasoning test. Female humanities students 
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performed worse on the embedded figures test than the other groups, and science students 
scored higher on the block design test than humanities students. On the other hand, 
Mechanical reasoning and performance on the block design and embedded figures tests 
was unrelated to Social Skills. Mechanical reasoning was also unrelated to SQ. There was 
a significant relationship between sex and "brain type" (i.e., "male brain" with high 
systemizing and low empathising skills or "female brain", which is the opposite), but there 
was no relationship between discipline or AQ and "brain type". 
In sum, there seem to be reliable sex differences on Baron-Cohen et al.'s measures 
of AQ, SQ and EQ, although the relationships between these measures are not quite clear 
(no evidence for strong negative correlations between AQ and EQ, and also not very strong 
correlations between AQ and the other two measures). In fact, there is recent genetic 
evidence that social skills/impairments, communication abilities, and restricted and 
repetitive behaviours are inherited through largely independent genes (Happe & Ronald, 
2008). Additionally, the AQ measure is not correlated very strongly with diagnostic tests 
of autism (according to Baron-Cohen, Auyeung, Ashwin & Knickmeyer, 2009 it only 
accounts for approximately 20% of autistic traits). 
Probably the most problematic aspect of the theory is that it mixes the question of 
natural sex differences with the issue of how the autistic cognitive profile differs from that 
of the general population. One reason that autism is associated with a male brain type is the 
fact that autism is more common amongst males than females. Children with autism have a 
sex ratio of 4:1 (malesrfemales) across the full IQ range (Chakrabarti & Fombonne, 2005), 
and a ratio of 9; 1 in the case of Asperger syndrome (Wing, 1981). That is, in the 
population that the AQ is aimed at approximately 90% of the individuals with autism are 
males. However, there are a number of other developmental disorders which 
predominantly affect males (just to give two examples, the male:female ratio is 5:1, and 
10:1 in dyslexia and ADHD, respectively). The idea that sex differences emerge because of 
the same reason as differences between autistic and typically developing groups is also 
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problematic. For example, men generally perform better than women on the mental 
rotation task, and individuals with autism perform better than typically developing males 
(Falter, Plaisted & Davis, 2008). However, men are better than women on the rotational 
aspect of the task (rotation speed), whereas autistic individuals are superior on the non-
rotational aspects (speed of mental comparison of objects). Similariy, poor performance on 
certain tasks can arise due to different reasons in different groups. For example, there are 
obvious and important differences between typically developing 3-year-oIds who do not 
pass the false belief task, and older autistic children, who also fail. As Bloom and German 
(2000, p. B29) note "in all interesting regards, normal 3-year-olds are nothing like older 
children with autism". 
The measure of systemizing also seems to be seriously gender biased with 
representative items including; " I f I were buying a car I would want to obtain specific 
information about its engine capacity." " I find it difficult to read and understand maps." " I f 
there is a problem with the electrical wiring in my home I would be able to fix it myself" 
The SQ questionnaire has also little to do with input-output operations, and it is hard to see 
why systemising should only be relevant to understanding non-social systems, rather than 
understanding any kind of system. As a recent psychometric analysis by Ling, Burton, Salt 
and Muncer (2009) shows, the scale is also better understood as consisting of four 
moderately correlated subscales (technicity, topography, DIY, and structure) than a 
measure of a unitary construct. Finally, the ecological validity of the questionnaire is 
dubious, as it does not correlate well with measures that tap into understanding systems, 
such as the Mechanical reasoning test (although it does correlate with performance on 
some tests where there is a known male advantage, such as the mental rotation test - when 
the effects of gender are not controlled for). 
In conclusion, the EMB theory seems to be aimed at collecting evidence to support 
the claim that "autism can be described as a manifestation of extreme male characteristics" 
rather than at a better understanding o f the cognitive profile of actual autistic people. This 
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is done through making circular claims, where cause and effect relationships (as well as the 
influence of both societal and biological factors) are hard to disentangle. Sadly, besides 
being devoid of practical significance, the theory even turned out to be dangerous in that 
recently Geier and Geier (2007) started to use testosterone-blockers for the "treatment" of 
children with autism, which is a form of chemical castration, usually used in the case of 
adult sex offenders. 
4.2. Reasoning and autism 
In the following section I wil l review the (sparse) existing research on reasoning in 
autism in the areas of analogical reasoning, memory retrieval and conditional reasoning, 
and some studies related to heuristics and biases in autism (two studies on counterfactual 
reasoning, and a study on the framing effect). 
4.2.1. Analogical reasoning in autism 
Analogy enables us to reason about novel phenomena, to identify relevant information on 
the basis of relational similarity, and to transfer knowledge from an initial learning context to 
future environments (e.g.. Hummel & Holyoak, 2005; see Experiment 3 for a brief review on 
analogical reasoning). A small number of studies investigated analogical reasoning in autism. 
Based on some theoretical interpretations, it could be expected that individuals with autism 
would show impairments in this type of reasoning. For example, analogical reasoning is closely 
associated with the executive functions (EF) of the prefrontal cortex (Waltz et al., 1999), which 
are ofien impaired in autism (see Section 4.1.3.). However, such impairment is not universal, and 
autistic people exhibit varying performance profiles across different executive tasks. Some 
studies reported deficits on EF tasks in low- but not high-functioning autistic groups (e.g., 
Hughes, Russell & Robbins, 1994; Ozonoff et al., 2004). There is also some indication that EF 
deficits in autism as compared to typical controls decrease with age (Happe, Booth, Charlton & 
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Hughes, 2006; Ozonoff et al., 2004), although these findings could reflect sampling artefacts (as 
these studies were not longitudinal). 
A deficit in analogical reasoning would also appear to be predicted by the WCC theory 
(see Section 4.1.2.). The WCC theory proposes that typically-developing individuals tend to 
engage in global processing, building up a gist-based representation, whereas autistic individuals 
engage in more detailed, local or piecemeal processing. Other evidence suggests that autistic 
people are impaired in generativity (i.e., using their knowledge spontaneously and flexibly in 
novel situations; Peterson & Bowler, 2000), and they appear to exhibit reduced processing of 
similarities between stimuli; instead, they are better at processing differences (Plaisted, 2001), 
although this characteristic may be restricted to perceptual processing. Autistic people also seem 
to have difficulty understanding metaphors and other types of non-literal language, such as irony 
(e.g., Pexman, 2008). Recently, Happe and Frith (2006) modified the WCC theory, and claimed 
that the finding of a local bias was robust. On the other hand, the evidence regarding weak global 
processing is mixed. Happe and Frith also concluded that the local bias was not a side effect of 
EF or ToM deficits, and that it could be overcome through conscious effort. 
Given that relational integration involves a form of coherence, it would appear that WCC 
theory would predict that autism should lead to a general impairment of analogical reasoning. In 
fact, O'Loughlin and Thagard (2000), using a computational model in which coherence is 
established by constraint satisfaction, predicted (extrapolating from a computer simulation of 
performance on a homograph task) that the ability to reason analogically is very likely to be 
impaired in autism. However, the empirical evidence to date has been mixed. Scott and Baron-
Cohen (1996) reported that autistic children with a learning disability were able to perform 
analogical reasoning tasks as well as both typically-developing children matched in mental age, 
and a group of children with learning disability who were matched in chronological and mental 
age. In contrast. Reed (1996) reported that autistic children showed poorer performance than a 
typically-developing group on two out of four analogical reasoning tasks. More recently, 
Dawson, Soulieres, Gemsbacher, and Mottron (2007) examined autistic people's performance on 
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the Raven Progressive Matrices test (Raven, 1938), which is designed to measure the abihty to 
form perceptual relations and to reason analogically independent of language and formal 
schooling. These investigators found that autistic people with a learning disability according to 
their Wechsler intelligence scores performed in the normal range on the Raven test. 
The performance of autistic people on the Raven test suggests that their ability to reason 
relationally with complex, abstract materials is unimpaired. However, although the Raven test 
requires integration and processing of complex information (Carpenter, Just & Shell, 1990), it 
does not require activation and integration of relevant knowledge (as the problems are purely 
formal). In addition, the presence of distraction is not systematically varied in the Raven test. It 
thus remains possible that autistic people may have difficulty with analogical reasoning when 
they have to retrieve and integrate relevant knowledge, or when they have to resist interference 
(Diamond, 2006). 
Another hypothesis is that autistic people solve Raven problems using a different strategy 
than controls. For example, increased ability to discriminate between and remember highly 
similar visual patterns is characteristic of autistic people, and has been claimed to underlie their 
superior performance on the Block Design task (Caron et al., 2006). This heightened 
discrimination ability could contribute to their success on the Raven test, which requires 
choosing the correct response from an array of visually similar patterns. Superior autistic 
performance in processing differences, coupled with reduced processing of similarities (e.g., 
Plaisted, 2001), might also contribute to the observed discrepancy between autistic people's 
Wise and Raven scores (e.g., Dawson et al., 2007). 
4.2.2. Memory retrieval and everyday conditional reasoning in autism 
Although the results of the analogical reasoning studies indicate that the ability to 
make links between explicitly presented, complex non-verbal information is intact in 
autism, it is less clear whether autistic people are also able to reason about things that have 
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to be inferred. One area of research that could be informative in this respect is the research 
on memory functioning in autism. 
Traditionally children with autism are regarded as having good rote memory (e.g., 
Wing, 1981), but they seem to be impaired in the free recall of pictures and words relative 
to children matched on verbal and non-verbal ability (Boucher & Warrington, 1976), and 
even adults with Asperger syndrome show deficits in this regard (Bowler, Matthews & 
Gardiner, 1997). However, these studies also reported intact recall when participants were 
provided with acoustic, graphemic or semantic cues. In a series of studies Bowler and 
colleagues showed evidence of normal priming and recognition processes (that is, 
unimpaired implicit memory - e.g., Bowler, Gardiner & Grice, 2000), but an impairment 
in episodic memory requiring intentional recall (Bowler et al., 1997) and poor source 
memory (Bowler, Gardiner & Berthollier, 2004) in Asperger syndrome. Bowler et al. 
(2004) have proposed the "task support hypothesis" to account for these findings. 
According to this hypothesis, autistic individuals show greater difficulty in retrieving and 
integrating their background knowledge with a problem context when the task provides 
little support for retrieval. Similarly, Minshew and Goldstein (2001) proposed that the 
memory impairment in autism originates from a failure to use organising strategies or 
meaning to support memory, although the underlying memory representation is intact. 
Based on these considerations Happe and Frith (2006) proposed (using the terms of 
the ftizzy-trace theory - see Section 2.1.3.) that verbatim memory is intact in autism, 
whereas gist memory (which is likely to play a role in structuring the free recall of events) 
might be selectively impaired. In a study investigating eye-witness memory in autism 
(McCroy, Henry & Happe, 2007) children with Asperger syndrome mentioned less details 
of an event during free recall, and they were less likely to recall the most salient ("gist") 
elements of the event than children in the control group. However, general and specific 
questioning elicited the same amount of new information in the autistic and in the control 
group, and in this case both groups recalled the most salient elements of the scenario. An 
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additional important finding of this study was that memory recall was correlated with 
executive functioning in the autistic, but not in the control group. A possible explanation 
for this is that children with autism did not benefit from a spontaneous organization of the 
material, and, consequently, they had to rely on their general executive resources during 
memory retrieval. This finding is in line with Bennetto, Pennington and Rogers (1996) 
who found correlations between memory and E F in autism, and also with Toichi and 
Kamio (2003) who reported an association between memory functioning and non-verbal 
reasoning in autism. 
Everyday conditional reasoning (see Section 2.2.) relies heavily on memory retrieval. 
Namely, the logically valid MP inference (e.g., "if it's raining, Tom gets wet", "It's 
raining, therefore..." ) can be blocked by retrieving counterexamples, such as "Tom has an 
umbrella with him". In this case, relying on real-life knowledge leads to worse logical 
performance. By contrast, in the case of the fallacious AC inference (e.g., "Tom gets wet, 
therefore... ") retrieving real-life knowledge about possible altemative antecedents (for 
example, "Tom has just had a shower") helps blocking the invalid inference. Two recent 
studies looked at conditional reasoning in autism. 
One of them (Pijnacker, Geurts, van Lambalgen, Kan et al., 2009) was conducted 
with high-frinctioning adults with autism, and of individually matched control participants 
(matched on age, gender, handedness, and verbal and non-verbal IQ). Two different tasks 
were used: traditional conditional reasoning problems (MP, MT, DA and AC) , and 
"suppression task" versions of the same inferences. The suppression task consists of 
adding a further premise to a traditional conditional reasoning task, for example a MP 
inference with an additional premise would be: "If Mary has an exam, she will study in the 
library. If the library is open, Mary will study in the library. Mary has an exam. Will Mary 
study in the library?" Without the extra premise people usually endorse the conclusion. 
However, including the extra premise reduces endorsement rates to around 50% (Byrne, 
Espino & Santamaria, 1999). The results of this study showed that although there was no 
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difference between the autistic and control group on the traditional conditional inference 
problems, autistic participants were less influenced by the explicitly presented 
counterexamples in the suppression task. More specifically, they showed less suppression 
of MT and MP, although they showed equal suppression of DA and AC as the control 
group. Moreover, participants in both groups showed significantly lower endorsement rates 
in the suppression task than in the traditional conditional inference task. Overall these 
results give clear evidence that autistic participants were influenced by explicitly presented 
counterexamples, and their performance on the traditional tasks also suggest that they were 
equally influenced by retrieved counterexamples as the control group. According to 
Pijnacker et al. (2009) the reason that autistic participants showed less suppression of MP 
and MT (that is, they showed less suppression of valid inferences) is that they are less able 
than typically developing individuals to deal with exceptions, and it is a sign of their 
reduced mental flexibility. This argument is similar to Klaczynski's (2007) conclusion who 
claimed that children sometimes seem more rational than adults, because they follow rules 
more rigidly, whereas adolescents and adults integrate rule understanding with contextual 
considerations. Consequently, the decisions they make are more likely to deviate from the 
relevant normative rules. 
The other recent study on conditional reasoning in autism (McKenzie, Evans & 
Handley, in press) was conducted with high-functioning adolescents with autism matched 
to a group of typically developing adolescents on age, verbal ability, verbal working 
memory and inhibition. In this study the availability of counterexamples was 
experimentally manipulated in order to examine the role of memory retrieval in 
participants' conditional reasoning performance (in this study only MP and AC inferences 
were included). In the case of typical samples the suppression of inferences is more likely 
when a high number of counterexamples are available, as opposed to when the availability 
of counterexamples is low (e.g., Quinn cS: Markovits, 1998). The results of this study 
showed that in the case of the MP inference typically developing adolescents were 
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influenced by the availability of counterexamples, whereas participants with autism 
showed no effect of availability. By contrast, in the case of A C inferences both groups 
were affected by the availability of counterexamples, although this effect was greater in the 
case of the typically developing group. The results of this study were somewhat similar to 
the Pijnacker et al. (2009) study in that the difference between the autistic and control 
groups was more pronounced in the case of valid inferences. On the other hand, in the 
McKenzie et al. {inpress) study there was a bigger difference between the performance of 
the autistic and the control group. This possibly indicates that some of the differences 
between groups can be better understood as signs of a developmental delay in autism, 
although the difference on the suppression task in the case of valid inferences persisted into 
adulthood. Two other aspects of the McKenzie et al. (in press) study are interesting. 
Besides solving the conditional inference tasks, participants were also asked to rate the 
believability of the relations described in the premises. Moreover, they were asked to 
generate counterexamples that would render the conclusion of the conditional reasoning 
problems invalid. Believability ratings are based on implicit, associative processes and are 
known to have an influence on conditional reasoning, which is independent of the 
availability of counterexamples (e.g., Verschueren, Schaeken & d'Ydewalle, 2005). 
Neither believability ratings, nor the amount and quality of counterexamples generated by 
the two groups differed. This is in line with the claims of the task support hypothesis 
(Bowler et al., 2004) that implicit memory processes are unimpaired in autism, whereas 
explicit memory retrieval is deteriorated. However, autistic participants are able to retrieve 
the contents of explicit memory when they are provided with appropriate cues. 
4.2.3. Heuristics and biases in autism 
Stanovich (2003) described the fundamental computational bias as the automatic and 
ubiquitous tendency to contextualize problems with prior knowledge. In addition to 
contextualisation, people also tend to "socialize" problems, and rely on pragmatic cues and 
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inferences even in impersonal situations; they are looking for deliberative design and 
pattem in randomly generated events; and they try and create a coherent narrative of the 
events of their lives (see also Section 1.1.1). Stanovich (2003) also claimed that these 
tendencies form the basis of the susceptibility to heuristics and biases. Based on the ToM 
deficit and the WCC theory (see Sections 4.1.1. - 4.1.2.) we could expect that individuals 
with autism will not experience the drive to contextualise and socialize problems, and thus 
we could expect them to be less susceptible to reasoning biases. An interesting relevant 
finding is related to the Social Attribution Task (Heider & Simmel, 1944) which is a silent 
animation of geometric objects interacting with each other. Although the figures are 
abstract, people tend to describe their behaviour in mentalistic terms. Klin (2000) asked a 
group of higher-functioning adolescents and adults with autism, and a neurotypical control 
group to describe the behaviour of the objects. Participants with autism tended to describe 
the animation in mainly geometric and physical terms, whereas the control group attributed 
social meaning to the movements of the geometric shapes. Thus, as could be expected 
based on the ToM deficit and WCC accounts, autistic participants did not exhibit the 
fundamental computational bias in the case of this task. 
Another relevant area of research is the investigations into counterfactual reasoning 
in autism. Counterfactual reasoning is reasoning about what might have been if some past 
events had turned out differently (e.g., Byrne, 2007). This type of reasoning underlies 
certain reasoning biases, such as the if-only fallacy (see Chapters 2-3). Studies of typically 
developing children showed that counterfactual reasoning is closely related to false belief 
understanding, even when verbal mental age is controlled for (Riggs, Peterson, Robinson 
& Mitchell, 1998). Peterson and Bowler (2000) conducted a study with children with 
autism, children with severe leaming difficulties (SLD), and a group of typically 
developing children who were matched to the other two groups on verbal mental age. They 
used false belief scenarios which were similar to the unexpected transfer test of false belief 
(see Section 4.1.1), and they asked participants both about the belief of the character (false 
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belief question), and the location of the object if the relocation hadn 7 taken place 
(counterfactual question). Children with autism, but not children with SLD showed 
significantly poorer performance on the false belief task than the control group (the 
difference between the two clinical groups was not significant). The results also showed 
that for the clinical groups the counterfactual reasoning task was significantly easier than 
the false belief task, whereas the two tasks were equally difficult for the (much younger) 
control group. Verbal ability was significantly related to both counterfactual reasoning and 
ToM performance in all groups. Finally, verbal ability and counterfactual reasoning were 
significant predictors of ToM performance in each group. Peterson and Bowler (2000) 
claimed that counterfactual reasoning ability is a necessary, but not sufficient prerequisite 
of passing the false belief task. This is because the ToM task requires the spontaneous 
generation of counterfactual suppositions, whereas the counterfactual alternative is cued in 
the case of the counterfactual reasoning question. 
In Peterson and Bowler's (2000) study only one type of counierfactual reasoning 
(i.e., subtractive reasoning) was investigated. A recent study on counterfactual reasoning 
in children with high fiinctioning autism (Begeer, Terwogt, Lunenburg & Stegge, 2009) 
investigated the development of both additive ("If only I had done...") and subtractive ("If 
only 1 had not done...") counterfactuals in children between the age of 6 and 12. The 
autistic and control groups were matched on age, gender, verbal ability, and ftiU-scale IQ. 
Besides the counterfactual reasoning tasks, children also had to engage in an ideational 
fluency task where they had to generate as many ideas within a certain category as possible 
(e.g., "What can you drink?"). Overall both groups generated a similar number of both 
additive and subtractive counterfactual statements. However, the developmental pattems in 
the two groups differed. In the autistic group, older children tended to generate more 
subtractive counterfactuals than younger children, whereas there was no age-related 
increase in the number of additive counterfactuals. By contrast, in the control group the 
number of additive counterfactuals increased with age, but the number of subtractive 
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counterfactuals remained stable. In addition, 6-8 year old autistic children generated fewer 
subtractive counterfactuals than the control group, whereas 10-12 year old autistic children 
generated fewer additive counterfactuals than controls. Autistic children showed poorer 
performance on the ideational fluency task than the control group, and performance on the 
ideational fluency task was significantly related to generating additive counterfactuals in 
both groups. Begeer et al. (2009) interpreted these findings as a sign of a tendency in the 
autistic group for "think within the box". That is, a tendency to narrow down responses to 
the explicitly given information which results in a preference for generating subtractive, 
rather than additive counterfactuals. However, these patterns could also be interpreted as 
indicating a slight delay in the development of counterfactual reasoning in autism. 
A final study that can be related to the heuristics and biases research programme is 
an investigation into the framing effect in autism (De Martino, Harrison, ICnafo, Bird & 
Dolan, 2008). Participants in this experiment were presented with different scenarios 
where they had to choose between a sure option and a gamble option. Half of the trials 
were framed as "gain trials", the other half were framed as "loss trials". For example, in 
one scenario participants had received £50 and then they had to decide whether they 
wanted to keep £20 (gain scenario)/lose £30 (loss scenario) or they choose to gamble, 
where they had a 60% chance of losing all money and a 40% chance of keeping it all. 
Given the equivalence of the gamble and sure choices in terms of the expected utility, the 
measure of participants' "rationality" was whether they were able to ignore the frame, and 
give the same response on equivalent tasks regardless of presentation (i.e. gain or loss 
frame). Participants had to make a decision within 4 seconds. De Martino and colleagues 
found a strong tendency for the control participants to exhibit a framing effect, which was 
markedly reduced in the autistic group. In addition to the behavioural differences, autistic 
participants exhibited no differential autonomic responses to contextual cues as indexed by 
skin conductance responses. De Martino et al. (2008) related these findings to Type 1 and 
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Type 2 processing, and they claimed that autistic participants have an increased tendency 
towards analytic decision making due to their impaired intuitive reasoning mechanisms. 
4.3. Discussion 
Historically, and in the interest of parsimony, cognitive theories of autism were 
aimed at identifying a single cause that could explain all the symptoms of autism. Four 
major cognitive theories of autism have been developed with this aim: the theory of mind 
deficit hypothesis, the weak central coherence theory, the executive function deficit theory 
and, most recently, the extreme male brain theory. Despite much research in all these areas, 
none of these accounts provide a complete picture of autism. Moreover, indices of autistic 
symptomatology have been found to be unrelated to performance in any cognitive domain, 
suggesting that cognitive capabilities and deficits are not associated with the behavioural 
symptoms of autism (Pellicano et al., 2006). 
Recent evidence from twin-studies also indicates that largely independent genes may 
operate on social skills, communication abilities, and repetitive behaviours (Happe & 
Ronald, 2008). Due to the independent inheritance of the different behavioural symptoms 
of autism, as well as due to the developmental interactions between different symptoms 
which can lead to distinct profiles of strengths and weaknesses in each autistic individual, 
we can expect much heterogeneity within the autistic population. Autism is diagnosed on 
the basis of deficits in social communication, social interaction, and social imagination, 
thus impairments in the social domain are present in all individuals with autism, by 
definition. Many autistic individuals also suffer from executive functioning deficits, and 
they also tend to exhibit a particular cognitive style which results in a reduced level of 
contextualisation, although this can be overcome by conscious effort. 
Investigations into analogical reasoning suggest that autistic individuals are able to 
process the relationships between explicitly presented, complex, non-verbal items. On the 
other hand, the evidence concerning verbal reasoning reveals some differences between 
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autistic and typical populations. Research in the area of memory retrieval suggests that 
autistic individuals have problems with the uncued retrieval of explicit memories, whereas 
they show unimpaired implicit and associative processes. Experiments regarding 
conditional inference show a reduced tendency in autism to contextualise problems with 
relevant background knowledge, even when counterexamples are explicitly presented. 
Similarly, counterfactual reasoning in autism tends to be more restricted than in typical 
development, with a decreased tendency to "think outside the box", and to go beyond 
explicitly presented facts. However, it is also worth mentioning that in the case of high-
ftinctioning individuals with autism, and especially in the case of adults, these differences 
are subtle and participants with autism display similar pattems to control participants. 
Thus, the differences are often quantitative rather than qualitative. 
From the point of view of dual-process theories, the performance of autistic 
participants sometimes seems more logical or normative than that of the control group. For 
example, in the studies on conditional reasoning (McKenzie et al., in press; Pijnacker et 
al., 2009), as well as in a study on the framing effect (De Martino et al., 2008) autistic 
participants were less influenced by contextual information, and thus, in effect, they were 
more "logical" than the control group. In dual-process terms, these findings can be 
interpreted as the results of missing or insufficient Type I input. However, certain Type 1 
processes, such as implicit associations seem to be intact. On the other hand, Type 2 
processing can also be impaired in the case of individuals with autism who suffer from EF 
deficits. However, there is little evidence for a general deficit in working memory or 
inhibition skills in autism (see Hill, 2004), and E F deficits are usually absent or mild in the 
case of high-ftinctioning individuals with autism. Consequently, we can expect that high-
ftinctioning autistic individuals will show increased logical performance on some heuristics 
and biases tasks. 
Some dual-process theorists (e.g., Evans & Over, 1996) suggest that heuristic 
processing leads to correct responses most of the time. Consequently, if individuals with 
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autism rely less on heuristic processing, they will be disadvantaged in many real-life 
situations where typically developing individuals are able to make decisions quickly and 
efficiently. From a developmental perspective, it seems that, at least in the case of some 
reasoning biases, individuals with autism develop the same kind of biases as typically 
developing individuals, but they achieve the same level of development more slowly, and 
sometimes their development does not reach the level of functioning of the mature typical 
system. It is also possible that although some autistic participants show typical 
performance on certain tasks, the underlying cognitive processes are different. In Chapter 5 
I am going to describe two experiments that investigated the development of reasoning 
heuristics in autism. 
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Chapter 5. Heuristic reasoning in autism (Experiments 4 and 5). 
5.0. Introduction to Chapter 5 
\x\ this Chapter we are going to describe two studies that were aimed at investigating 
the development of reasoning heuristics in autism. In these studies we administered the 
same reasoning problems and cognitive ability/executive function measures as in 
Experiments 2 and 3, and a subset of the children who took part in those studies were 
involved in the present experiments as a control group. The experimental findings with 
typically developing children (see Chapter 3) suggested that although in some respects 
children's normative competence increases with age, this is not always evident in their 
actual performance on reasoning tasks, especially in the case of typical heuristics and 
biases tasks where heuristic and normative responses are always in conflict with each 
other. In fact, in the case of young children (between the age of 5 and 11) giving responses 
that are traditionally considered to be heuristic (and also non-normative) was positively 
related to children's cognitive ability. At this stage reasoning performance on the different 
tasks was also moderately related across tasks. In the case of adolescents, performance 
across tasks was mostly unrelated, and the relationship between reasoning performance and 
cognitive capacity also showed very mixed patterns. This can be interpreted as a sign that 
at this stage of development some heuristic responses were produced relatively quickly and 
automatically, whereas others were still dependent on general cognitive resources. Based 
on these findings, we concluded that using reasoning heuristics is a developmental 
achievement which is closely related to the development of general cognitive resources, 
and possibly to the development of executive functions as well. 
In Chapter 4, we gave an overview of the reasons why it can be expected that the 
development of heuristics will be atypical in autism. Based on the prominent cognitive 
theories of autism, two conflicting predictions can be made. The weak central coherence 
theory (Frith & Happe, 1994; Happe, 1999) proposes that individuals with autism engage 
159 
in a piecemeal, detail-focussed processing, and they are less inclined to extract the gist of 
stimuli that they are presented with than typically developing individuals. As heuristic 
responding is considered to be based on the perceived contextual links between the 
representation of a task and a particular response option, we can expect that autistic 
children will be less sensitive to these contextual cues, and will consequently produce 
fewer heuristic responses. Alternatively, it is possible that autistic individuals achieve 
global coherence, but this does not happen spontaneously. Instead contextualisation will be 
optional, and when it happens, it will require conscious effort (Happe & Frith, 2006). 
We can also expect autistic children to be less susceptible to reasoning heuristics and 
biases on the basis of the extreme male brain theory (Baron-Cohen, 2002). This theory 
proposes that autistic cognition is characterized by a strong drive for systemizing. 
Systemizing makes it possible to analyse and understand the variables and rules that 
govern the behaviour of a system, and it also involves the drive to construct systems 
(which can be mechanical, natural, abstract or other). On the basis of this description we 
could expect that individuals with autism will be good at extracting the logical structure of 
tasks, and as a result, will be more likely to produce normatively correct responses. 
On the other hand, based on the executive function deficit theory (see e.g.. Hill, 2004 
for a review) it could be hypothesized that individuals with autism have impaired Type 2 
processing abilities. That is, they will be more susceptible to biases than typically 
developing children. However, as we have seen in Chapter 3, in the case of children Type 
2 processing can lead to responses that are traditionally considered to be heuristic. Thus, on 
the basis of these findings we can expect that a Type 2 deficit could result in less bias in 
the case of individuals with autism. Taken together the claims of all these accounts, the 
most likely result in the case of children is decreased heuristic processing in autism. 
Looking at the results of studies that have investigated the reasoning abilities of 
individuals with autism (see Section 4.2.), the findings are mixed. Research into analogical 
reasoning suggests that autistic individuals are able to process the relationships between 
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explicitly presented, complex, non-verbal items (i.e., they perform well on the Raven test -
see Dawson et al., 2007). On the other hand, the evidence concerning verbal reasoning 
reveals some differences between autistic and typical populations. Research in the area of 
memory retrieval suggests that autistic individuals have problems with the uncued retrieval 
of explicit memories, whereas they show unimpaired implicit and associative processes. 
Experiments on conditional inference show a reduced tendency in autism to contextualise 
problems with relevant background knowledge, even when counterexamples are explicitly 
presented. Similarly, counterfactual reasoning in autism tends to be more restricted than in 
typical development, with a decreased tendency to "think outside the box", and to go 
beyond explicitly presented facts. However, it is also worth mentioning that in the case of 
high-functioning individuals with autism, and especially in the case of adults, these 
differences are subtle and participants with autism display similar pattems to control 
participants. Thus, the differences are often quantitative rather than qualitative. In any case, 
the above findings support the idea that there is a reduced tendency in autism to 
contextualize complex verbal stimuli (see also Lopez & Leekam, 2003). In line with this 
assumption, in the studies on conditional reasoning (McKenzie et al., in press; Pijnacker et 
al., 2009), as well as in a study on the framing effect (De Martino et al., 2008) autistic 
participants were less influenced by contextual information, and as a result they were more 
"logical" than the control group. In developmental studies (McKenzie et al., in press) 
autistic individuals also seemed to show a developmental delay in displaying some typical 
biases. 
In summary, it seems that individuals with autism develop the same kind of biases as 
typically developing individuals, but they achieve the same level of development more 
slowly, and sometimes their development does not reach the level of functioning of the 
mature typical system. As a result, they sometimes seem more normative or logical than 
typically developing individuals, as they display less biases. However, these differences 
between groups can be very subtle or even absent. Nevertheless, it is also possible that 
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although autistic participants show similar performance to the control group on certain 
tasks, the two groups rely on different cognitive processes whilst they solve the tasks (for 
example, they contextualise verbal materials through conscious effort). 
i . /. Experiment 4: The development of heuristic reasoning in autism and its relationship to 
cognitive abilities and executive functioning. 
The main aim of this study is to compare the tendency to rely on heuristic reasoning 
in autism and in typical development. Based on the theoretical approaches that we 
reviewed in the introduction, the most probable outcome is that children with autism will 
be less susceptible to heuristics than typically developing children (see Table 5.1. for a 
summary). Another aim is to explore the links between potential differences between 
groups both in their reasoning performance and their cognitive abilities/executive function 
(EF) skills. Finally, given that a prominent cognitive theory of autism is based on the 
assumption that EF deficits are widespread in autism, it can be informative to compare the 
EF skills of the two groups. Although EF components are usually investigated through 
extracting latent variables from a number of different tasks, using a large group of 
participants, many studies that have investigated EF-deficits in autism used small groups 
and they also employed tasks that required the simultaneous use of multiple EF-skills. In 
the present study we used tasks that measure working memory capacity, inhibition and set-
shifting ability, which were identified as the main aspects of EF (Miyake et al, 1999). The 
fact that we use tasks that tap into all main components of E F , and that each of these tasks 
measure a single EF-component (rather than a combination of different skills) makes this 
aspect of the study interesting in itself 
Investigating E F skills and reasoning performance within the same group of 
participants can also be informative from another point of view. Frith (2003) speculated 
that EF deficits in autism might be the result of poor pruning (i.e., the elimination of faulty 
connections between neurons), which she also connected with weak central coherence in 
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autism. Consequently, EF-deficits could be related to a decontextualised thinking style 
(that is, less use of heuristics in reasoning tasks). There is a wave of synapse formation in 
the fi-ontal cortex just before puberty (age 11 in girls, 12 in boys) which is followed by a 
pmning back in adolescence (Giedd, 2004). The differences between autistic and typically 
developing children should emerge at the time when pruning takes place, that is, after the 
age of 12. The idea that EF deficits should be related to a decontextualised thinking style 
goes against the claims of dual-process theorists, but it fits well with the concept that 
general cognitive resources are necessary for the development of reasoning heuristics. 
Table 5.1. Expectations about heuristic use in autism based on some prominent theoretical 
approaches. 
Theoretical approach Expectations about 
heuristic use 
Mechanism 
Weak central coherence 
theory 
Extreme male brain theory 
Executive dysfijnction 
theory 
Task support hypothesis 
Less heuristic use 
Less heuristic use 
More/less heuristic 
use 
Less heuristic use 
Piecemeal processing style, 
reduced sensitivity to context 
Piecemeal processing style, 
increased sensitivity to structure 
and factual information 
Executive fiinction deficits 
(reduced ability to resist 
interference / piecemeal processing 
style) 
Problems with uncued retrieval of 
contextually related concepts 
In summary, the present study is the first one to examine the performance of autistic 
children on a range of classic heuristics and biases problems. Based on some prominent 
cognitive theories of autism, we expect that if there are any differences between groups, it 
is likely that autistic children will produce fewer heuristic responses to typical heuristics 
and biases tasks than the control group. This prediction is however complicated by the fact 
that once children are able to produce heuristic responses automatically, they might 
suppress these responses, if they are aware of the conflict between these heuristics and a 
relevant normative rule (see Stanovich & West, 2008). As a result, in the case of these 
tasks there might be no difference in the responses given by the two groups, or EF-deficits 
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can lead to more heuristic responses. Additionally, we can expect either no difference in 
the EF skills of the two groups, or some impairment in the autistic group. Alternatively, 
there might be no difference between heuristic responding across groups, because children 
with autism engage in an effortful contextualisation process (cf. Happe & Frith, 2006). 
Thus, although it is possible that children with autism wi l l produce the same number 
of heuristic responses as the control group, in these cases we expect that the relationships 
between heuristic responses and the measures of cognitive capacity and executive 
functioning will differ between groups. Namely, it is likely to be the result of either autistic 
children giving heuristic responses based on an effortful contextualisation process, or the 
lack of difference between groups is the result of typically developing children's effortflilly 
suppressing heuristic responses. In the first case, there should be a positive correlation 
between cognitive capacity and heuristic responding in the autistic group only. In the latter 
case, there should be a negative correlation between heuristic responding and measures of 
executive functioning (especially inhibition) in the typically developing group only. 
Method 
Participanls 
Twenty-five high functioning children with autism (1 giri) took part in the study 
(mean age 14 years 4 months). Diagnostic records of the children showed that every child 
had received a diagnosis of autism by experienced clinicians. No child had a diagnosis of 
Asperger's syndrome or Pervasive Developmental Disorder. Additionally, 41 typically 
developing children (18 girls; mean age 13 years 10 months) participated in the study as a 
control group. The typically developing participants involved in this study were the same 
children as in Experiment 2, and the individual differences measures used in both studies 
were also identical (consisting of the Vocabulary and Block Design subtests of the WISC, 
the counting span task, the stop-signal task, and the colour-shape set-shifting task). 
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Table 5.2. displays the descriptive statistics for the measures of cognitive capacity 
and executive functioning across groups. We failed to collect data from 2 participants on 
the working memory task, I participant on the block design task, 3 participants on the 
inhibition task, and 2 participants on the set-shifting task due to software errors or the 
experimenter's failure. Autistic participants scored significantly lower on the working 
memory and vocabulary tasks. There was no difference between groups in terms of age, 
block design scores, inhibition or set-shifting. We also compared the two groups on the 
combined WISC score (the combined z scores of the two subtests), and there was no 
difference between groups on this measure either. 
Table 5.2. Comparisons between the autistic and the control group on the measures of 
cognitive abilities and executive functions. 
M(SD) t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Age (in 
months) 
autistic 
control 
\1\M(3.54) 
165.78 (1.96) 
1.50 72 .14 
Working 
memory 
autistic 
control 
5.32 (6.1) 
9.45 (8.65) 
2.12 70 .04 
Vocabulary autistic -^X.96 (9.66) 
2.12 72 .04 
control 36.51 (6.52) 
Block 
design 
autistic 
control 
48.76 (10.42) 
49.75 (9.67) 
.40 71 .69 
WISC autistic 
control 
.00 (1.47) 
-.02 (1.63) 
.06 71 .95 
Inhibition autistic 42.39 (12.13) 
.14 69 .89 control 42.02 (10.09) 
Set-shifting autistic .SO (14) 
.09 70 .93 
control .19(14) 
Materials and procedure 
The same reasoning tasks as in Experiments 1 and 2 were used (see Appendix A), 
and the procedure was also the same. Participants took part in two sessions. Session 1 took 
about 15 minutes, and participants solved the reasoning tasks. Participants were tested in 
small groups. After listening to the instructions given by the experimenter they worked 
165 
through the tasks individually. Session 2 consisted of the counting span task, the 
vocabulary and block design subtests of the WISC-III, the stop-signal task, and the set-
shifting task. This session took about 40 minutes, and children did the tasks on a computer 
(apart from the WISC subtests), supported by the experimenter. 
Results 
ANOVAs were conducted on the number of heuristic, analytic and "other" responses 
(see Table 5.3.) in order to analyze the effects of participant group on each problem 
(supplementary tables can be found in Appendix S4). As there was a significant difference 
between groups in their working memory and vocabulary scores, these were included as 
covariates in the analyses. However, this did not significantly change the results (apart 
from in the case of the conjunction fallacy task, see below). Consequently, we report the 
results of the simple ANOVA analyses. It is also worth noting that controlling for 
differences in verbal ability is considered to be dubious by some theorists, as impairments 
in verbal ability are a fundamental aspect of autism. Thus, controlling for differences in 
verbal ability possibly results in indirectly "controlling for autism" (see Bishop, 1997). 
On the syllogistic reasoning task the ANOVAs indicated a main effect of participant 
group in the case of the heuristic responses (F(I,73)=6.58,p<.05, rjp^=.09). This was 
because autistic participants gave more belief-based responses than the control group. No 
other effects or interactions reached significance (Fs<4, ps>.05). 
In the case of the sunk cost fallacy, the main effect of participant group on normative 
responses was significant (F(l ,73)=4.89, p<,05, v /= .07) . This indicated that autistic 
children gave fewer normative responses than children in the control group. There was also 
a main effect of participant group in the case of "other" responses (F(l ,73)=l8. l3 ,p<.00l , 
Vp^=.2l), indicating that autistic children gave significantly more "other" responses to the 
tasks than typically developing children, which corresponded to a reversed sunk cost effect 
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(a tendency to abandon an unpleasant situation more readily i f previous investment has 
been made). 
There was no effect of group on any type of response in the if-only fallacy problems. 
In the case of the conjunction fallacy, there was a main effect of participant group on 
heuristic/normative responses (F(l,73)=5.28, p<.05, f]p^=.01). This indicated that autistic 
children committed the fallacy significantly less often than the control group. However, 
when we included vocabulary and verbal working memory as covariates, this effect 
disappeared (F(l,73)=2.16, p=-\5) and there was only a significant effect of vocabulary 
scores (F(l,73)=4.65,p<.05, t]p=.01). 
Table 5.3. Proportion of heuristic, normative and "other" responses on the different types 
of reasoning andjudgment tasks across participant groups (SDs in parentheses). 
autistic control 
Syllogistic Heuristic responses .59 (.25) .43 (.25) 
reasoning Normative responses .27 (.22) .37 (20) 
Other responses .\A(13) 20(18) 
Sunk cost Heuristic responses .20(29) .22 (29) 
fallacy Normative responses .44 (36) .63 (34) 
Other responses .36(37) .08 (19) 
If-only fallacy Heuristic responses .44 (36) .54 (38) 
Normative responses .50 (35) .43 (.35) 
Other responses .06(17) .03(12) 
Conjunction Heuristic responses M(23) .96(14) 
fallacy Normative responses .\4(23) .04(14) 
Relationships between the individual differences measures 
The next set of analyses examined the relationship between age (in months), 
cognitive ability (as indicated by the counting-span task, and the short form of the WISC-
III) , and executive functioning (as measured by the stop-signal task, and the set-shifting 
task). Results are displayed in Table 5.4. 
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Table 5.4. Correlations between the cognitive ability measures for the autistic sample (the 
results for the typically developing sample in Experiment 2 are displayed in brackets). 
T I T A. 5^  
1. age in months 
2. WISC ,20 (,23) — 
3. working memory M(37*) .29 (49**) — 
4. inhibition .25 (.24) -.08 (25) ,16(15) 
5. set-shifting cost -.02 (~.19) .12 (-.20) 'A\* (-.25) '34(-.J6J 
In the typically developing group (see Experiment 2) there was a significant 
correlation between age and working memory (r(45)=.37,/?<.05), and WISC scores and 
working memory (r(44)=.49,/7<.01). In the case of the autistic group, although there were 
some medium-sized correlations, because of the small sample size {n=25) these 
correlations were mostly statistically unreliable. The only significant relationship was a 
negative correlation between set-shifting cost and working memory capacity. That is, the 
higher children scored on the verbal working memory task, the better they were at set-
shifting. Miyake, Emerson, Padilla and Ahn (2004) reported that articulatory suppression 
increased the switch cost on the colour-shape task in an adult sample. They suggested that 
inner speech might be required for retrieving and activating relevant task goals. Thus, 
children with autism might show impairments on the set-shifting task (and might have 
problems with flexibly switching between representations in general) because they have 
verbal working memory deficits. In fact, many previous studies found a relationship 
between memory functioning and EF in autism, but not in typical development (e.g., 
Bennetto et al., 1996; McCroy el al., 2007). However, although we found a relationship 
between set-shifting and verbal working memory in the autistic sample, and autistic 
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children had significantly lower working memory scores than the control group, there was 
no difference between groups in their set-shifting ability. 
Relationships between the individual differences measures and heuristic responding 
As a next step, the correlations between the individual differences measures and 
heuristic responding on the reasoning and decision-making tasks were analysed (the results 
are displayed in Table 5.5.). In the case of the autistic sample we did not combine the 
Wise and working memory scores as we did in the case of typically developing children, 
since the two scores were not significantly correlated (although we did find a medium-size 
correlation between the two measures). Heuristic responding was not reliably related to 
age. However, there was a significant positive correlation between WISC scores and 
committing the if-only and the conjunction fallacy. These correlations remained significant 
even after controlling for the effects of age: r(20)=.55, p<.0\, in the case o f the if-only 
fallacy, and r(20)=.45,p<.05, in the case of the conjunction fallacy. 
Finally, we analysed the relationships between heuristic/analytic responding on the 
different tasks in the autistic group (see Appendix S4, Tables 2 and 3). As in the case of the 
typically developing children, there was no relationship between giving heuristic/analytic 
responses to the different tasks. 
Table 5.5. Correlations between the individual differences measures and heuristic 
responding on the different tasks in the autistic group (results for the typically developing 
sample from Experiment 2 are displayed in brackets). 
WISC Working Set-shifting 
age scores memory Inhibition cost 
Belief bias .23^--/^; M (-18) ,02 (-,24) AsTTJF) .13 (07) 
Sunk cost fallacy .10 (-.06) .13 (-.11) -.01 (-.18) .05 (-.32*) .27 (08) 
If-only bias ,29 (W) .51*^.22) .27 (12) .01 (25^) -.23 (08) 
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Conjunction fallacy M (.29*) .45^.25) .23 022) -.02 ^./J) .10^20; 
Discussion 
This study was aimed at investigating the differences between the development of 
reasoning heuristics in autism and in typical development, as well as the differences 
between groups in their general cognitive resources and EF skills. Our participants with 
autism showed no general impairment in their cognitive capacity and executive 
functioning. The two groups performed at the same level on the short form of the WISC, 
on the inhibition measure and on the set-shifting task. However, participants with autism 
scored significantly lower on the working memory measure and on the vocabulary task. 
Certain theoretical accounts (e.g., Baddeley, Gathercole & Papagno, 1998) propose that 
there is a direct causal link from poor verbal working memory and delayed vocabulary 
acquisition. However, poor vocabulary can also contribute to poor working memory 
performance (Hulme & Roodenrys, 1995). Verbal working memory is also involved in 
flexible switching between mental representations (Miyake et al., 2004), and we found 
evidence for a relationship between set-shifting ability and working memory scores in our 
sample. Nevertheless, we found no evidence for impairments in mental flexibility (as 
indexed by set-shifting performance) in the autistic group. 
To the best of our knowledge this is the first experiment which has investigated 
heuristic reasoning in autistic people. Based on some prominent cognitive accounts of 
autism (see Table 5.1. for a summary), we expected that autistic children w i l l produce less 
heuristic responses to typical heuristics and biases tasks than the control group, at least on 
a certain subset of tasks. Namely, we expected this in the case of tasks where there was no 
evidence in the control group that children suppress heuristic responses (i.e., the if-only 
fallacy and the conjunction fallacy -see Experiment 2). Alternatively, we expected autistic 
children to produce the same number of heuristic responses on these tasks as the control 
170 
group, but to do this through conscious effort. In fact, we found that although there was no 
clear evidence for less bias in the autistic sample (the difference between groups in the 
case of the conjunction fallacy task was the result of differences in their verbal abilities). 
However, the correlational patterns indicated that autistic children produced heuristic 
responses on these tasks relying on effortftil (Type 2) processing. By contrast, typically 
developing children seemed to produce these responses effortlessly, although the non-
significant correlations between cognitive capacity/EFs and heuristic responding on these 
tasks were positive. There was also a significant positive correlation between cognitive 
capacity and heuristic responding on the conjunction fallacy task in the typically 
developing group, but it disappeared after controlling for age. 
There are also some heuristic responses that children can produce with little effort, 
but they tend to suppress them, because they are aware of the conflict between these 
heuristics and a relevant normative rule (see Stanovich & West, 2008). In the case of these 
tasks it can be expected that EF-deficits should lead to more heuristic responses in the case 
of the autistic group. Based on the results of Experiment 2, this was to be expected in the 
case of the belief bias and the sunk cost fallacy. In fact, participants with autism were more 
susceptible to the belief bias than the control group. Although there was no difference 
between groups in committing the sunk cost fallacy, typically developing children gave 
more normative responses to these tasks. The fact that autistic children did not suppress 
these heuristics as typically developing children did, might be the result o f them not being 
able to produce these heuristics automatically. Alternatively, in the case o f the syllogistic 
reasoning task, typically developing children's advantage could be the result of their 
benefitting from the context the tasks were presented in. When investigating the 
performance of young children, children with autism and children with a learning disability 
on syllogistic reasoning problems, Leevers and Harris (1999) found that in general children 
benefitted from presenting the problems in a fantasy context. Specifically, providing a 
fantasy context made it possible for typically developing children, and children with a 
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learning disability to accept false premises as the basis of their reasoning, and to avoid 
belief bias (i.e., simply saying that believable conclusions followed from the premises, and 
unbelievable conclusions did not). By contrast, autistic children did not benefit from the 
fantasy context, and they performed at chance level. 
Going back to our results, just as in the typically developing group, there was no 
relationship between heuristic/normative responding across tasks. This is in conflict with 
the predictions of dual-process theories, but supports the idea that heuristic reasoning 
develops through different stages. There is an initial effortful stage, followed by a more 
automatic stage, which is (sometimes) followed by a stage where heuristics are consciously 
suppressed. The exact timing of these stages can differ across different tasks, depending on 
the complexity of the contextualisation process. In the case of the autistic sample it seemed 
that belief-based responses on the syllogistic reasoning task, and sunk cost responses were 
produced relatively effortlessly, whereas if-only responses and committing the conjunction 
fallacy required conscious effort. 
5.2. Experiment 5: Susceptibility to heuristics, and analogical reasoning ability in autism. 
Experiment 5 was a partial replication of Experiment 3. This study was conducted 
with a different group of autistic children (except for 7 children who also took part in 
Experiment 4). A subset of children from Experiment 3 was included as a control group. 
As we described in Chapter 3, each task was presented in two versions: one in which there 
was a conflict between logic/a normative rule and intuitions (conflict problems), and in 
another version where logical/normative considerations were in line with intuitions (non-
conflict problems). In the case of non-conflict tasks it was possible to give a normative 
response without relying on a contextualization process, and also without the need to 
suppress a tendency to contextualize. 
Experiment 4 demonstrated that children with autism were less biased than the 
control group in the case of some problems, and more biased in the case of others. We 
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interpreted this variability across tasks as the sign of differences in the nature of the 
contextualization process that was required to solve each task (that is, we assumed that the 
complexity and capacity demand of the contextualization process was not uniform across 
tasks). This interpretation was supported by the findings of Experiment I , where the 
contextualization process required conscious effort in the case of young children, and even 
in the case of adolescents (in Experiments 2 and 3), heuristic responding on some tasks 
was positively related to measures of analogical reasoning. Nevertheless, i f the differences 
between groups only affect contextualized reasoning, it could be expected that there will be 
no difference between groups in the case of tasks where a normative conclusion can be 
reached without contextualized reasoning (at least we could expect autistic children to 
reason about these problems at the level of their general cognitive functioning). That is, in 
the present experiment we can expect that the performance of the two groups will only 
differ on conflict problems, i f there is a group difference in contextualized reasoning only. 
However, i f there is a difference between groups in their reasoning ability at a more 
general level, then we can expect group differences on both conflict and non-conflict 
problems. 
A further manipulation that we used in this study was related to the content of the 
problems. Each type of task was presented in two forms: first as involving objects or 
animals (non-social content), and second as involving people (social content). See Figure 
5.1. for an illustration of the content and conflict manipulations. Note that the conflict and 
non-conflict version of the same problem (e.g., the "Brian problem" or the "tiger 
problem") was administered to different groups of participants. That is, there were 8 
conjunction fallacy problems altogether, and each participant had to solve four problems, 
which corresponded to one of each type. (Although the tasks used in Experiment 3 were 
the same, the effect of the content manipulation was not analysed there). It is well 
documented that autism often results in profound difficulties with everyday social 
interaction. It has been claimed that such deficits arise because autistic people have very 
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specific problems with reasoning within the social domain (see, for example, Adolphs, 
1999). Whilst recent evidence suggests that stereotypes are activated and used as readily 
for autistic as typical populations (Hirschfeld, Bartmess, White & Frith, 2007), it is 
possible that participants with autism show impairments in social reasoning in the case of 
certain problems. Thus, it could be argued that participants with autism reason differently 
about a particular problem not because of differences in the way they contextualise 
information, but because these problems require reasoning about the social world. 
Conjunction fallacy, social, con flict Conjunction fallacy, non-social, con flict 
Brian has a studio, where he works alone. He is a 
very creative man, and he likes to experiment with 
colours. He takes his work to exhibitions, and sells 
some of them too. Mark the following statements 
with number 1 to 4 according to how likely they are. 
o Brian is an aerobics instructor, (non-
representative 1) 
o Brian is a painter, (representative) 
o Brian is a painter and an accountant, 
(representative + non-representative 2) 
o Brian is an accountant (non-representative 2) 
This animal lives in the jungles in Asia. It is quite 
big and strong, and has black stripes on its body. It 
feeds on smaller animals, and sometimes it also 
attacks people. Mark the following statements with 
number 1 to 4 according to how likely they are. 
o This animal lives in large groups, (non-
representative 1) 
o This animal is a big cat. (representative) 
o This animal is a big cat and it likes to eat small 
birds, (representative + non-representative 2) 
o This animal likes to eat small birds, (non-
representative 2) 
Conjunction fallacy, social, non-conflict Conjunction fallacy, non-social, non-
conflict 
Brian has a studio, where he works alone. He is a 
very creative man, and he likes to experiment with 
colours. He takes his work to exhibitions, and sells 
some of them too. Mark the following statements 
with number 1 to 4 according to how likely they are. 
o Brian is an aerobics instructor, (non-
representative 1) 
o Brian is a painter, (representative) 
o Brian is an aerobics instructor and an accountant, 
(non-representative 1 + non-representative 2) 
o Brian is an accountant (non-representative 2) 
This animal lives in the jungles in Asia. It is quite 
big and strong, and has black stripes on its body. It 
feeds on smaller animals, and sometimes it also 
attacks people. Mark the following statements with 
number 1 to 4 according to how likely they are. 
o This animal lives in large groups, (non-
representative 1) 
o This animal is a big cat. (representative) 
o This animal lives in large groups and it likes to eat 
small birds, (non-representative 1 + non-
representative 2) 
o This animal likes to eat small birds, (non-
representative 2) 
Figure 5.\. An illustration of the content and conflict manipulations used in Experiment 5. 
Another reason why this manipulation might be interesting is that there is a known 
content effect in the case of a classic heuristics and biases task. As we described in 
Chapter I , when thinking about sequences of random events, people tend to give 
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responses corresponding to the gambler's fallacy (or negative recency) when the problem 
is about objects, whereas they are more likely to commit the hot hand fallacy (i.e., 
negative recency) when the problems are about people (Ayton & Fischer, 2004; Gilovich 
et al., 1985). Most of the other classic heuristics and biases tasks, however, are generally 
presented with a social content. Thus, it is not clear whether content effects exist in the 
case of other tasks as well (i.e., whether participants give different responses to otherwise 
logically equivalent problems depending on the content of the problems). 
An additional topic that was investigated in this study was analogical reasoning in 
autism. Analogical reasoning requires comparing a source to a target analogue to identify 
systematic relational correspondences (Centner, 1983), enabling a transfer of knowledge to 
novel environments (see Experiment 3 for a review on analogical reasoning, and Section 
4.2.1. for a review of analogical reasoning in autism). On a theoretical basis we could 
hypothesize that analogical reasoning is impaired in autism. For example, a deficit in 
analogical reasoning would be predicted by the executive function deficit account of 
autism, as analogical reasoning is closely associated with the executive functions of the 
prefrontal cortex (Waltz et al., 1999). Given that relational integration involves a form of 
coherence, a deficit in analogical reasoning would also appear to be predicted by the weak 
central coherence theory (Frith & Happe, 1994; Happe, 1999). However, the empirical 
evidence to date has been mixed. Scott and Baron-Cohen (1996) reported that autistic 
children with a learning disability were able to perform analogical reasoning tasks as well 
as both typically-developing children matched in mental age, and a group o f children with 
learning disability who were matched in chronological and mental age. By contrast, Reed 
(1996) reported that autistic children showed poorer performance than a typically-
developing group on two out of four analogical reasoning tasks. More recently, Dawson, 
Soulieres, Gemsbacher, and Mottron (2007) examined autistic people's performance on the 
Raven Progressive Matrices test (Raven, 1938). They found that autistic people with a 
learning disability according to their Wechsler intelligence scores performed in the normal 
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range on the Raven test. This suggests that autistic people are able to reason relational ly 
with complex, abstract materials. However, although the Raven test requires integration 
and processing of complex information (Carpenter, Just & Shell, 1990), it does not require 
the activation and integration of relevant knowledge. In addition, the presence of 
distraction is not systematically varied in the Raven test. It thus remains possible that 
autistic people may have difficulty with analogical reasoning when they have to retrieve 
and integrate relevant knowledge, or when they have to resist interference. It is also 
possible that autistic people solve Raven problems using a different strategy than controls. 
The Raven test requires choosing the correct response from an array of visually similar 
patterns. Autistic people might rely on their increased ability to discriminate between and 
remember highly similar visual patterns (e.g., Caron et al., 2006) when they solve Raven 
problems. In the present study we also investigated the relative difficulty o f the items 
involved in the analogical reasoning tasks across groups. I f the autistic group relies on 
different abilities to solve analogical reasoning problems, then the item analyses should 
reveal this. 
In summary, this experiment investigated the following questions. In order to 
examine further why autistic children perform differently from control children on some 
classic heuristics and biases tasks, we included some control tasks where heuristic and 
normative responses were in line with each other. The effect of task content (social/non-
social) on children's performance was also investigated in order to decide whether the 
differences in reasoning performance are generally present, or they are restricted to 
reasoning about the social domain. Children also solved different types of analogical 
reasoning problems (which were aimed at measuring their ability to reason analogically 
about both abstract and thematic materials). Finally, the relationships between reasoning 
performance on the heuristics and biases and analogical reasoning tasks were also 
investigated. According to Kahneman and Frederick's (2004) notion of attribute 
substitution, heuristic reasoning is based on making links between situations that are 
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similar in some respect, and transferring knowledge from one context to another. 
Analogical reasoning has been described in very similar terms (see e.g. Centner, 1983). 
On the other hand, Stanovich (e.g., 1999) emphasizes the need to decontextualise and 
decouple representations while solving heuristic reasoning problems. Analogical 
reasoning also requires the decoupling of representations, and based on this view, we 
could expect it to be related to normative (rather than heuristic) responding. As we have 
seen in Experiment 3, there was in fact some evidence for a relationship between heuristic 
and analogical reasoning in the case of typically developing children, and the relationship 
was positive (which is in line with the attribute substitution, rather than the decoupling 
view of heuristic reasoning). 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty children (2 females) with autism (Autistic Disorder: AD) took part in the 
study (7 children from this group also took part in Experiment 4). The children were 
between the age of 11 and 16 (mean age 13 years 11 months). Diagnostic records of the 
children showed that every child had received a diagnosis of autism by experienced 
clinicians using the guidelines of DSM-IV (American Psychological Association, 1994). 
No child had a diagnosis of Asperger's syndrome or Pervasive Developmental Disorder. 
Al l participants in the A D group had a language delay, and at the lime of the testing they 
took part in language and communication development classes in specialist units within 
their schools. 
hi addition, thirty-five typically-developing children (17 females), between the age 
of 11 and 16 (mean age 13 years 1 month) participated in the study as a control group. An 
independent samples / test indicated that children in the control group were significantly 
younger than the children with autism (/(53)=2.l9,/7<.05). Children in the control group 
had no known clinically significant impairment or diagnosis. The criterion for including 
children in this experiment was that they had to solve all reasoning tasks and individual 
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differences measures that were administered to the autistic group. Due to the fact that we 
did not manage to collect data on all tasks from many children in Experiment 3, the control 
group included in this experiment was around half the size of the original sample. Whether 
a child was able to complete all the tasks did not reflect their abilities, rather it was 
determined by the availability of the class that they belonged to. 
The same measures of cognitive ability and executive ftinctioning were used as in 
Experiment 3: the short form of the WISC-III (Wechsler, 1991) consisting of the block 
design and the vocabulary subtests. Set 1 of the Raven Advanced Progressive Matrices 
(Raven, Raven & Court, 1998), and the counting span task (see Handley et al., 2004). In 
addition, children were also administered a computerized version of the Corsi blocks task 
(based on Vandierendonck, Kemps, Fastame & Szmalec, 2004), a visuospatial counterpart 
to verbal working-memory span tasks. We used both a forward and a backward recall 
version of the task. The forward recall version is a purer indicator of visual-spatial working 
memory, whereas the backwards version additionally loads on central executive resources 
(Vandierendonck et al., 2004). 
Table 5.6. Comparisons between the autistic and the control group on the measures of 
cognitive capacity and executive functioning. 
Mean ^53) P 
Raven autistic 
control 
7.25 (2.20) 
6.83 (2.49) 
.63 .53 
Vocabulary autistic 27.85 (8.96) 
.67 .50 
control 29.31 (7.01) 
Block design autistic 
control 
46.55(12.61) 
46.80(10.47) 
.08 .94 
Counting span autistic 
control 
20.85(10.11) 
25.11 (8.11) 
1.71 .09 
Corsi forwards autistic 
control 
10.25 (4.22) 
9.94 (2.96) 
.31 .76 
Corsi backwards autistic 
control 
7.80 (4.10) 
8.84 (2,28) 
1.16 .25 
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Table 5.6. presents the results of the comparisons between the autistic and the control 
groups on the measures of cognitive capacity and executive functioning. There was no 
significant difference between the groups on any of these measures apart from a marginally 
significant difference on the verbal working memory measure, indicating a trend for 
autistic participants to score lower on this task. In order to take account of differences 
between groups, we included age as a covariate in our main analyses. Where there was no 
effect of age, we report the simpler ANOVA models. 
Materials and procedure 
There were sixteen tasks altogether, four tasks measuring each type of heuristic: the 
representativeness heuristic (on the engineers and lawyers problem with a representative 
description), the equiprobability bias (on the engineers and lawyers problem with a non-
representative description), the hot hand / the gambler's fallacy (i.e., positive/negative 
recency effects), and the conjunction fallacy. We used a 2x2 design where tasks measuring 
each heuristic were presented both with a social and a non-social content, and two out of 
the four tasks were conflict problems, and the other two were non-conflict problems. In the 
present study we employed three analogical reasoning tasks. In addition to the APM, 
children were also administered a picture analogy task (ICrawczyk et al., 2008), and a scene 
analogy task (Richland et al., 2006). Both the picture analogy and the scene analogy task 
require the activation and application of real-life knowledge. In the more difficult versions 
of both tasks, participants have to resist perceptual and semantic interference. For a 
description of each task see the method section of Experiment 3. The full list of tasks can 
be found in Appendix B. 
Al l the problems were presented in a booklet. The different types of reasoning 
problems were mixed together in a random order. The analogical reasoning tasks were 
presented afler the heuristics and biases problems in a fixed order. The experimenter read 
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out the instructions and participants worked through the problems at their own pace. The 
individual differences measures were administered individually in a separate testing 
session. 
Results 
The effects of conflict, content and group membership on performance on the reasoning 
andjudgment tasks. 
2x2x2 mixed ANOVAs were run for each type of task with group (autistic/control) 
as a between-subjects variable and problem type (conflict/non-conflict), and content 
(social/non-social) as within-subjects variables. As in Experiment 3, the differences in 
normative responding across conflict and non-conflict tasks were analysed. The purpose of 
these analyses was to assess children's susceptibility to the different heuristics measured 
by the tasks. Due to the significant difference in age between groups, we included this 
measure as a covariate in our analyses. Where age had no effect on the results, we report 
the simple ANOVA analyses. A supplementary table for the analyses can be found in 
Appendix S5 (Table I ) . 
The first task was the engineers and lawyers problem with a representative 
description. Table 5.7. displays the proportion of children who chose each type of 
response. The ANOVA indicated a significant effect of conflict (F(l,51)=20.54,p<.00l, 
rfp^=.29), and a significant conflict by age interaction (f(l,5l)=7.01 ,/7<.05,9]p^=,\2) on 
normative responses. 
In order to examine the nature of this interaction further, we divided our sample into 
two age groups. There were 29 children in the younger group (8 autistic children and 21 
typically developing children; mean age: 12 years 2 months) and 26 children in the older 
group (12 autistic and 14 typically developing children; mean age: 14 years 8 months), and 
we compared the difference bet\veen normative responses on the conflict vs. non-conflict 
problems. That is, we subtracted the number of normative responses on the conflict 
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problems from normative responding on the non-conflict problems. As in Experiment 3, 
we used this measure as an indicator of susceptibiHty to heuristics (in the present case, the 
measure of susceptibility to representative information that is in conflict with base rates). 
An independent samples / test indicated that younger children (M=\.62, SD=.56) were 
more susceptible to representativeness than older children (A/=I.12, SD=J\; /(53)=2.94, 
p>.0\). That is, base rate information had a greater effect on children's responses as they 
got older. 
Table 5.7. The proportion of participants choosing each type of response across groups, 
content and conflict conditions on the engineers and lawyers problem with a representative 
description. 
rep. 
Conflict 
base rate 
(non-rep.) 
equally 
likely 
rep. / 
base rate 
Non-conflict 
non-rep. equally 
likely 
Aut. Social .75 (.44) .20 (41) .05 (.22) .80 (.41) .05 (.22) .15 (.37) 
Non- .80 (.41) .15 (.37) .05 (.22) .80 (.41) .05 (.22) ,15 (.37) 
social 
Control Social .77 (.43) .09 (.28) .14 (.36) .80 (.41) .03 (.17) .17 (.38) 
Non- .83 (.38) .14 (.36) .03 (.17) .89 (.32) .07 (.24) .04 (.17) 
social 
The second task was the engineers and lawyers problem with a non-representative 
description (see Table 5.8. for descriptives). First, we analysed the effect o f conflict, 
content and group membership on giving base rate (i.e., normative) responses. There was a 
significant effect of conflict, indicating that children took base rate information less into 
consideration in the case of conflict tasks, where they were provided with some irrelevant 
individuating information (F(l ,53)=l 5.47, p<.00l, ;//=.23). Additionally, there was a 
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significant conflict by group interaction (F(l,53)=4.45, p<.05, r]p^=.OS). This indicated that 
in the case of conflict tasks autistic children took base rate information more into account 
than children in the control group (that is, they were less sensitive to the conflict between 
base rate information and representativeness). This interaction remained significant even 
after including age as a covariate (F(l,52)=4.2l,p<.05, np^=M). 
Table 5.8. The proportion of children choosing each type of response across groups, 
content and conflict/non-conflict tasks on the engineers and Ia\\ryers problem with a non-
representative description. 
other 
Conflict 
base rate equally 
likely 
other 
Non-conflict 
base 
rate 
equally 
likely 
Autistic Social .15 (.37) .50 (.51) .35 (.49) 0(0) .75 (.44) .25 (.44) 
Non- .25 (.44) .60 (.50) .15 (.37) .25 (.44) .60 (.50) .15 (.37) 
social 
Control Social .34 (.48) .31 (.47) .34 (.48) .06 (.23) .74 (.44) .20 (.41) 
Non- .26 (.44) .29 (.46) .43 (.50) .09 (.28) .69 (.47) .23 (.43) 
social 
The third task investigated the positive/negative recency effects (see Table 5.9. for 
descriptive statistics). The analysis o f the normative responses indicated a significant 
effect of conflict (F(l,53)=16.12,/K.001; /y^,^-24). As expected, participants gave more 
normative responses in the case of non-conflict problems. 
In order to see whether we find the content effects that would be expected based on 
the literature, the responses corresponding to both the positive and the negative recency 
effect were analysed separately. The ANOVA on the positive recency responses indicated 
a main effect of content (F(l,53)=6.43,;7<.05, fjp^=.\ 1) and a main effect o f conflict 
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(F(I,53)=I4.00,/7<.00I, Y]p=lT). That is, children were more hkely to exhibit the positive 
recency effect when they had to predict an outcome which followed a seemingly non-
random sequence (as opposed to a sequence that seemed random). In line with the 
literature on this bias, the positive recency effect was more pronounced when the task had 
a social (as opposed to a non-social) content. There was also a content by conflict 
interaction (F(1,53)= 17.86, p<.001, 26). This indicated that the content manipulation 
only affected performance on the conflict problems (i.e., where the sequence seemed non-
random). 
Table 5.9. The proportion of participants choosing each type of response on the 
positive/negative recency problems across groups, content and conflict/non-conflict tasks. 
Conflict Non-conflict 
positive negative equally Response Response equally 
recency recency likely 1 2 likely 
Autistic Social .47 (.51) 0(0) .53 (.51) 0(0) .06 (.24) .94 (.24) 
Non- .06 (.24) .29 (.47) .65 (.49) .06 (.24) .12 (.33) .82 (.39) 
social 
Control Social .26 (.44) .03 (.17) .69 (.47) .03 (.17) .03 (.18) .94 (.24) 
Non- .11 (.32) .11 (.32) .77 (.43) .06 (.24) 0(0) .94 (.24) 
social 
A similar analysis regarding the negative recency effect indicated a significant effect 
of content (F(l,53)=8.18,p<.01 4), a content by group interaction (f(l,53)=4.25, 
/7<.05; /;p^=.08), and a content by conflict interaction (F(l,53)=8.13,/;<.05; 7^=14). This 
indicated that the negative recency effect was stronger in the case of tasks with a non-
social (as opposed to a social) content. The effect was also stronger in the case of conflict 
tasks. The content by group interaction showed that autistic children were more likely to 
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commit the fallacy when the tasks were about objects, whereas in the control group there 
was no difference between tasks with social and non-social contents (in fact, children in 
the control group did not show a susceptibility to this fallacy). The content by group 
interaction remained significant even after controlling for age (F(l,52)=4.42, p<.05; 
^/=.08). 
In the case of the conjunction fallacy task (see Table 5.10.) heuristic and 
normative responses were mutually exclusive. The ANOVA indicated a significant effect 
of conflict (f*(l,53)=8.85,p<.OI, ///=.14). That is, children were more likely to commit 
the conjunction fallacy i f the conjunction contained a representative event than when it 
consisted of two non-representative events. There was also a significant group by conflict 
interaction (F(l,53)=^.36,p<.05, //p^=.08). This indicated that autistic children were less 
sensitive to conflict than children in the control group. However, after controlling for the 
effects of age, only the conflict by group interaction remained significant (F(l,52)=4.00, 
p<,05, np'=.01). 
Table 5.10. The proportion of participants choosing each type of response on the 
conjunction fallacy problems across groups, content and conflict/non~conflict tasks. 
Conflict Non-conflict 
conjunction normative conjunction normative 
fallacy fallacy 
Autistic Social .80 (.41) .20 (.41) .70 (.47) .30 (.47) 
Non-social .65 (.49) .35 (.49) .65 (.49) .35 (.49) 
Control Social .94 (.24) .06 (.24) .54 (.50) .46 (.50) 
Non-social .86 (.36) .14 (.36) .69 (.47) .31 (.47) 
In summary, on three out of four tasks (with the exception of the engineers and 
lawyers problem with a representative description) we have found evidence for differences 
between groups. Autistic children were less susceptible to the equiprobability bias in the 
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case of the engineers and lawyers problem with a non-representative description, and they 
were also less susceptible to the conjunction fallacy. On the other hand, the autistic group 
showed a stronger negative recency effect than the control group. 
Analogical reasoning performance 
The following analyses concerned children's performance on the analogical 
reasoning tasks. As before, we also ran these analyses including age as a covariate. As 
including this measure as a covariate did not change the results, we report the results of the 
simple ANOVAs below. We have already reported the comparison between groups in the 
case of the APM in the participants section. We also analysed the relative difficulty of the 
Raven items in both groups. The purpose of this analysis was to check whether the test 
measured the same construct in the case of the two groups. Dawson et al. (2007) reported 
that item difficulty on the Raven test was highly correlated between autistic and control 
children. Similarly, in the present sample the correlation was r(IO)=.89,/7<.001. 
Performance on the picture analogy tasks (see Table 5.11.) was analyzed using a 2x2 
mixed ANOVA with distraction (present/absent) as a within-subjects factor, and group 
(autistic/control) as a between-subjects factor. A main effect of distraction was obtained, 
F(\,53)= 88.46, p<.001, r|p^=.63). There was no effect of group, and no distraction by 
group interaction. This indicated that autistic and control participants suffered equal 
impairment from the presence of distractors as response options. 
Table 5.11. Proportion of correct responses on the picture analogy tasks. 
Non-distractor Distractor 
M(SD) M (SD) 
Autistic .73 (.08) .54 (.15) 
Control .75 (.08) .53 (.17) 
Additional independent samples / tests were run to test for possible differences in 
the number of perceptual, semantic and other errors that children made on the picture 
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analogy task (see Table 5.12.). There was no difference between groups in the proportion 
of errors that they made (/s<.80,/?s>.45; the ful l results can be found in Appendix S5 Table 
3). 
Table 5.12. Proportion of perceptual, semantic and other errors across groups on the 
picture analogy tasks. 
Perceptual Semantic Other 
Autistic .03 (.04) .13 (.07) .05 (.07) 
Control .02 (.03) .14 (.09) .04 (.06) 
In order to ftirther assess whether the autistic and control groups solved the picture 
analogy problems using similar strategies, an item analysis was performed. For each group, 
the mean percent correct was obtained for each of the 16 basic items, collapsing across the 
distractor and non-distractor versions. If there are reliable differences among items, and i f 
both sets of participants solved the problems using similar strategies, then we would expect 
to find a robust correlation between the difficulty of the individual items across the groups. 
The relative difficulty of the picture analogy items was indeed highly correlated between 
the autistic and control children, r(14)= 81,/?<.00l suggesting that both groups solved the 
problems using similar strategies. 
Finally, Table 5.13. depicts mean performance on the scene analogy task. We 
performed a 2x2x2 mixed ANOVA on the scene analogy task to examine the effects of 
relational complexity (one or two relations: within-subjects), distraction (present/absent: 
within-subjects), and group (autistic/control: between-subjects). This analysis revealed a 
main effect of relational complexity (F( 1,53)= 22.88,/K.OOl, rjp^=3\), a main effect of 
distraction (F(l,53)= 28.77,p<.O0I., =.36), and a relational complexity by distraction 
interaction (F(l,53)= 10.23,/7<.0I, 7/=. 17). This pattern reflected the fact that children 
perfomied worse on problems with higher relational complexity or in the presence of 
distraction. As is apparent in Table 5.13., the profile of accuracy across conditions was 
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very similar for autistic and control children, and the performance of autistic children was 
again statistically indistinguishable from that of the control group. 
Table 5.13. Proportion of correct responses on the scene analogy tasks. 
Autistic Control 
M(SD) M(SD) 
One relation, non-distractor .89 (. JO) .88 (. 18) 
One relation, distractor ,61 (.35) .66 (.24) 
Two relations, non-distractor .61 (22) .71 (24) 
Two relations, distractor .60 (.26) .64 (22) 
We also compared the groups with respect to the number of perceptual, relational 
and other errors that they made on the scene analogy task (see Table 5.14.), using 
independent samples / tests. There was no difference between groups in the proportion of 
errors that they made (/s<.92, ps>.2>6\ the ful l results can be found in Appendix S5 Table 
3). 
Table 5.14. Proportion of perceptual, relational and other errors across groups on the 
scene analogy tasks. 
Perceptual Relational Other 
M (SD) U(SD) M (SD) 
autistic .13 (13) .13 (10) .05 (.06) 
control .\0(.08) .13 (.07) .05 (.09) 
Finally, we also performed an item analysis similar to that reported above for the 
picture analogy task. For each group, we obtained the mean percent correct for each of the 
20 basic pairs of scenes, collapsing across the four conditions. The relative difficulty of 
the scene analogy items was highly correlated between the autistic and control children, 
/-(I8)=.7I,/7<.001, again suggesting that the two groups used similar strategies to perform 
the analogy task. 
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Relationships between the measures of individual differences in age, cognitive capacity 
and analogical reasoning performance in the autistic group 
The following analyses will only concern the autistic group. The same analyses 
were run in Experiment 3 with a (bigger) group of typically developing children, and those 
results can be used as reference for comparing the underlying processes in the autistic and 
the typically developing group. As we did in Experiment 3, we created an analogical 
reasoning composite score by adding up the z scores of each measure of analogical 
reasoning (the APM, performance on the distractor and non-distractor trials of the picture 
analogy task, and performance at the different levels of relational complexity and 
distraction on the scene analogy task). The Cronbach's alpha for the analogy measure was 
.57 for the autistic group (a Cronbach's alpha above .5 is considered to be an acceptable 
level of reliability - see Rust and Golombok, 1999). 
Table 5.15. Correlations between age and the cognitive ability measures in the autistic 
group (the correlations for the typically developing sample in Experiment 3 are displayed 
in brackets). 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. age — 
2. counting span .42 (18) — 
3. Corsi forwards -.03 .32 — 
4. Corsi backwards .02 .62" .59" — 
5. analogy composite .29 (28*) 36(37**) .26 .51* 
6. Wise composite .25(42**) 39(42**) .23 .67" .43 (59**) -
Table 5.15. displays the correlations between age and the cognitive ability 
measures in the autistic group. Although the sample size was very small, there were some 
strong correlations between measures that reached significance. As expected, analogical 
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reasoning was correlated with the Corsi backwards score, which is a measure of non-verbal 
working memory and executive functioning. Interestingly, the Corsi backwards score was 
also strongly correlated with performance on the verbal working memory task, although 
verbal and non-verbal working memory scores are supposed to be at least partly 
independent (for a comparison, the corresponding correlation in the control group was 
r(29)=-.02, U.S.) . As well as being a measure of non-verbal working memory, the 
backwards version of the Corsi blocks task is also a measure of executive functioning. In 
Experiment 4 there was also a significant correlation between verbal working memory and 
set-shifting ability (which is also related to executive functioning). In the control group 
these correlations were small in size, and non-significant. It has been suggested (e.g., 
Miyake et al., 2004) that inner speech is an important retrieval aid in cueing task goals, and 
goal retrieval is disrupted by articulatory suppression. As verbal working memory is often 
impaired in autism, it is possible that, at least in some cases, executive function deficits 
arise as a result of a problem with verbal processing. 
Relationships between reasoning performance across tasks in the autistic group 
We also investigated the relationship between reasoning performance on the different 
tasks (see Table 5.16.). Based on the results of the previous experiments (apart from 
Experiment 1) it can be expected that participants giving heuristic responses on one task 
will not necessarily give heuristic responses to another task. We can also expect both 
positive and negative associations between susceptibility to heuristics on the different 
tasks. In line with this expectation, there was no significant relationship between heuristic 
responding across tasks (although there was a medium-sized negative correlation between 
heuristic responding on the engineers and lawyers task with a representative description, 
and between the positive/negative recency effect). These results need to be taken with 
caution, as the sample size was very small (w=20). Nevertheless, the pattern of correlations 
appears to be different from what was found in the typically developing group. Thus, 
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unlike in the case of the analogical reasoning tasks, there was some indication that the 
processes underlying performance on these tasks differed between groups. (However, note 
that the differences between correlations across groups were not even close to being 
significant, ps>.21 as indicated by Fisher r to z transformations.) 
Table 5.16. Correlations between susceptibility to different biases in the autistic group 
(correlations for the typically developing group from Experiment 3 are displayed in 
brackets). 
L 2. 3. 
1. Engineers and lawyers problem, repr. 
2. Engineers and lawyers problem, non-repr. ^ , , 
,05 (.34'**) 
3. Positive/negative recency , ^ 
^ ^ -.30(08) .004(08) 
4. Conjunction fallacy 
^ -.18(07) .OS (-.20) -.19 (-.35**) 
Relationships between performance on the reasoning tasks and age, cognitive capacity and 
analogical reasoning 
Our final analysis concerned the relationships between susceptibility to biases and 
the measures of age, cognitive capacity, and analogical reasoning in the autistic sample 
(the correlations are displayed in Table 5.17.). Based on the correlations between the 
different measures of analogical reasoning, we created an analogy composite score (see 
above). In addition, as a measure of cognitive capacity we used the combined z scores of 
the Wise, the counting span task, and the backward version of the Corsi blocks task. 
These measures were strongly associated with each other in the case of the autistic group 
(see Table 5.15.). The Cronbach's alpha for this measure in the aufistic group was .56. As 
before, the susceptibility scores were created by computing the difference between 
normative responding on the non-conflict and conflict versions of each task. This was done 
in a way so that greater susceptibility to a bias resulted in a higher score. As we highlighted 
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before, the correlational analyses relating to the autistic sample have to be interpreted with 
caution due to the small sample size (/j=20). 
Table 5.17. Correlations between age, the cognitive capacity measures and susceptibility 
to different biases in the autistic group. (Correlations that were significant at the p<.W 
level are marked with ^ correlations for the typically developing group from Experiment 3 
are displayed in brackets) 
age 
Cognitive 
capacity 
Analogical 
reasoning 
Engineers and lawyers problem, repr. 
-.46* (.04) -.42 V- -.31 (.36**) 
Engineers and lawyers problem, non-repr. 
•A2(I5) .38^ (04) .25(17) 
Positive/negative recency 
-.01 (16) m(i3) .03 (-.06) 
Conjunction fallacy 
30 (-.22) .48* (~.I5) .33 (-.14) 
Based on the results of Experiment 4, and also on the weak central coherence theory, 
we expected that the relationship between susceptibility to biases and cognitive ability wil l 
be either positive (indicating that producing a heuristic response requires conscious effort) 
or there wil l be no relationship (indicating either that participants with autism do not 
engage in the contextualisation process, or that they are able to contextualise without 
effort). In line with this prediction, there was evidence that susceptibility to the 
conjunction fallacy, and to the equiprobability bias (on the engineers and lawyers problem 
with a non-representative description) were positively related to cognitive capacity. On the 
other hand, susceptibility to the representativeness heuristic (in the case of the engineers 
and lawyers problem with a representative description) was negatively correlated with 
cognitive capacity. After controlling for age all these correlations were non-significant at 
the p<.05 level. However, the strength of correlations remained at a medium level; r(\l)=-
.32 (p>.10) for the representativeness heuristic and cognitive ability, r(17)= 45 (p<.10) for 
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cognitive ability and the equiprobability bias, and r(17)=.42 (p<.10) for cognitive ability 
and the conjunction fallacy. The positive/negative recency effect was unrelated to 
children's cognitive capacity. 
Our final analysis concerned the use of social stereotypes in reasoning. In order to do 
this, we compared the performance of the two groups in the case of the engineers and 
lawyers problem with a representative description. Specifically, we looked at whether 
autistic and control participants were equally likely to choose the representative response 
in the case of non-conflict tasks with both social and non-social content. An ANOVA on 
the representative responses with group (autistic/control) as a between-subjects factor, and 
content (social/non-social) as a within-subjects factor indicated no effect of conflict or 
group, and no conflict by group interaction (Fs<.35, ps>.55). We also compared the 
proportion of participants in each group who rated the representative item as the most 
likely option on the non-conflict conjunction fallacy problems. The purpose of this analysis 
was to evaluate whether both groups identified the representative item as the most likely to 
the same degree. This would indicate that similar knowledge was activated and employed 
in making judgments about the simple options. The analysis revealed no significant 
difference between the proportion of participants from the control and the autistic groups 
ranking the representative item as the most likely either for tasks with a non-social content 
(82% vs. 6I%,/(1)=2.27, n.s.) or for tasks with a social content (90% vs. 83%, / ( l )= .79 , 
n.s.). 
Discussion 
The results of this study were mostly in line with the findings of Experiment 4. 
Probably the most important result is that once again we found evidence for both less and 
more bias in the autistic group, as compared to controls. More specifically, autistic children 
were less susceptible to the equiprobability bias in the case of the engineers and lawyers 
problem with a non-representative description, and to the conjunction fallacy than controls. 
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On the other hand, autistic children were more susceptible to the negative recency effect 
(at least in the case of tasks with a non-social content) than controls. These results suggest 
that "heuristic" responding (that is, producing responses that are traditionally considered to 
be heuristic) on the different tasks have different processing requirements. Instead of 
heuristic responses being produced by a different type of process than normative 
responses, based on the present data it seems more likely that producing both heuristic and 
normative responses requires a certain amount of cognitive effort. Overall it seems that 
reasoning performance differs between groups, although the differences are hard to pin 
down. In the case of certain problems autistic participants seem to show a developmental 
delay (i.e., they perform similarly to a younger typically developing group) and they tend 
to produce fewer of those responses that require conscious effort in the case of the control 
group. Additionally, it is important to note that there was no main effect of group on 
normative responses in the case of any of the tasks, and the performance of autistic and 
typically developing children on non-conflict problems was very similar. This suggests that 
autistic participants did not show a general tendency for normative, rule-based (or logical 
structure-based) reasoning on all tasks, rather they exhibited a distinct pattern of 
responding on conflict tasks only, where contextualised responding played a major role. 
This is in contrast with the predictions of the extreme male brain theory, but it is in line 
with the weak central coherence account. 
Looking at the content effects, it seems unlikely that the differences stem from 
autistic children's having specific problems with reasoning within the social domain (see, 
for example, Adolphs, 1999). In fact, when there was a difference between groups in how 
they reasoned about tasks with a certain content, it affected reasoning about non-social, 
rather than social problems (such as in the case of the negative recency effect). Recent 
evidence suggests that stereotypes are activated and used as readily for autistic as typical 
populations (Hirschfeld, et al., 2007). In order to check i f this is the case, we compared the 
performance of the two groups in the case of the engineers and lawyers problem with a 
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representative description. These results indicated that autistic children used stereotype 
information for drawing simple inferences as readily as typically developing children. That 
is, whatever was the basis of the differences between reasoning performance across groups, 
had little to do with the content of the problems. On the other hand, autistic children were 
more susceptible to the negative recency effect than the control group (which is a bias that 
affected reasoning about objects). Finally, we only found evidence for a general content 
effect in the case of the positive/negative recency task, which is in line with the literature 
(see e.g., Ayton & Fischer, 2004). 
Another interesting aspect of the present study is the data regarding executive 
functioning in autism. One important finding is that in the case of these high-fianctioning 
children with autism, there was little evidence for a general deficit in executive 
functioning. In fact, the only aspect of executive functioning that was impaired in both 
experiments was verbal working memory. On the other hand, in both experiments there 
was evidence that verbal working memory capacity was related to other aspects of 
executive functioning for the autistic group. In Experiment 4, there was a significant 
correlation between verbal working memory and set-shifting scores, and in Experiment 5 
verbal working memory correlated with performance on the backward version of the Corsi 
blocks task (which is a measure of both non-verbal working memory and central executive 
resources). By contrast, in the control groups verbal working memory and other aspects of 
executive functioning were not significantly related. These findings are in line with 
Benetto et al. (1996) who found correlations between memory and executive functioning in 
autism, and with McCroy et al. (2007), who reported that memory retrieval in autism was 
closely related to executive functioning, whereas there was no such relationship in the 
control group. According to Miyake et al. (2004) verbal working memory, and inner 
speech play a strategic role in the retrieval of relevant background knowledge and task 
goals. Thus, it is possible that autistic children with a working memory deficit will be 
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disadvantaged in the strategic use of knowledge, which is a central aspect o f executive 
functioning. 
Another aim of this study was to investigate analogical reasoning in autism, and its 
relationships to heuristic reasoning. We compared the performance of autistic and typically 
developing children on the Raven Advanced Progressive Matrices test and two knowledge-
based tests of analogical reasoning. We found no difference between the two groups on 
any of the analogical reasoning tasks. Performance of the autistic and the typically-
developing children was equally impaired by increased relational complexity and by the 
presence of perceptual and semantic distractors. 
Our results for these analogy tasks confirmed patterns observed previously with 
non-autistic populations (Krawczyk et al., 2008; Richland et al., 2006), but provided no 
evidence of differential performance between the autistic and non-autistic groups. 
Moreover, we replicated the finding of Dawson et al. (2007) that the relative difficulty of 
the Raven items was highly correlated between the autistic and control children, arguing 
against the possibility that the two groups use substantially different strategies to solve the 
problems. In addition, the difficulty of individual items on both the picture analogy and 
scene analogy tests correlated highly between the two groups. Although relatively superior 
performance of autistic people on the Raven test (as compared to general intelligence as 
measured by the WISC) could be related to enhanced perceptual processing, it seems 
implausible to attribute normal performance on the picture analogy and scene analogy 
problems to group differences in perceptual abilities, as the relationally-matched source 
and target items in these problems were visually dissimilar. There was also no evidence for 
superior autistic performance on the Raven test in the case of our sample. 
Our findings support the hypothesis that the ability to reason analogically is intact 
in autism, not only for abstract problems such as the Raven test (Dawson el al., 2007), but 
also for knowledge-based problems (the picture analogy and scene analogy tasks). The 
present findings are consistent with those of previous studies that found intact analogical 
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reasoning performance in autistic people (e.g., Dawson et al., 2007; Scott & Baron-Cohen, 
1996). These results suggest boundary conditions on the hypothesis that autistic people 
have problems with using their knowledge spontaneously and flexibly in novel situations 
(Peterson & Bowler, 2000), insofar as basic analogical reasoning would seem to require 
some ability to use knowledge flexibly. Our results are also inconsistent with the 
hypothesis that autistic people exhibit reduced processing of similarity between stimuli and 
situations (Plaisted, 2001), as analogical transfer crucially depends on recognising 
similarities. Contrary to predictions based on the weak central coherence theory (Frith & 
Happe, 1994), autistic children were able to create systematic mappings between stimuli 
(which requires processing of stimuli in context and establishing coherence), even in the 
face of perceptual disiractors that encourage use of a perceptual matching strategy. 
Altogether, the present findings paint a picture very different from Kanner's original 
description of autism, which stated that " I f the slightest ingredient [of a situation, 
performance or sentence] is altered or removed, the total situation is no longer the same 
and therefore is not accepted as such..." (Kanner, 1943, p. 246). 
The prerequisites for successful analogical reasoning include access to relevant 
real-world knowledge, as well as intact working memory and executive functions. Autistic 
participants in the present study were well-matched to controls on executive ftmctioning, 
apart from a marginal difference in verbal working memory scores. As autistic people 
sometimes have impairments of executive functions when compared to IQ-matched 
controls (for reviews see Hil l , 2004; Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007), it is possible that some 
autistic people wi l l have problems with analogical reasoning when they are matched to 
controls on IQ only, but not on measures of executive functioning. (See Pellicano, 
Maybery, Durkin & Maley, 2006, for evidence concerning the relationship between 
executive function deficits and problems with integrating information.) Autistic people 
may also have difficulty when analogical reasoning requires the processing of complex 
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verbal material (Lopez & Leekham, 2003) or picking up and integrating cross-modal cues 
(Pexman, 2008). 
In summary, the present findings indicate that autism perse does not imply an 
inability to reason analogically. It is important to note that all the analogy tasks used in the 
present study involved pictorial rather than verbal presentation of the problems. Moreover, 
the problems were either purely formal (APM), or required highly constrained knowledge 
largely provided directly by the pictorial stimuli (picture analogies and scene analogies). 
According to the Task Support Hypothesis (Bowler et al., 2004), autistic individuals show 
greater difficulty in retrieving and integrating background knowledge with a problem 
context when retrieval is not directly cued by a task. Our findings leave open the question 
of whether a difference in reaction times would be found between the autistic and control 
groups when solving the present tasks (indicating a difference in efficiency of processing), 
as well as the question of whether analogical reasoning ability in autism would also be 
intact for tasks that provide less support for memory retrieval. 
Given that the same autistic participants whose performance on the analogical 
reasoning problems was indistinguishable from controls, showed distinct patterns of 
reasoning performance on the heuristics and biases tasks, we can expect that (in line with 
the Task Support Hypothesis - Bowler et al., 2004) autistic participants would show 
impairments in reasoning about problems that require the spontaneous activation of 
relevant background knowledge. 
5.3. General discussion 
The aim of the studies that we described in this chapter was twofold. One aim was to 
test some of the claims of dual-process theorists using a special population. The other aim 
was to find out more about reasoning in autism, especially in the domains of using 
reasoning heuristics, and making analogies. Although we tried to make some predictions 
regarding the expected patterns based on the prominent theories of autism, this was not 
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easy, because higher order reasoning in autism has not been extensively researched. The 
only relevant existing study was an investigation into the framing effect in risky choices by 
De Martino and colleagues (2008). This study found increased logical performance (and 
less sensitivity to framing effects) in autism. This is in line with the weak central coherence 
account, which predicts reduced contextualisation in autism, or, alternatively, a tendency to 
produce contextual responses through conscious effort, instead of a spontaneous 
appreciation of context. 
Table 5.18. summarizes our findings in the two experiments. We used seven different 
tasks, and one of them (the conjunction fallacy) was included in both experiments. When 
comparing the autistic and the control groups, we found that in the case of the conjunction 
fallacy task, and in the case of the engineers and lawyers problem with a non-
representative description, autistic children tended to give less heuristic/more normative 
responses, and they seemed to produce heuristic responses effortftilly. Although the results 
concerning the belief bias are seemingly in contrast with this, the possible explanation for 
less belief bias in the typically developing group might be that they benefitted more from 
the fantasy context than the autistic group (see Leevers & Harris, 1999). Thus, although the 
outcome is the opposite in the case of this task, it is possible that this difference was also 
the result of reduced contextualisation in the autistic group. In the case of the if-only bias, 
although there was no difference between groups in terms of their responses, heuristic 
responding seemed to be based on effortful reasoning in the case o f autistic children. 
Finally, autistic children gave less normative responses in the sunk cost task, and in the 
negative recency task. In the sunk cost task they also seemed to exhibit a tendency to give 
reverse sunk cost responses (i.e., to abandon a situation more quickly i f they made 
previous investments), thus exhibiting a different bias from the control group. Although we 
did not find direct evidence for this, it is possible that the increase in biased responding in 
the autistic group in these tasks might be associated with a reduced ability to control 
automatic responses, or maybe these responses were not produced completely 
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automatically, which resulted in less metacognitive awareness of these responses (or a 
restricted availability of cognitive resources to manipulate these representations), 
compared to the control group. This could have led to a reduced ability to resist these 
fallacies. 
Table 5.18. Summary of the results of Experiments 4 and 5. 
Type of heuristic Experiment Any difference bet^ veen 
groups? 
Relationship between 
heuristic responding and 
cognitive capacity 
Belief bias 1 autistic children gave 
more biased responses 
none 
Sunk cost fallacy 1 autistic children gave less 
normative responses 
none 
If-only bias 1 none positive correation with 
Wise scores 
Conjunction 1 and 2 autistic children gave less positive correation with 
fallacy heuristic responses (but 
the effect disappeared in 
Exp. 1 after controlling 
for vocabulary) 
Wise scores in Exp. 1 
positive correlation with 
cognitive capacity in Exp. 
2 
Engineers and 2 none negative correlation with 
lawyers problem, cognitive capacity 
representativeness 
Engineers and 2 autistic children gave positive correlation with 
lawyers problem, more normative responses cognitive capacity 
equiprobability 
Positive/negative 2 autistic children gave less none 
recency normative responses to 
negative recency tasks 
In summary, although most of these findings can be understood in terms of reduced 
contextualisation / contextualisation through effort in autism, this is clearly not the whole 
story. This is reflected in the fact that in the case of some tasks, autistic participants were 
more susceptible to fallacies than typically developing children. Although our autistic 
participants did not show impairments in their executive functioning skills, they might be 
less able to manipulate and control verbal representations on-line due to a reduced ability 
to activate these representations automatically. According to Bowler et al.'s (2004) task 
support hypothesis autistic individuals often show difficulty in retrieving and integrating 
their background knowledge with a problem context when the task provides little support 
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for retrieval (i.e., when concepts are not directly presented or cued, or when no explicit 
instructions are given to search for a concept - see also McCroy et al., 2007). 
Moving on to the issue of executive functioning in autism, we measured several 
aspects of executive functioning in our samples (verbal working memory, inhibition and 
set-shifting in Experiment 4, and verbal and non-verbal working memory, and central 
executive resources in Experiment 5). Additionally, the measures of analogical reasoning 
can be considered as indices of executive functioning or "decoupling", especially the trials 
that require participants to resist interference while performing mapping between 
representations. Importantly, apart from an impairment in verbal working memory, we 
found no evidence for executive functioning deficits in the autistic sample. However, in 
both experiments there was a relationship between verbal abilities and measures of 
executive functioning in the autistic sample (which was not found or was much weaker in 
the control group), which indicated that the organization of cognitive abilities in the two 
samples might be different. A possible explanation for these findings is that children with 
autism do not benefit from a spontaneous organization of verbal materials, because they 
have verbal working memory deficits (see Miyake et al., 2004), and as a result they have to 
rely on their general executive resources during memory retrieval (see e.g., McCroy et al., 
2007; see also Section 4.2,2. for a review on memory retrieval in autism). However, when 
retrieval is supported by external cues (such as pictures or explicit questioning) individuals 
with autism are able to retrieve memory contents as easily as typically developing 
individuals (see Bowler et al., 2004). This would explain why children with autism in our 
sample had no problem with analogical (i.e., contextualised) reasoning about pictorial 
stimuli, whilst they showed a distinct pattem of reasoning about heuristics and biases tasks. 
I f children with autism need to rely on effortful processes when they retrieve memory 
contents, then when they reason about contextualised problems they essentially perform a 
dual task. This could explain why the correlations between giving particular responses to 
the heuristics and biases tasks and cognitive capacity were different between groups, 
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although the general cognitive resources of autistic children seemed to be intact. This also 
explains why autistic children reasoned about these problems in a way which was similar 
to the performance of "lower ability" (i.e., younger) typically developing children. These 
findings are also in line with Lopez and Leekam (2003) who reported that contextual 
processing was unimpaired in autism, apart from when it required the integration of 
complex verbal materials. The results of Experiment 5 also clarified that the differences 
between groups were not restricted to reasoning about the social domain. In addition, 
children with autism only showed a distinct pattern of performance in the case of conflict 
tasks (which required decontextualisation), but not in the case of non-conflict tasks (which 
could be solved by relying both on contextualised and decontextualised reasoning). 
Finally, as Table 5.18. demonstrates, children with autism were sometimes more biased on 
conflict tasks, and sometimes they were less biased (we found this in both experiments, 
using a range of different tasks). This clearly shows that the differences between groups 
cannot be explained in terms of a tendency for one group to rely more on 
logic/rules/statistical information. It is also not possible to describe the differences between 
groups as restricted to Type 1 or Type 2 processes. 
When interpreting these findings it is important to keep in mind some 
methodological issues. First of all, autism is a diverse disorder. Certain behavioural 
symptoms of autism are similar across individuals - however, the origins o f these 
symptoms might differ. Although researchers of autism usually consider their autistic 
sample as a homogeneous group, it makes little sense to generalize certain characteristics 
to all individuals with autism. There are theories that aim to describe the autistic cognitive 
profile (such as the weak central coherence account, the executive dysfunction theory, the 
theory of mind hypothesis and the extreme male brain theory). However, there is evidence 
from several studies which shows that there are many autistic individuals who do not suffer 
from executive function or theory of mind deficits (see Sections 4.1.1. and 4.1.3. for 
references). SimilaHy, the claims of the extreme male brain theory are very controversial 
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(see Section 4.1,4.). Probably the weak central coherence account of autism is based on the 
strongest evidence. Nevertheless, even this theory has been severely criticised (see e.g., 
Mottron et al., 1999; Pellicano et al., 2005). Although many studies found evidence for an 
autistic advantage on the block design task (most famously. Shah & Frith, 1993 who also 
showed that the autistic advantage disappears when the patterns are pre-segmented) in the 
present studies we found no evidence for an autistic advantage on this task. In fact, in both 
experiments our autistic participants scored lower than the control group (although the 
differences were very small, and far from being statistically significant). It could be argued 
that this might be an evidence for an inappropriate matching of samples in the present 
studies (see next paragraph for a discussion on the issue of matching). However, we are not 
alone in finding no difference between groups on this task (see White, O'Reilly & Frith, 
2009 for a review), in fact, besides many studies reporting no difference between groups, 
one study found impaired rather than enhanced performance in autism on three 
visuospatial tasks (Bumette, Mundy, Meyer, et al., 2005). In recent years it has been 
suggested by a couple of researchers that the autistic advantage on these tasks might be 
carried by a significant minority of the autistic sample. For example. White et al. (2009) 
suggested that maybe only those with macrocephaly (i.e., increased head/brain size -
which affects approximately 20% of all autistic individuals) exhibit weak central 
coherence. 
Now we turn into the issue of matching the autistic and typically developing 
samples. There are several ways of matching samples. In developmental research, and 
when participants have a learning disability one of the most commonly used matching 
strategies is to have two control groups: a cognitive ability and age-matched group with a 
leaming disability, and an ability-matched (younger) typically developing group (see e.g. 
Scott & Baron-Cohen, 1996). Another possible strategy, which is often used in the case of 
high-functioning autistic participants (like our present sample) is to match the samples 
individually (see e.g., Bowler et al., 2004). Although this strategy makes it possible to have 
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two samples that are fairly matched on a number of important measures, the problem with 
this method is that the typically developing sample is not a random sample, and as such it 
is likely to be not representative to the typically developing population. Another possible 
problem with this strategy is that it might under-or overestimate the abilities of the autistic 
sample depending on the nature of the tasks that are used for matching (see Mottron, 
2004). One way to overcome the problem o f having a non-representative control group is 
to have a relatively large comparison sample; to measure the abilities of both samples on a 
number of important dimensions, and to control for any pre-existing differences between 
groups statistically. In our present sample we did this by performing analyses of 
covariance. The problem with this method, however, is that is assumes certain statistical 
properties of the data (see also Jarrold & Brock, 2004). One issue is thai i f there is a 
substantial difference between groups on the covariate in question, observed means might 
be adjusted for spurious reasons (i.e., due to the aggregation of data points into "group" 
clusters without there necessarily being a relationship between covariate and the factor to 
be explained at the level of individuals in each group - see Robinson, 1950). Another 
problem is that for an analysis of covariance to be meaningfiil, both groups have to show 
the same pattern of relationship between covariate and performance. These issues highlight 
that using ANCOVAs to control for differences between groups is not the perfect method. 
However, we only used ANCOVAs in the case of tasks where we found a difference 
between groups using a simple ANOVA analysis. This way the risk we took was to 
disregard some meaningfiil differences between groups (that is, the method was overly 
conservative). On the other hand, we were not taking the risk of finding differences 
between groups due to chance (i.e., as an artefact of our statistical analyses). That is, using 
this method increases the chance of Type 1, but not Type 2 errors. 
A final issue is the question of how informative our results with autistic children 
really are for dual-process theorists. In a number of influential publications, Karmiloff-
Smith and colleagues (e.g., Karmiloff-Smith, Scerif & Ansari, 2003; Thomas & Karmiloff-
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Smith, 2002) criticized the idea that certain "cognitive modules" can be selectively 
impaired, and double dissociations might occur in developmental disorders. This is 
because although there are specialised areas or cognitive modules in the adult brain, these 
emerge from a developmental process of modularization. This process is based on some 
innately specified starting points, but at the early stages of development, these are only 
domain-relevant, rather than domain specific. The modularization process unfolds during 
development, and also as a result of specific environmental interactions. In the case of 
individuals with developmental disorders the effects of genetic mutation during early 
development are likely to be widespread across the developing system. Instead of neatly 
segregated patterns of intact and impaired cognitive modules, it is more likely that all 
domains develop alypically, although some domains may be more affected than others due 
to their particular problem space. As a result of the dynamic nature of development (for 
example, the changes in the regulation of gene expression over time), and the effects of 
environmental interactions, it is also likely that the pattems of strengths and weaknesses 
within the same developmental disorder change over time. That is, based on this argument 
it is possible that although there is no evidence for separate Type 1 and Type 2 reasoning 
systems in developmental samples, these might be present in the case of adults. 
Additionally, finding no evidence for the claims of dual-process theories in the autistic 
sample certainly cannot be interpreted as evidence against the existence o f two 
systems/two types of process in the case of the general population. 
What does all this tell us about dual-process theories? In Chapter 3 we described 
three studies that showed that giving responses that are traditionally considered to be 
heuristic is effortful for young children, and in some cases even for adolescents as well. In 
the present studies we found that for the autistic group, committing the conjunction fallacy 
was positively correlated with measures of cognitive capacity in both experiments. 
Additionally, in Experiment 4 committing the if-only fallacy was positively correlated with 
Wise scores, and in Experiment 5 susceptibility to the equiprobability bias was positively 
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correlated with autistic children's cognitive capacity. At the same time there was little 
evidence for a negative relationship between susceptibility to biases and cognitive capacity 
or analogical reasoning ability. These results cleady contradict the predictions of dual-
process theories, at least the versions advocated by Evans (e.g., 2006a) and Stanovich and 
West (e.g., 2008). Although developmental dual-process theories (such as that of 
Klaczynski, 2009), anticipate an increase in heuristic processing with age, they also do not 
account for the positive correlation beUveen cognitive capacity and "heuristic" responding 
that we found in many cases. Thus, dual-process theories do not describe the reasoning 
performance of children and adolescents in an adequate way. However, it is still possible 
that dual-process theories are applicable in the case of adults. Also, one of the latest 
concepnjalisations of the theory (Stanovich & West, 2008) places a great emphasis on the 
role of relevant knowledge in reasoning performance. In order to test whether the theory 
applies to adults, and how reasoning performance is affected by knowledge, in Chapter 6 
we are going to describe three experiments which were conducted with university students 
at different stages of their education. The students also differed in the discipline that they 
studied and the country where they lived. \n the next chapter we are also going to review 
the educational approaches to heuristic reasoning. 
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Chapter 6: The role of education and knowledge in heuristic 
reasoning (Experiments 6-8) 
6.0. Introduction to Chapter 6. 
In Chapter 3 we described three studies which showed that giving responses that are 
traditionally considered to be heuristic is effortful for young children, and in some cases 
even for adolescents as well. In Chapter 5 we additionally found that producing a number 
of different heuristics required effortful reasoning in the case of autistic participants. 
Although we did not find this in the case of all problems, there was also no evidence for a 
negative relationship between susceptibility to biases and cognitive capacity. These results 
are inconsistent with the predictions of dual-process theories, at least in relation to the 
versions advocated by Evans (e.g., 2006a) and Stanovich and West (e.g., 2008). Although 
developmental dual-process theories (such as that of Klaczynski, 2009), anticipate an 
increase in heuristic processing with age, they also do not account for the positive 
correlation between cognitive capacity and "heuristic" responding that we found in the 
case of both typically developing and autistic children. Overall it seems that dual-process 
theories cannot predict children's and adolescents reasoning performance on some of the 
most popular tasks in the heuristics and biases literature. However, it is still possible that 
dual-process theories are able to account for the reasoning performance of adults. 
The main issue that we addressed in the present chapter is the role o f knowledge (and 
education) in reasoning performance. This question was examined by comparing the 
performance of students at different stages of their education, and students studying 
different disciplines at university level, and also through comparing the performance of 
students in the UK and at an Italian university. Stanovich and West (2008) have suggested 
that cognitive capacity and thinking styles wi l l only be reliable indicators o f reasoning 
capacity i f relevant knowledge is available (see more on this in Chapter I ) . That is, one 
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might expect education to decrease heuristic use. By contrast, educational theorists (e.g., 
Fischbein, 1997) propose that education can actually increase heuristic use in some cases. 
Because of these conflicting predictions, and because the role of knowledge and education 
in heuristic use has been largely ignored in reasoning research so far (apart from some 
studies on the effect of training) it seems an interesting question to look at. A corollary of 
the idea that education can increase heuristic use is that some heuristics might appear at 
later stages of development, well beyond childhood. 
In Chapter 3 we presented evidence which suggested that rather than being basic and 
effortless, reasoning heuristics appear during mid-childhood, and they are related to 
effortfijl contextualisation processes (thus, they are initially produced by Type 2, rather 
than Type 1 processes - see Experiment 1). At a later stage (i.e., during adolescence - see 
Experiments 2 and 3) some of these heuristics become effortless, and they can even be 
suppressed by effortful reasoning. However, there are also some heuristics which continue 
to require conscious effort, or which seem to emerge or increase during this stage (such as 
the conjunction fallacy). This also results in inconsistent correlational patterns between 
heuristics (with both positive and negative correlations, or no relationship between 
heuristic reasoning across certain tasks). Finally, the studies involving adolescents with 
autism (Experiments 4 and 5) suggest that producing heuristic responses sometimes 
requires conscious effort for this group, or they fail to give certain heuristic responses. 
Overall, these results suggest that most (or possibly all) reasoning heuristics require Type 2 
contributions, at least initially. I f reasoning plays a role in the development of heuristics, it 
is also possible that explicit knowledge can contribute to the development of certain 
heuristics. Moreover, this process should not be restricted to childhood or adolescence. 
Instead it should depend on the time when participants acquire the new knowledge that 
leads to the development of a heuristic. In order to test this prediction, the following three 
experiments were conducted with university students. In this chapter we also review the 
207 
literature on the role of education and knowledge in reasoning heuristics (both as it is 
described by dual-process and educational theorists). 
There are a number of reasons to consider the claims and predictions of educational 
theorists alongside the ideas of dual-process theorists. One reason is that educational 
theorists have been interested in the role of intuitions in reasoning for a long time (see e.g., 
Fischbein, 1987, or our review of the intuitive rules approach in Section 2.1.4.). Moreover, 
educational theorists are also familiar with the inconsistent developmental patterns of 
heuristics (that heuristics can increase, decrease or remain stable with age and education), 
and they also acknowledge the inconsistent relationships between cognitive capacity and 
heuristic use (see e.g., Osman & Stavy, 2006). In the next section we introduce the ideas of 
educational theorists regarding probabilistic reasoning, and contrast their predictions with 
the claims of dual-process theorists. Then we describe three experiments which were 
designed to test these predictions. 
6. J. Heuristics in probabilistic reasoning and their relationship with cognitive 
ability, thinking styles and educational background. 
Probabilistic reasoning consists of drawing conclusions about the likelihood of 
events based on available information, or personal knowledge and beliefs. The heuristics 
and biases literature (e.g., Gilovich, Griff in & Kahneman, 2002) mostly describes 
problems where a rule of probability is disregarded in favour of making decisions on the 
basis of vivid information or personal beliefs. Educational theorists have also been aware 
for a long time that the notion of probability is notoriously hard to grasp. One reason for 
this is that the concept of probability incorporates two seemingly contradictory ideas: that 
the individual outcomes of events are unpredictable. However, on the long run there is a 
regular pattem of outcomes. According to educational theorists (e.g., Metz, 1998) a failure 
to integrate these two aspects of probability (or randomness) leads to either interpreting 
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probabilistic events in an overly deterministic way, or to disregarding the pattem and 
focusing entirely on the uncertainty aspect. That is, people either overrate or underrate the 
information given. Depending on whether people under- or overrate the unpredictability of 
probabilistic events, educational theorists discriminate between two main categories of 
bias: errors based on the representativeness heuristic (which are the result o f overly 
deterministic judgements), and errors based on the equiprobability bias (which stem from 
disregarding deterministic information). 
Educational theorists have been interested in the role of intuitions in probabilistic 
reasoning for a long time. For example, according to Fischbein (1975) intuition plays a 
very important role in the domain of probabilistic reasoning, probably more so than in 
other domains of mathematics. He defined the concept of intuition as self-evident, holistic 
cognitions that appear to be true without the need for any formal or empirical proof. 
Fischbein distinguished between two sources of intuition: primary intuitions which are 
based on individual experiences, especially on interactions with, and on adaptations to the 
environment. Fischbein (1987) also claimed that these intuitions do not disappear with 
education, but they continue to influence judgment, even after formal instruction in a 
particular area. So far these ideas are very similar to the concept of Type I processes. 
However, in Fischbein's view there are also secondary intuitions, which are formed by 
scientific education at the school, and which are partly independent from cognitive 
development in general. 
Developing useful primary intuitions about probability is not easy. Although people 
have lots of experience with situations involving chance in their everyday lives, these 
experiences are in general quite "messy". In contrast to arithmetic where 2 + 2 yields the 
easily testable result of 4, the outcomes of probabilistic events are much harder to evaluate. 
For example, the low chances of winning at the national lottery are in apparent contrast 
with the fact that people win every week (Borovcnik & Bentz, 1991). At the level of 
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personal experiences, "bad" decisions (in terms of probabilities) are sometimes followed 
by positive outcomes, or vice versa. For example, high risk gambles can occasionally result 
in big prizes, whereas low risk gambles can result in losses. Of course, it is counterintuitive 
(or even culturally unacceptable) to evaluate decisions irrespective of their consequences. 
It is even more unusual for people to imagine a series of equivalent events happening many 
times, so that they can see some sort of a pattern emerging on the long run (Borovsnik & 
Peard, 1996). As a result of probabilistic events being hard to conceptualise, people's 
everyday experiences can actually lead to inappropriate intuitions about the nature of 
probability. 
The heuristics and biases literature (e.g., Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman, 2002; see 
also Chapter 1) describes the representativeness heuristic as a tendency for people to base 
their judgement of the probability of a particular event on how much it represents the 
essential features of the parent population or of its generating process. The 
representativeness heuristic often manifests itself in the belief that small samples wil l 
"look" exactly the same, and they wi l l also contain the same proportion of outcomes, as the 
parent population. That is, when relying on the representativeness heuristic, people put too 
much confidence in small samples. An example for this is the gambler's fallacy (see also 
Section 1.1.1.). For example, when tossing a fair coin, after a series of heads people have 
the feeling that a tails should follow, because this corresponds more to their expectation of 
having a mix of heads and tails, rather than a long sequence of just heads. 
The representativeness heuristic is also at work when we base our probabilistic 
judgments about people on how much they resemble a prototypical member of a certain 
category. For instance the use of social stereotypes often leads to the neglect of relevant 
statistical rules and base rates. Demonstrations of this heuristic involve the conjunction 
fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), and the engineers and lawyers problem with a 
representative description (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973 - see also Section 1. 1.1.). 
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In contrast to the representativeness heuristic which is based on the content of 
problems, and leads to overiy deterministic judgments, the other bias that we looked at in 
the present studies is based on the structure of probability problems, and it has the opposite 
effect: people focus entirely on the uncertainty and unpredictability aspect of probabilistic 
events, and disregard the pattems in the outcome. The equiprobability bias (which is very 
similar to the same A-same B rule, in the intuitive rules program, see Section 2.1.4., but it 
is restricted to cases when people reason about random outcomes) was first described by 
Lecoutre (1985). It is a tendency for individuals to think of random events as 
"equiprobable" by nature, and to judge outcomes that occur with different probabilities as 
equally likely. This bias emerges as the result of formal education in probability (thus, in 
Fischbein's terms it is a secondary intuition), and it is based on a misunderstanding of the 
concept of randomness. An increase in equiprobability bias in the course of education was 
found in the case of both secondary school and university students (see e.g., Batanero, 
Serrano & Garfield, 1996; Lecoutre, 1985). 
Equiprobability responses are usually based on the following (incorrect) argument: 
the results to compare are equiprobable, because random events are equiprobable "by 
nature". This sort of reasoning is especially common when there is no single effect that 
could account for the outcome, or the effect is hard to identify and conceptualise (Callaert, 
2004). For example, when playing at the national lottery, people do not believe that they 
have a 50% chance of winning the jackpot, although there is randomness involved, and 
there are only two possible outcomes for any person (ie., they either win or they do not 
win). By contrast, when students have to predict the sum of two dice, they often declare 
that no total is harder or easier to obtain than any other, because the dice are individually 
fair, and they cannot be controlled (Pratt, 2000). Another example for this bias is the 
engineers and lawyers problem with a non-representative description (Kahneman & 
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Tversky, 1973 - see also Section 1.1.1.). In line wi th the findings o f educational theorists, 
in Experiment 3 we found that this bias increased wi th age in an adolescent population. 
The theory o f naive probability (Johnson-Laird et al., 1999) offers a different 
explanation as to the origin o f incorrect equiprobability responses. According to this 
model, individuals who are unfamiliar wi th the probability calculus construct mental 
models o f what is true in the various possibilities, and each model represents an 
equiprobable alternative unless individuals have knowledge or beliefs to the contrary, in 
which case they w i l l assign different probabilities to different models. Thus, in this 
approach equiprobability is assumed by default, unless individuals have beliefs to the 
contrary, and this effect is independent o f education in statistics, or should actually 
decrease wi th education. 
Fischbein and Schnarch (1997) investigated the relationship between education, age 
and probabilistic reasoning ability using seven different tasks. Participants were secondary 
school children between the age o f 10 and 17, and college students specialising in 
mathematics. Similarly to the findings o f Experiments 2 and 3, the results were mixed, 
with some misconceptions increasing, some decreasing, and some remaining stable across 
age groups. In general, representativeness-based responses (the representativeness heuristic 
in a lottery scenario, the negative recency effect, and the conjunction fallacy) decreased 
with age. However, other misconceptions, such as the neglect o f sample sizes (see Section 
1.1.1.), the availability heuristic (see e.g., Section 1.3.3.) and the time-axis fallacy (the 
erroneous belief that the knowledge o f an event's outcome cannot be used to determine the 
probability o f a previous event, because later events cannot retrospectively affect eariier 
events) increased wi th age, except in the case o f college students who generally gave the 
correct response. The equiprobability bias was stable across ages in one scenario (rol l ing 
two dice and getting 5 and 6 vs. getting two 6s) and increased in the case o f another 
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(neglecting sample size when predicting the probability o f an unusual ratio o f girls and 
boys being b o m the same day in a small versus in a b ig hospital). 
According to Fischbein and Schnarch (1997) these results are based on the 
interplay between students' intuitions and the structure o f the problems. In general, the 
impact o f intuitions increases with age and wi th education. When a problem is easy to 
conceptualise, and the relevant rule is readily available, misconceptions w i l l diminish with 
age. However, i f the task is hard to conceptualise, the effects o f misconceptions activated 
by some irrelevant aspect o f the task w i l l increase. Thus, according to Fischbein, the 
context o f the tasks, personal experiences and education all have an effect on reasoning 
about probabilistic events. 
As we already discussed earlier (e.g., in Chapter I ) , dual-process theories o f 
reasoning (e.g., Evans & Over, 1996) also discriminate between the effect o f heuristics 
(i.e., intuitions) and the ability to conceptualise problems. A n idea shared by all dual-
process theories is that heuristics are automatically activated by certain aspects o f the 
problem content (the representativeness heuristic is activated by a stereotypical description 
o f a person, for example). Once a heuristic response is activated, it depends on a person's 
cognitive capacity and personal motivation, whether they override this initial intuition by 
conscious, e f fo r t fu l (i.e., Type 2) reasoning, and give a response based on the logical 
structure o f the problem, or i f they go with their initial intuitions (cued by Type 1 
processes). For an overview o f supporting evidence for dual-process theories see Section 
1.2.2. 
Recently, Stanovich and West (2008) proposed that people wi th higher cognitive 
ability might not always reason more normatively than lower ability people (see also 
Section 1.3.1.). This is usually because they do not possess the necessary "mindware" (i.e., 
relevant knowledge) to solve the problem. It is also possible that they know the relevant 
rule, but they do not recognise the need to apply it. People with higher need for cognition 
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(i.e., people who are inclined to think harder about problems) are more l ike ly to recognise 
the need to apply the appropriate rule. Moreover, instructing people to think hard/logically 
about problems also sensitises them to potential conflicts between logic and intuitions 
(e.g., Epstein, Lipson, Holstein & Huh, 1992; Ferreira, Garcia-Marques, Sherman, & 
Sherman, 2006; Klaczynski, 2001), and this can lead to more normative performance, 
given that people possess the relevant knowledge to solve the task. 
On a theoretical basis (see e.g., Stanovich & West, 2008) one can expect that 
relevant knowledge plays an important role in reasoning performance. However, 
participants' knowledge is usually not assessed in empirical studies o f heuristic reasoning. 
On the other hand, there is some evidence that studying different disciplines at university 
level affects certain aspects o f reasoning abilities in distinguishable ways. For example, 
Lehman, Lempert and Nisbett (1988) found that psychology and medical training increased 
performance on statistical and conditional reasoning problems (e.g., there was a marked 
increase in students' relying on the law o f large numbers when reasoning about everyday 
situations involving uncertainty, and their abil i ty to recognize the effect o f confounding 
variables also improved), whereas law students got better only on conditional reasoning 
during their undergraduate years. On the other hand, chemistry training had no effect on 
any o f the types o f reasoning studied. Although there is clearly a self-selection effect (i.e., 
students with different interests and strengths enrol in different courses) which may explain 
some o f these differences, because o f the longitudinal nature o f the study (the same 
students were tested in the first and third year o f their course) it was clear that education in 
a specific discipline also had a distinguishable effect on students' reasoning, depending on 
their subject o f study. 
Lehman et al. (1988) proposed that psychology and medical students' statistical 
reasoning ability increased because these are probabilistic sciences, where statistical 
reasoning is a very important aspect o f education. By contrast, chemistry is a non-
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probabilistic (i.e., deterministic) science and law is a non-scientific discipline. They also 
proposed in line wi th an earlier study (Feng, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1986) that these changes in 
statistical reasoning ability not only affect the way students think about their own 
discipline, but also have an effect on how students o f different disciplines reason about 
everyday-life events. 
Heller, Salzstein and Caspe (1992) compared first, second and third year paediatric 
residents' reasoning about medical and non-medical problems. Some effects that they 
studied were consistent across training level and problem content. However, first year 
residents made use o f base-rate information more than third year residents, whereas, first 
year residents were influenced by the way medical data were presented to them, but second 
and third year residents were not. On the non-medical problems there was no effect o f 
training level. By contrast, higher year residents relied more on representativeness. This 
was attributed to the fact that medical training consists o f practising the recognition o f 
disease conditions and syndromes. Thus, just like the students in Fischbein and Schnarch's 
(1997) study, they got worse in one aspect o f probabilistic reasoning, and got better in 
another. Unlike the changes identified by Fong et al. (1986) and Lehman et al. (1988) these 
effects were not general, but specific to medical problems. 
The purpose o f the fo l lowing experiments was to investigate the changes in the 
representativeness heuristic (according to Fischbein, a primary intuition which leads to a 
deterministic view o f probability), and the equiprobability bias (a secondary intuition 
which results in the overrating o f the uncertainty aspect o f probability) wi th statistical 
education. 
Reasoning theorists (e.g., Stanovich & West, 2008) predict that biases in general 
should decrease with education. By contrast, educational research (e.g., Fischbein & 
Schnarch, 1997) showed that different heuristics can fo l low different developmental 
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patterns, and the overall impact o f heuristics on reasoning increases wi th experience. 
However, the use o f the representativeness heuristic was found to decrease with education. 
According to Batanero et al. (1996) and Lecoutre (1985) the equiprobability bias 
should increase wi th statistics education. On the other hand, Johnson-Laird et al. (1999) 
and Stanovich and West (2008) would predict that the equiprobability bias should decrease 
with statistics education. Moreover, dual-process theories (e.g., Stanovich & West, 1999) 
claim that students wi th higher need for cognition and higher cognitive ability w i l l be less 
biased, at least when they possess the necessary "mindware" to solve the tasks (Stanovich 
& West, 2008). In order to test this prediction we included need for cognition as a control 
measure. Cacioppo and Petty (1982) described the need for cognition as individual 
differences in the tendency to engage in and enjoy e f fo r t f i j i cognitive activity. The need for 
cognition is positively related to academic performance and course grades (Leone & 
Dalton, 1988; Sadowski & Gulgoz, 1996). Students wi th a high need for cognition are able 
to comprehend material requiring cognitive effort better (Leone & Dalton, 1988), and they 
are also more effective information processors (Sadowski & Gulgoz, 1996). 
As a measure o f cognitive abilities we included a short form (Arthur & Day, 1994) 
o f the Raven Advanced Progressive Matrices ( A P M ) . The A P M is a nonverbal measure o f 
fluid intelligence with a low level o f culture-loading which made it appropriate to use with 
students f rom different countries (we used students f rom different countries in these studies 
in order to test the robustness o f our findings across different educational settings). 
We wanted to address the question whether we find a change in statistical 
reasoning ability with education, and whether it is a general effect (as in Fong et al., 1986, 
and Lehman et al., 1988) or i f it is specific to the subject o f study (see Heller et al., 1992). 
To do this, we investigated the effects o f problem content. We used problems wi th both 
social content (based on the idea that education in psychology might affect the way we 
reason about people), and we compared students' performance on these tasks wi th their 
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reasoning about tasks wi th the same underiying logic, but wi th a less individualised content 
where the tasks were mostly about objects and natural phenomena. 
The main aim o f the present investigation was to test the (often conflict ing) 
predictions o f reasoning and educational theorists wi th in one study, and to potentially 
integrate these approaches. In order to separate out the effects o f individual differences, the 
educational system, and education in a certain discipline, we investigated the performance 
o f different groups o f students on the same problems. In Experiment 6 we compared the 
performance o f undergraduate psychology (probabilistic science) and marine biology 
(deterministic science) students f rom a UK university. The samples included both first year 
students who have had no education in statistics, and higher year students at different 
stages o f statistics education. In Experiment 7 we examined the performance o f Italian 
psychology students (ie., students studying the same discipline at a different educational 
setting) on the same problems. Finally, in Experiment 8 we manipulated the amount o f 
cognitive effort that students invested in solving the problems by instructing them to 
reason logically vs. intuitively. The aim o f this manipulation was to distinguish between 
reasoning errors that stemmed from a shallow processing o f information (i.e., serial 
associative cognition - see Stanovich, 2009 and Section 1.1.1.), and errors that were the 
result o f the lack o f relevant knowledge (i.e., "mindware gaps" - see Stanovich & West, 
2008, and Section 1.3.1). 
6.2. Experiment 6: The role of education, discipline, cognitive abilities and cognitive styles 
in heuristic reasoning. 
This study investigated the fo l lowing questions. Is there any effect o f psychology 
education on the representativeness heuristic and on the equiprobability bias? I f so, do 
these biases increase or decrease with education? Are these changes in psychology 
students' probability Judgments only present when they are reasoning about people, or do 
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they also affect their reasoning about objects and natural phenomena? Are these effects 
present in both the psychology and the biology student groups, or only in psychology 
students (as education in probabilistic reasoning is more central to their education)? 
Finally, in addition to education-related changes, do we also find any effect o f individual 
differences on probabilistic reasoning? 
In order to address these questions we used 12 tasks to assess undergraduate 
psychology and marine biology students* probabilistic reasoning ability (see Appendix E). 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 40 first, 40 second and 31 third year psychology students, and 31 
first, 21 second and 22 third year biology students f rom the University o f Plymouth. The 
experiment was run in the first term, so first year students were at the beginning o f their 
statistics course, second year students had a year's education in statistics, and third years 
had two years o f statistics education behind them. 
For the purpose o f analyses we combined the second and third year groups (group 2 
- those students who have had education in statistics), and compared them wi th the year 1 
students (group I - no education in statistics). The mean age o f the students in group 1 was 
19.2 years (age range 18-28 years) for the psychology students (w=40, 29 females), and 
19.7 years (age range 18-31 years) for the biology students (w=31,21 females). In group 2 
the mean age o f the psychology students (w=70, 64 females) was 22.5 years (age range 19-
52 years). The mean age o f the biology students (w=42, 32 females) was 21,2 years (age 
range 19-37 years). Psychology students took part in the experiment for ungraded course 
credits, biology students participated as volunteers. 
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Probabilistic reasoning tasks 
We used 12 probabilistic reasoning tasks (see Appendix E for the actual tasks, the 
instructions, and the normative and heuristic response fo r each problem). There were 6 
different types o f task: 3 problems measuring the representativeness heuristic (problems I , 
2 and 4 in each set), and 3 problems measuring the equiprobability bias (problems 3, 5 and 
6 in each set). 
A l l the problems were presented twice (once in Set 1, and once in Set 2). The 
logical structure o f the corresponding problems in the two sets was equivalent, but the 
content o f the problems was different. In Set I the presentation and content o f the 
problems were similar to probabilistic problems that are usually included in statistics 
textbooks (everyday context). In these tasks the randomness o f the processes involved was 
more salient (i.e., the processes were related to activities which are known to generate 
random outcomes, such as throwing a dice, or taking part in a lottery) and the stories were 
usually about objects (e.g., f l ipping a coin, drawing a marble, etc.) or natural phenomena 
(e.g., the weather). Set 2 required probabilistic reasoning about people. These problems 
also contained information about the probabilities o f the different outcomes, but the 
randomness o f the generating process was less salient than in the object content tasks (e.g., 
when we know that most students wi th a learning disability are dyslexic, we probably still 
do not think that the type o f learning disability an individual suffers f rom is randomly 
assigned to them). These problems resembled the way probabilistic data are usually 
presented in psychology papers and textbooks. 
In each task participants chose from three different response options. One 
corresponded to the representativeness heuristic or the equiprobability bias, one was the 
normative response (i.e., a response that corresponds to the statistical rule that is required 
to solve the task), and the third one neither corresponded to the main misconception nor 
was normative. 
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An example for an everyday content task that measured the representativeness 
heuristic is the fol lowing: 
A fair coin is flippedfive times, each time landing with tails up; 77777. What is the 
most likely outcome if a coin is flipped a sixth time? 
a. Tails 
b. Heads (heuristic response; representativeness) 
c. Tails and a heads are equally likely, (normative response) 
This task is measuring the negative recency effect/gambler's fallacy; to expect 
heads after a series o f tails in order to make the pattern more representative to a random 
sequence o f heads and tails (i.e., the alternation o f the two outcomes). Students were given 
a representativeness point i f they chose b) and they were given a normative point i f they 
chose c). 
A n example for a social content task measuring the equiprobability bias is the 
fol lowing. 
The two most common causes of learning difficulties among university students are 
dyslexia (specific problems in learning to read, write and spell) and dyscalculia (specific 
problems in learning arithmetical concepts and procedures). Out of 15 university students 
with learning difficulties approximately 9 are dyslexic, and 6 have dyscalculia. Joe is a 
student with a learning difficulty. Which of the following is the most likely? 
a. Joe is dyslexic (normative response) 
b. Joe has dyscalculia 
c. Both are equally likely (heuristic response; equiprobability) 
Students were given an equiprobability point i f they chose response c.) and they 
were given a normative point i f they chose response a.). 
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The problems were presented in a f ixed random order, and the order o f the 
problems within both sets was the same. The order o f the presentation o f the two sets was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
For each problem students were given either a representativeness/equiprobability, a 
normative or an "other" point. The maximum number o f representativeness and 
equiprobability responses was 3 per set (6 in total), and the maximum number o f normative 
responses was 6 per set (12 in total). 
Measures of individual differences and educational achievement in mathematics and 
statistics. 
A 12-item short form o f the Raven Advanced Progressive Matrices ( A P M ) test 
(Arthur & Day, 1994) was used as a measure o f cognitive capacity which was designed for 
adolescents and adults with above average intelligence. The students solved 3 practice 
items taken from the Raven Standard Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1938) before they 
solved the actual tasks. Participants also f i l led in the 18-item need for cognition 
questionnaire (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996), The Raven test is a measure o f 
fluid intelligence, whereas need for cognition is an indicator o f how much an individual is 
inclined to engage in effor t f t i l cognitive processing. These measures are independent (i.e., 
uncorrelated) but both are known to be related to individual differences in the tendency to 
avoid relying on automatic, heuristic processing. In this study we used the combined z 
scores o f these two measures as an indicator o f participants' normative potential, that is, a 
person's ability and propensity to engage in e f fo r t fu l reasoning. According to dual-process 
theories (see e.g., Kokis et al., 2002) this should be a good predictor o f normative 
reasoning. 
Students had to choose their highest qualification in mathematics from a list (see 
Appendix E). Second and third year students also had to report their marks on the previous 
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year's statistics module. Although both psychology and biology students have education in 
statistics, and they learn about the same statistical tests (/ tests, A N O V A , Chi-square test, 
etc.), statistics and methodology is not as central to biology as to psychology education. 
Biology students have fewer lectures in a year (e.g., in the first year they have 5 lectures a 
year as opposed to 20 statistics lectures in the case o f the psychology students). 
Additionally, psychology students, but not biology students, have education in critical 
thinking (10 lectures in the first year, where, among other things, they leam about 
reasoning heuristics and Bayes' Theorem). 
Procedure 
Psychology students were tested in groups o f 5-10, working on the problems 
individually. The tasks were presented in a paper and pencil version, and they were given 
in the same order for each participant (apart f rom the two sets o f probabilistic reasoning 
problems which were presented in a counterbalanced order). The students worked through 
the probabilistic reasoning problems first, then they filled in the need for cognition 
questionnaire, and finally they solved the A P M . The session took about 25 minutes. 
Biology students solved the problems in their year groups (groups o f 20-30). The 
procedure was the same, except that they did not do the A P M (the reason f o r leaving out 
the A P M was to reduce the time of test administration, as the students took part in the 
experiment during their tutorial time). The sessions took about 15 minutes. 
Results 
In our first analysis we examined the individual differences measures across subject 
and year groups, in order to check for any pre-existing differences. A 2x2 A N O V A wi th 
subject o f study (psychology/biology) and year group (first year/higher year) as between 
subjects variables showed a main effect o f subject o f snjdy ( F ( I , l79)=6.39 , /7<.05, rjp^ 
=.03) on need for cognition, but no effect o f year group and no interaction between subject 
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o f study and year group. This indicated that biology students had significantly higher need 
for cognition scores than psychology students. However, there was no difference between 
first and higher year students within subject groups. A n independent samples / test 
indicated that there was no difference between first and higher year psychology student 
groups in terms o f cognitive ability (/(I08)=.65, n.s.). We also compared the students' 
highest qualification in mathematics before starting their university course. A chi-square 
test indicated that the distribution o f qualifications in mathematics was not significantly 
different between subject groups ( /^(2, n=183) = 3.75). 
We then computed reliability scores for our measures o f reasoning heuristics. The 
Cronbach's alpha for the representativeness tasks was .51 , and for the equiprobability tasks 
was .59. A correlation o f over r=.50, is considered a satisfactory level o f reliabili ty for 
group measurement (Rust & Golombok, 1999). Performance on the two scales was 
uncorrelated (r(181)=-.001). 
The next set o f analyses concemed the number o f representativeness-based, 
equiprobability and normative responses across contents (everyday/psychology) and 
groups (see Tables 6.1. and 6.2. for the descriptive statistics in percentages, see Appendix 
S6 Table 1 for f l i l l results). The purpose o f these analyses was to find out whether 
statistical reasoning changed with education, whether these changes were present in 
general or they were restricted to the field o f study, and whether students studying different 
disciplines showed the same pattern o f changes. In order to investigate these questions we 
ran a series o f 2x2x2 mixed A N O V A s wi th content (everyday/psychology) as a wi th in-
subjects factor, and subject group (psychology/biology) and year group (f i rs t year / higher 
year) as between-subjects factors on the representativeness, equiprobability and normative 
responses. As we found a difference in need for cognition between subject groups, and we 
expected this to have an effect on students' performance on the tasks, we included need for 
cognition as a covariate in the analyses. 
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Table 6.1 . 77;e means and standard deviations (in brackets) of the 
representativeness and equiprobability responses across groups and problem types as a 
percentage of all responses. 
Representativeness 
Everyday Psychology 
Equiprobability 
Everyday Psychology 
group M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) 
First year psychology 25(16) 29(19) 9 (15) 23 (25) 
Higher year psychology 15(18) 13(19) 23 (29) 30 (32) 
First year biology 17(16) 20 (21) 9 (15) 27 (29) 
Higher year biology 22 (20) 20 (20) 11 (23) 20 (22) 
The A N O V A indicated a main effect o f year group ( F ( l , l78)=6.39 , /7<.05, 7 / 
=.04) on the representativeness responses. There was no effect o f content and subject 
group. However, there was a significant subject group by year group interaction ( F ( l , 
178)= 11.61,p<.01, 7]p^ = 06). This indicated that representativeness responses decreased 
with education, but only in the psychology student group. Need for cognition also had a 
significant effect ( F ( l , 178)=4.12,;;<.05, TJP'= 02). 
In the case o f the equiprobability responses the A N O V A showed a significant 
subject group by year group interaction (F(\, 179)= 4.36,p=.05, rjp^=.02), indicating that 
higher year psychology students gave more equiprobability responses than first year 
psychology students. There was no difference between year groups within the biology 
student group. Need for cognition also had a significant effect {F{\, I78)=6 .95 ,p< .0 l , rjp^ 
=.04). 
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The A N O V A on the normative responses indicated a significant effect o f need for 
cognition ( F ( l , 178)=13.24,/7<.01, = 07). No other effects or interactions reached 
significance. 
Table 6.2. The means and standard deviations (in brackets) of the normative responses 
across groups and contents as a percentage of all responses. 
Normative responses 
Everyday Psychology 
group M(SD) M(SD) 
First year psychology 80(15) 71 (17) 
Higher year psychology 79 (19) 76 (20) 
First year biology 84 (13) 73 (18) 
Higher year biology 83 (16) 77 (16) 
In order to see i f individual differences (the students' normative potential) and the 
students' achievement in statistics had an effect on the number o f representativeness and 
equiprobability responses that they gave, we ran a series o f regression analyses (see also 
Appendix S6 Table 2.). Based on Stanovich and West (2008) we expected that students 
higher in normative potential would give more normative responses, given that they 
possess the necessary mindware to solve the task (which is more l ikely in the case o f 
higher year students, and students with a more intensive training in statistics). 
In the first year psychology student group there was no relationship between their 
normative potential and their giving heuristic responses. In the higher year psychology 
student group statistics marks alone were significant negative predictors o f both the 
representativeness responses {fi=-.25, p<.05) and the equiprobability responses {fi=-.32, 
p<.0\). When we also entered normative potential into the equation, after controlling for 
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the effect o f statistics marks, we found that it was a significant negative predictor o f giving 
equiprobability responses (fi=-.21, p<.Q5). 
In the biology student group neither statistics marks, nor need for cognition was a 
significant predictor o f giving heuristic responses in the first or in the higher year student 
group. 
Discussion 
In this study we compared the performance o f first year and higher year psychology 
and marine biology students f rom the same university on a number o f probabilistic 
reasoning problems. The results indicated distinctive patterns o f relationship between 
statistics education and the two reasoning biases, and we also found a difference between 
subject groups (in line wi th Heller et al., 1988). Amongst psychology students, 
representativeness responses decreased, and equiprobability responses increased wi th 
education. In the case o f the biology student group there was no difference between year 
groups in the number o f representativeness and equiprobabilily responses that they gave. 
There was also no relationship between biology students' statistics marks or their 
need for cognition, and their probabilistic reasoning performance. This indicates that their 
education in statistics and biology did not have an effect on reasoning about the problems 
used in this study. Although dual-process theories o f reasoning (e.g., Sianovich & West, 
1999) predict a relationship between thinking styles and the use o f reasoning heuristics, 
more recently Stanovich and West (2008) proposed that this relationship only holds i f an 
individual has the necessary "mindware" (i.e., knowledge o f relevant rules and procedures 
which lead to the normative response). This is a possible explanation for the lack o f 
relationship between heuristic responding and need for cognition in the biology student 
group, and also amongst the first year psychology students. 
In the psychology student group participants gave fewer representativeness and 
more equiprobability responses with education. These changes were present in the case o f 
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both the psychology and the everyday content tasks. This result replicates the findings o f 
other studies that found simultaneous increases and decreases in the use o f different 
heuristics within the same group of students (e.g., Fischbein & Schnarch, 1997, Heller et 
al., 1992). 
The fact that there was no increase in normative responding in either subject group 
is in line with eariier findings by Kahneman, Slovich and Tversky (1982) who compared 
heuristic-based errors made by those with and without training in statistics. They only 
found small and infrequent differences between the two groups. 
In order to see i f this pattem o f increase in the equiprobability bias and decrease in 
the representativeness heuristic is generally present in psychology students we replicated 
the experiment with a group o f Italian psychology students. As there was no effect o f 
education in the case o f biology students we have not included this comparison group in 
Experiment 7. 
6.3. Experiment 7. The replication of Experiment 6 with Italian psychology students. 
This study was a partial replication o f Experiment 6 wi th a group o f Italian 
psychology students. The students in this sample had similar education in statistics as the 
psychology students in the U K , but they did not learn critical thinking. As in Experiment 6 
first year students with no previous education in statistics (group I ) were compared wi th 
students f rom the same course who already attended statistics classes (group 2). We also 
investigated the individual differences (cognitive abilities and cognitive styles) correlates 
o f the students' use o f reasoning heuristics. 
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Method 
Participants 
Participants were 129 psychology students from the University of Florence. Two 
groups were created: group I {n= 47, 33 females; students who had not done any statistics 
courses yet), and group 2 (w=82, 36 females; students who had had education in statistics 
already). The mean age of the students in group 1 was 21.3 years (age range 18-32 years). 
In group 2 the mean age was 24.8 years (age range 19-45 years). They took part in the 
experiment as volunteers. 
Materials and procedure 
Students worked through the same 12 probabilistic reasoning problems that were 
used in Experiment 6. They also filled in the Italian version of the need for cognition 
questionnaire (Chiesi &. Primi, 2008), and the short form of the APM. As in Experiment 6, 
we used the combined z scores of the two measures as an indicator of students' normative 
potential. 
Students were also asked to report their high school final grade in mathematics. 
Higher year students also had to report their marks on the previous year's statistics module. 
Participants were tested in groups of 5-10 (working on the tasks individually). They 
started with the two sets of probabilistic reasoning problems (the order of sets was 
counterbalanced across participants). Then they filled in the need for cognition 
questionnaire, and finally they solved the APM. The session took about 25 minutes. 
Results 
The first analyses concerned the individual differences measures (APM scores, and 
need for cognition). The purpose of these analyses was to confirm that there were no pre-
existing differences between groups. Independent samples / tests indicated that there was 
no difference between groups in terms of need for cognition (/(127)= -.63, n.s.) or 
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cognitive ability (/(126)=1.26, n.s.), or high school final grades in mathematics (/(122)= 
1.18, n,s.)-
The next analyses concerned the differences in probabilistic reasoning ability 
between first and higher year students, and we also investigated the effects of task content. 
Based on the findings of Experiment 6, we expected that educational level would affect 
reasoning performance. We ran a series of 2x2 mixed ANOVAs with content (everyday / 
psychology) as a within-subjects factor, and group as a between-subjects factor on the 
representativeness, equiprobability and normative responses (see Tables 6.3. and 6.4. for 
descriptive statistics, a supplementary table for these analyses is Appendix S7 Table 1.). In 
the case of the representativeness responses, the ANOVA indicated no effect of group or 
content, nor a content by group interaction (Fs<l). The results showed that 
representativeness responses remained stable across year groups. 
Table 6.3. The means and standard deviations (in brackets) of the representativeness and 
equiprobability responses across groups and problem types as a percentage of all 
responses. 
group 
Representativeness 
Everyday Psychology 
M(SD) M(SD) 
Equiprobability 
Everyday Psychology 
M(SD) M(SD) 
First year psychology 21 (18) 
Higher year psychology 20 (18) 
23 (22) 
21 (19) 
7(13) 
10(16) 
17(18) 
24 (22) 
In the case of the equiprobability responses the ANOVA showed a main effect of 
content (F( l , 126)= 27.65, p<.01, 7P^=.18), and a main effect of group ( F ( l , 126)= 5.63, 
;?<,05, T]p =.04). There was no interaction between content and group. Thus, students gave 
more equiprobability responses to the psychology content tasks than to the everyday 
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content tasks, and, as in Experiment 6, the number of equiprobability responses increased 
with education. 
Moreover, the ANOVA indicated that normative responding did not change with 
education, but there was a main effect of problem content (F ( l , 124)= 14.01,/K.001, T}^ 
=.10). There was no interaction between content and group. This indicated that students 
gave fewer normative responses on the psychology content tasks, and correct responding 
did not change with education. 
Table 6.4. The means and standard deviations (in brackets) of the normative responses 
across groups and problem types as a percentage of all responses. 
Normative 
Everyday Psychology 
group M(SD) M(SD) 
First year psychology 74(14) 70(13) 
Higher year psychology 75 (13) 67 (15) 
We also examined the relationship between students' normative potential^ their 
statistics marks and the number of representativeness and equiprobability responses that 
they gave (see also Appendix S7 Table 2). We expected that normative potential would 
only be related to normative responding in the case of students who possess the relevant 
mindware to solve the tasks (i.e., higher year students). In fact, in the first year student 
group normative potential did not significantly predict their giving representativeness or 
equiprobability responses. Amongst higher year students there was no relationship between 
statistics marks and heuristic responding. However, students* normative potential was 
negatively related to their susceptibility to the equiprobability bias 09=-.24, p<.05). 
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Discussion 
Experiment 7 was a partial replication of Experiment 6 with Italian psychology 
students as participants. As with the British psychology students in Experiment 6, the 
equiprobability bias increased with education. We also found that students gave more 
equiprobability responses to the psychology content tasks, which indicates that problem 
content might be important in the case of the equiprobability bias. Specifically, when the 
task is about people who have individual properties (as opposed to objects and natural 
phenomena, which are interchangeable with each other) students can "justify" their 
intuition of equiprobability by arguing (similarly to Gigerenzer et al., 1999) that base rates 
are irrelevant when making predictions about a single, individual outcome, disregarding 
the fact that in the present tasks individuals were randomly selected from a sample with 
known probabilities of the different possible outcomes. 
Johnson-Laird et al. (1999) suggested that individuals who are unfamiliar with the 
probability calculus wil l construct mental models of all possible outcomes and they assume 
by default that these outcomes are equiprobable, unless they have knowledge or beliefs to 
the contrary. Experiments 6 and 7 showed that students without education in statistics were 
to some extent susceptible to the equiprobability bias (they gave erroneous equiprobability 
responses about 10-20 % of the time). However, this susceptibility increased significantly 
with education. On the other hand, the bias was negatively correlated with students' 
normative potential. Stanovich (2008) used the term serial associative cognition with a 
focal bias to describe a reasoning process which is not purely associative and effortless 
(that is, not completely heuristic), but consists of the justification of a heuristically cued 
response through conscious, but low-effort processing (basically, a rationalization process) 
which lacks a real attempt to consider alternatives. Instead it is looking for easy ways of 
justifying the most obvious answer (a similar idea was proposed by Evans, 2006a, which 
he called the satis/icing principle - s^e Section 1.3.1). It is possible that students with a 
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poor understanding of the concept of randomness use it to justify their initial intuitions 
about the equiprobability of different outcomes which results in the counterintuitive 
increase in equiprobability responses with education. 
According to previous studies (e.g., Epstein, et al., 1992; Ferreira, et al, 2006; 
Kiaczynski, 2001; see also Section 1.2.2.) instructing participants to reason analytically or 
logically (e.g., "take the point of view of a perfectly logical person" - Denes-Raj & 
Epstein, 1994) increases the mental effort that they invest in the task, and as a result, 
participants give more normative responses. I f the equiprobability bias is partly the result 
of shallow, low-effort processing, we should be able to reduce the bias by giving logical 
instructions, which encourages a more thorough and effortful processing. 
Going back to the results of Experiment 7, we found (similarly to the biology 
student group in Experiment 6) that the representativeness heuristic did not diminish as a 
result of education in statistics. It is possible that the decrease in the representativeness 
heuristic in the case of the British psychology students was not related to their education in 
statistics, but their education in critical thinking, where they learnt about the conjunction 
fallacy and other classic heuristics and biases tasks. This is also confirmed by the fact that 
in this group the representativeness heuristic was negatively correlated with their marks on 
the statistics and critical thinking module, whereas biology students' and Italian 
psychology students' achievement on their statistics courses was unrelated to their using 
the representativeness heuristic. Stanovich and West (2008) emphasised the role of the 
knowledge of relevant normative rules as a prerequisite of resisting reasoning heuristics. 
Obviously, i f we are unaware that the response we give is based on some mistaken 
intuition we wil l not be able to correct it through conscious effort. Thus, increasing the 
mental effort that we invest into solving a problem wi l l not have an effect on these types of 
error. 
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On the basis of the above we predicted that representafiveness responses would not 
be affected by instructing students to think logically, whereas the equiprobability bias 
would be reduced by logical instructions, as compared to the intuitive condition. 
6.4. Experiment 8: The effect of instructions on susceptibility to the representativeness 
heuristic and to the equiprobability bias. 
Drawing on the findings of Experiments 6 and 7 we proposed that the 
representativeness heuristic and the equiprobability bias might be based on different 
reasoning processes (i.e., the former being the result of pure heuristic processing, whereas 
the latter resulting fi-om an initial heuristic representation, followed by a low-effort, 
conscious justification phase). Although, as we have seen in Experiment 6, students who 
are explicitly taught about the representativeness heuristic (i.e., who possess the necessary 
"mindware") are able to resist this response. However, without explicit tutoring, students 
continue to commit this fallacy, at least in the case of tasks where they do not recognize the 
need to employ a relevant normative principle. This idea is consistent with Stanovich and 
West (2008) who reported that a number of cognitive biases were independent of cognitive 
ability. They explained these findings by proposing that people with high cognitive ability 
often do not recognize the need for a normative principle any better than people with lower 
cognitive ability. On the other hand, even when a person possesses the necessary 
knowledge, they can still come to an erroneous conclusion. As Evans (2006b) noted, just 
because a reasoning process is conscious and capacity demanding it does not necessarily 
lead to correct, logical reasoning. 
One possible way of distinguishing between reasoning errors that arise from the 
lack of the necessary "mindware", and those that are the result of effortful but sloppy 
reasoning is to use different instructional conditions. Giving logical instructions sensitises 
participants to the potential conflict between logic and intuitions (Stanovich & West, 
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2008), and makes it more likely that i f participants have the relevant knowledge, they wil l 
use it (see more on the effects of instructions in Section 1.2.2.), However, i f the person 
lacks the knowledge that would lead to the normative solution, instructions should not 
make a difference. 
Finally, based on a recent finding by Evans, Handley, Neilens, Bacon and Over (in 
press) it was hypothesized that people with higher cognitive ability would better comply 
with instructions. That is, we expected a larger effect of instructions in the case of 
participants with higher cognitive ability. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 119 psychology students from the University of Florence who 
already had education in statistics, thus they were expected to possess relevant knowledge 
of the concept of randomness. The mean age of participants was 24.9 years (SD= 2.9, age 
range 23-45 years), there were 14 males and 105 females in this group. They took part in 
the experiment as volunteers. 
Materials and Procedure 
The same 12 tasks as in Experiments 6 and 7 were administered to measure 
students' probabilistic reasoning ability. As before, half of the problems had a social 
content and the other half had an everyday content. The problems were presented in a fixed 
random order, and the order of the problems within each set was the same. The order of the 
presentation of the two sets was counterbalanced across participants. Students had to solve 
the tasks individually. 
Two instruction conditions were used. In the "intuitive condition" the experiment 
was introduced as a study of human intuition. The purpose of this instruction was to 
encourage heuristic (Type 1) processing. The instructions were the following: ''Thepresent 
study's goal is to evaluate personal intuition when one has to make choices on the basis of 
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some information. The following pages consist of multiple-choice questions. Please answer 
the questions on the basis ofyour intuition and personal sensitivity". 
In the "logical condition" the experiment was introduced as a study on human 
rationality. The purpose of this instruction was to elicit logical (Type 2) processing. The 
instructions for this group were the following: ''Thepresent study's goal is to evaluate 
personal reasoning capacity when one has to make choices on the basis of some 
information. The following pages consist of multiple-choice questions. Please answer on 
the basis of your rational and reflective thinking. When answering the questions, take the 
perspective of a perfectly logical person ". 
About half of the participants («= 57) were randomly assigned to the intuitive 
condition and the other half (n= 62) to the logical condition. After solving the tasks, the 
students also worked through the short form of the APM, and they filled in the need for 
cognition questionnaire. 
Results 
First we compared the two instruction groups on their need for cognition and APM 
scores. There was no difference between groups in their cognitive abilities (M= 8.81 and 
M=S.52 for the intuitive and rational groups, respectively; /(117)=.79, n.s.) and cognitive 
styles {M=65.41 and M=65.91 for the intuitive and rational groups, respectively, 
/(117)=.30, n.s.). Then we computed the z scores of students' APM scores and their need 
for cognition. As in the previous experiments, we used the combined z scores of these two 
measures as an estimate of students' normative potential. In order to investigate the effects 
of normative potential, we created a high (n=59) and a low (n=60) normative potential 
group by dividing the sample at the median. The normative potential of the two groups was 
significantly different (/(117)= 16.26, p<.01). 
We ran a series of 2x2x2 mixed ANOVAs with content (everyday/psychology) as a 
within-subjects factor, and instruction and normative potential group (high/low) as a 
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between-subjects factor on the representativeness, equiprobability and normative responses 
(descriptive statistics are displayed in Tables 6.5. and 6.6., for additional results see 
Appendix S8 Table I) . The purpose of these analyses was to see whether instructions had 
an effect on students' giving representativeness-based and equiprobability responses, and i f 
there was any difference between students with high and low normative potential in how 
they complied with instructions. More specifically, it was expected that students 
possessing relevant knowledge about randomness should be able to resist the 
equiprobability bias when instructed to think logically. However, because students did not 
have training in recognising the representativeness heuristic, we expected that instructions 
should not affect this bias. 
A 2x2x2 ANOVA on the representativeness responses indicated no effect of 
problem content, instructions or normative potential, or any interaction between these. 
Table 6.5. The means and standard deviations (in brackets) of the 
representativeness and equiprobability responses across normative potential (NP) groups 
and problem types as a percentage of all responses. 
Representativeness Equiprobability 
Everyday Psychology Everyday Psychology 
group M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) 
Intuitive, low NP 12(16) 19(17) 12(19) 20 (23) 
Intuitive, high NP 22 (20) 24(17) 9(15) 22 (22) 
Rational, low NP 23 (22) 20(17) 3(14) 26 (23) 
Rational, high NP 19(19) 20(19) 7(16) 14(19) 
In the case of the equiprobability responses the ANOVA showed a main effect of 
content (F ( l , 114)= 40.72,/K.OOl, T ^ / = . 2 6 ) , and there was also a significant interaction 
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between content, mstrucl'ions and normative potential {F(\, 114)= 5.89,/r<:.05, 7p^  = 05). 
No other effects or interactions were significant. 
We analysed this effect further by running a 2x2 ANOVA with content 
(psychology/everyday) as a within subjects factor, and instructions (intuitive/rational) as a 
between subjects factor, separately for the high and low normative potential groups (see 
additional results in Appendix S8 Table 2.). 
Table 6.6. The means and standard deviations (in brackets) of the normative 
responses across normative potential (NP) groups and problem types as a percentage of 
all responses. 
Normative responses 
Everyday Psychology 
S^ "^P M(SD) M(SD) 
Intuitive, low NP 82 (14) 71(22) 
Intuitive, high NP 83 (14) 72 (15) 
Rational, low NP 79(17) 74(16) 
Rational, high NP 82 (17) 79 (16) 
Within the high ability group there was a significant effect of content (F ( l , 
57)=36.58,/7<.001, 7p^= 39) and also a significant content by instruction interaction 
(F(l,57)=8.94,/?<.01, ;7p^ = 14). This was because students in the intuitive condition gave 
more equiprobability responses to the psychology than to the everyday content tasks 
(/(28)=5.63,/7<.00l), but this difference was significantly smaller between the two 
contents in the rational condition (r(28)=2.54, /K .05) as a result of students' giving fewer 
equiprobability responses to the psychology content tasks (but not the everyday content 
ones). The same analysis within the low ability group showed only a significant effect of 
content (F ( l , 57)- 11.12,p<.01, V=-16). 
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The ANOVA on the normative responses (see Table 6.6. for descriptives) indicated 
that normative responding did not change with instructions, but there was a main effect of 
problem content (F ( l , 115)= 17.74,p<.00l, TJ/=A2). Students generally gave more 
correct responses on the everyday content tasks, and logical instructions did not increase 
the number of normative responses. 
Discussion 
Experiment 8 replicated and extended some of the findings of the previous 
experiments. As in Experiments 6 and 7, we found that the representativeness heuristic was 
unrelated to students' normative potential. This heuristic was also resistant to the effect of 
instructions. This supports the idea that students without explicit knowledge about the 
representativeness heuristic (or at least some typical reasoning errors based on this 
heuristic) are not very much able to resist this response, regardless of their cognitive 
abilities. 
As in Experiment 7, students gave more equiprobability responses to the 
psychology than to the everyday content tasks. Throughout Experiments 7 and 8 this effect 
was very strong. Although we did not find the same effect in Experiment 6, this was 
because in that experiment we included need for cognition as a covariate in the analysis of 
responses. Indeed, a simple ANOVA on the equiprobability responses indicated a main 
effect of content F( 1, 179)= 31.34, p<.01, TJP^ =. 15). Similady, in Experiment 8, the content 
effect in the case of the equiprobability bias only disappeared in the case o f high ability 
students when they were given instructions to think like *'a perfectly logical person" (that 
is, when they were instructed to think hard, or to think like somebody with a high need for 
cognition). 
This suggests that when the equiprobability tasks have a social content, the bias is 
harder to resist (i.e., it requires more conscious effort). This is probably because we think 
about people as agents and we attribute higher uncertainty and unpredictability (which is 
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the basis of the equiprobability bias - see Callaert, 2004) to people than to objects, which 
we see as more determined. It is likely that when they make inferences about people, 
students expect individuals to not necessarily behave exactly like other members of their 
group would (as opposed to a flip of one fair coin that would produce the same result as 
that of another). Also, as Gigerenzer et al, (1999) noted probabilities do not help much in 
predicting single outcomes, and making probabilistic judgments about an individual seems 
like doing exactly this, although the individuals in the tasks were randomly selected from a 
bigger population, thus students should have recognized the relevance of population base 
rates. It is also important to note that there was no evidence for a similar content effect in 
the case of the representativeness heuristic. 
In Experiment 8, as in Experiments 6 and 7, the equiprobability bias was more 
pronounced in the case of students with lower normative potential. Together with the fact 
that this bias increased with education, at least in the psychology student groups, this lends 
support to the notion that this bias stems from a misapplication of concepts or rules that 
students learn as part of their education. Based on this argument, we expected that 
instructions would have an effect on giving equiprobability responses, at least in the case 
of higher ability students (see Evans et al., in press). This is what was found, although it 
was only apparent on the psychology content tasks. However, given the small number of 
equiprobability responses on the everyday content tasks, it is possible that the lack of 
difference on these tasks was the result of a floor effect. This differential effect of 
instructions on the representativeness heuristic (which was unaffected by instructions) and 
on the equiprobability bias (which decreased under logical instructions) lends support to 
the claim that these two biases are based on different types of reasoning processes. This 
also helps in clarifying the distinction between primary and secondary intuitions, proposed 
by Fischbein (1987). Primary intuitions seem less accessible to consciousness, and thus we 
are less able to control them, whereas secondary intuitions are more accessible to 
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consciousness (and thus more controllable) but only i f we engage in effortful cognitive 
processing. 
6.5. General discussion 
The purpose of Experiments 6-8 was to examine the role of education in heuristic 
reasoning, and to test the contrasting predictions of educational (Batanero et al., 1996; 
Callaert, 2004; Fischbein & Schnarch, 1997; Lecoutre, 1985; Pratt, 2000) and reasoning 
theorists (Evans & Over, 1996; Johnson-Laird et al,, 1999; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; 
Stanovich & West, 1999) by looking at psychology students' probabilistic reasoning 
ability. In particular, these studies investigated students' use of the representativeness 
heuristic and the equiprobability bias. We combined the methods of the educational and 
reasoning approaches by simultaneously investigating changes with educational level, and 
the effects of individual differences in cognitive ability and need for cognition. Using an 
instruction manipulation it was also possible to explore the cognitive processes underlying 
primary and secondary intuitions. 
According to dual-process theories (e.g., Stanovich & West, 2008) individuals with 
higher cognitive ability, higher need for cognition, and more domain-specific knowledge 
tend to give more normative responses to reasoning problems. More specific theoretical 
accounts of probabilistic reasoning assume that education and training will facilitate more 
accurate representations of probabilistic information. Johnson-Laird et al. (1999), for 
example, have proposed that the equiprobability bias wil l be most evident in the case of 
individuals who are not familiar with the probability calculus and, consequently, represent 
outcomes as equiprobable mental models. 
In contrast, according to educational theorists, heuristics with different origins can 
develop differently, and some of them increase, rather than decrease with education (e.g., 
Fischbein & Schnarch, 1997). This literature predicts a counterintuitive increase in the 
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equiprobability bias as a result of statistics education which can be related to the students' 
misunderstanding of the concept of randomness (Balanero et al., 1996, Lecoutre, 1985). 
Our results supported the claim that different heuristics can show different patterns 
with education, and that it is possible that one heuristic increases while another one 
decreases the same time. In Experiment 6 higher year British psychology students gave 
fewer representativeness responses and more equiprobability responses than first year 
students. We found the same counterintuitive increase in equiprobability responses in the 
case of Italian psychology students in Experiment 7. This suggested that (contrary to 
Johnson-Laird et al.'s, 1999, claim, and in line with Batanero et al., 1996, and Lecoutre, 
1985) the equiprobability bias does not diminish with statistics education, rather, it 
increases in the case of students who misunderstand the role of randomness in determining 
the outcome of probabilistic events. 
We also investigated the effects of problem content. The purpose o f this was to see 
i f the observed changes in probabilistic reasoning were specific to the subject of study or i f 
they were general across contents. We found that all changes that we observed were 
present in both the psychology and in the everyday content tasks. We proposed that the fact 
that students gave more equiprobabilily responses when they had to make judgements 
about probabilistic events concerning people, was likely to be the result of students 
generally reasoning about people and objects differently. Namely, we argued that students 
are more inclined to ignore base rales when they reason about people, because they see 
them as individuals, rather than as interchangeable items which are mere representatives of 
the probabilistic properties of their parent population. 
We also wanted to address the question of whether there are differences in how 
groups of students who study different subjects think about probabilities (see Heller et al., 
1992, Lehman et al,, 1988). We only found an effect of statistics education in the case of 
psychology students. Although biologists also study statistics, in psychology education 
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statistics is more central (first year psychology students have four times as many lectures in 
statistics as biology students). It is likely that it is not studying psychology perse, but 
rather the fact that students had more education in statistics that led to the differences 
between subject groups. 
As dual-process theories of reasoning (e.g., Evans & Over, 1996; Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002; Stanovich, 1999) predict, students with higher cognitive abilities and with 
higher need for cognition were less susceptible to biases. At least incorrect equiprobability 
responses were mostly given by students with lower cognitive abilities. In addition, 
students with higher need for cognition (Experiment 6) and with higher normative potential 
and given logical instructions (Experiment 8) were less sensitive to content effects. This 
suggests that students with higher normative potential are more able to extract the logical 
stmcture of problems, regardless of problem content. Nevertheless, in the case of students 
who did not learn about the representativeness heuristic cognitive abilities were unrelated 
to correct responding. Overall these findings are in line with the new model of Stanovich 
and West (2008) with the restriction that although learning about normative principles is 
usually beneficial, knowledge can also be "dangerous" sometimes (i.e., misunderstanding 
normative principles can increase the number of incorrect responses). 
Instructions, which are considered to constrain the intentional level (by increasing 
the cognitive effort that students invest into solving tasks, and by sensitising them to the 
possible conflicts between logic and beliefs) somewhat improved reasoning performance, 
but only on the tasks measuring the equiprobability bias, and only in the case of higher 
ability students. In sum, although cognitive abilities, cognitive styles and instructions have 
an effect on the use of reasoning heuristics, education and relevant knowledge play a very 
important role too (although sometimes it can be a negative one!) 
The main focus of this study was the changes in the representativeness heuristic 
and the equiprobability bias with education in statistics. Nevertheless, it is worth 
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emphasizing that normative responding did not increase in any of the groups in this study 
throughout their undergraduate years. Students in each group solved around 80% of the 
tasks correctly. This might sound impressive, but given that the tasks only required simple 
computations and the correct responses were based on basic statistical principles, this 
means that many students struggle with understanding the basics of probabilistic reasoning. 
In each group only around 10 % of the students solved all the tasks correctly. This 
highlights the need for helping students to learn to identify the possible sources of error 
and bias, and to understand the principles of probabilistic reasoning better. 
From the educational point o f view, the most important findings o f this study were 
the increase in the equiprobability bias with education, and the fact that this bias was more 
prominent on psychology (social) content tasks. On the positive side, there is some 
indication that teaching students about the representativeness heuristic successfully 
decreased the number of representativeness-based responses in the case o f the British 
psychology students. Although students with high need for cognition and high cognitive 
capacity tended to give less heuristic responses, in an educational setting it is very 
important that students with different levels of ability should be equally able to produce 
normative responses. It is clearly not enough to teach normative statistical rules when 
many students are unable to recognize the need to apply them, or they actually use them to 
justify their incorrect intuitions. It is also clear that learning about a certain type of 
heuristic does not affect the use of another heuristic (e.g., students who learnt to resist the 
representativeness heuristic continued to give erroneous equiprobability responses). 
In summary, the present findings are in line with the predictions of educational 
theorists: heuristic use can increase or decrease with education, and these patterns can be 
present simultaneously in the same population. This is similar to our findings with 
adolescent populations (see Experiments 2 and 3) where the developmental patterns of 
different heuristics were very mixed. In contrast with the predictions of dual-process 
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theorists (e.g., Stanovich, 1999) overall normative responding did not increase with 
education, and giving logical instructions did not have an effect on the number of 
normative responses. This is again, in line with our previous findings, where cognitive 
abilities were mostly unrelated to normative responding, and normative responding did not 
tend to increase with age. On the other hand, students with higher need for cognition and 
higher cognitive capacity were less susceptible to the equiprobability bias, and we also 
found evidence that giving logical instructions had a greater effect in the case of higher 
ability students (which is in line with Evans et al., in press). The fact that normative 
potential was a good predictor of reasoning performance only in the case o f students with a 
higher level of education (who presumably possessed relevant knowledge) in Experiments 
6 and 7 is also in agreement with the predictions of Stanovich and West (2008). Overall the 
present findings confirm some of the ideas of dual-process theories, but also highlight the 
fact that these predictions can only be applied under certain conditions (e.g., normative 
potential only predicts performance in the case of participants with relevant knowledge; 
logical instructions only have an effect on high ability participants' performance, etc.). 
These results also provide ftirther evidence that heuristics are not always basic, and they 
can emerge/increase at later stages of development, well beyond childhood. 
In the final chapter I am going to discuss further the implications of these findings, 
and that of the other studies reported in Chapters 3 and 5, for dual-process theories. I wi l l 
also summarize the most important results of the empirical studies, discuss some issues 
that still need to be resolved, and (based on the above) outline some possible future 
directions of investigation. 
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Chapter 7: A review and interpretation of the experimental 
findings, and recommendations for future research. 
7.0, Introduction to Chapter 7. 
The main aim of this chapter is to review and interpret the experimental findings 
reported in Chapters 3, 5 and 6, and to relate these findings to the theoretical accounts that 
I have introduced in the previous chapters (i.e., dual-process theories, the cognitive 
theories of autism, and educational theories of heuristic reasoning). I also identify some 
issues that still need to be resolved, especially regarding the cognitive underpinnings of 
heuristic reasoning, and the development of reasoning heuristics. 
Section 7.1. reviews our most important empirical findings regarding the 
development of heuristics, heuristics and biases in autism, and the role of education in the 
emergence and suppression of reasoning heuristics. Besides the effects of cognitive 
capacity and personal experiences, this section also discusses the role of thinking styles, 
education and instructions in heuristic reasoning. I also discuss the compatibility of our 
findings with dual-process theories of reasoning, and with some prominent cognitive 
theories of autism. Another important aim of this section is to try and identify the driving 
forces behind the development of reasoning heuristics. 
Section 7.2. explores the question of whether dual-process theories offer the best 
explanation for our findings, or whether single process theories (such as the intuitive rules 
model - see Section 2.1.4.) could account for the present results just as well. In this section 
I also introduce a recent theoretical paper (Keren & Schul, in press) which criticized dual-
process theories, and relate the issues that they raised to the findings of our empirical 
studies. The main point here is that dual-process theories cannot account for many 
empirical findings, especially regarding the development of reasoning heuristics. Although 
the methods developed/implemented by dual-process theorists (for example, investigating 
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the effects of cognitive capacity on reasoning, using instruction manipulations or dual-task 
paradigms, etc.) are extremely useful in studying reasoning processes, dual-process 
theorists' claims about the underlying cognitive processes of reasoning still remain 
controversial. To say the least, it seems that single process theories can explain our 
empirical findings just as well as dual-process theories. 
Finally, Section 7.3. discusses the rationality of heuristics and biases. Although 
avoiding heuristics is supposed to be rational (see e.g., Stanovich, 2009) sometimes people 
who could be expected to be more rational are more susceptible to biases. For example, we 
have found that older children are more susceptible to biases than younger children, 
typically developing children are (often) more susceptible to biases than children with 
autism, and people with education in statistics are more susceptible to (a certain) bias than 
people without education in statistics. In this section 1 also outline some possible future 
directions of research, and 1 summarize my conclusions. 
7.1. Experimental findings regarding the development of heuristics and biases in autism 
and in typical development, and the role of education in heuristic reasoning. 
The main aim of this section is to review and interpret the experimental findings 
reported in Chapters 3, 5 and 6, and to relate these findings to the predictions of dual-
process theories and the cognitive theories of autism. I also review our empirical findings 
regarding the role of education in the emergence and suppression of reasoning heuristics. 
7.1.1. A summary of the predictions of dual-process theories regarding the 
development of heuristic reasoning. 
In Section 1.2.1.1 reviewed the evidence from studies with adults that supports the 
idea of two separate types of processes (i.e., quick, automatic and effortless vs. slow and 
effortful processes that are demanding of cognitive resources). This evidence includes the 
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fact that on some problems (notably on conflict problems where Type 1 and Type 2 
processes are expected to cue conflicting responses) people who have higher cognitive 
capacity, people who are disposilionally inclined to reason carefully or who are explicitly 
instructed to reason rationally are more Hkely to produce normative responses to problems. 
In addition, people who are given little time to think, or people whose working memory is 
burdened with preload are less likely to give normative responses to the same problems. 
By contrast, performance on non-conflict problems is unaffected by these manipulations. 
Evidence from experiments using verbal and non-verbal process-tracing methods also 
indicates that participants' attention is drawn to certain aspects of problems very quickly 
and they are more likely to process these details more carefully, neglecting other 
(sometimes crucial) aspects. A l l of these findings are in line with the predictions of 
traditional, default-interventionist dual-process theories (e.g., Evans & Over, 1996; 
Stanovich, 1999 - see also Section 1.2.1 .)• Although these claims are almost exclusively 
based on research with adult participants, some dual-process theorists (e.g., Stanovich, 
Toplak & West, 2008) maintain that all these should equally apply to children as well. 
Both Stanovich and West (2008) and Evans (2006a) modified their theories recently 
to offer a more complex idea of human cognition than their initial conceptualisations of 
dual processes (see Section 1.3.1.). One idea that both recent models emphasize is that 
cognitive effort does not always guarantee a normative solution, or even an abstract, 
logical representation of a task. Hypothetical thinking, and mental simulation of alternative 
outcomes might not be possible without Type 2 thinking, but Type 2 thinking is also no 
guarantee for an abstract, logical representation (see Evans, 2006a; Stanovich, 2009). 
Stanovich and West (2008) also emphasize the role of relevant knowledge in reasoning and 
they specify the ways in which knowledge, cognitive capacity and cognitive styles interact 
in shaping reasoning performance (see Figure 1,4. for a summary of the model). In Section 
1.3.2. I also summarized some concerns about the claims that the original dual-process 
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theories of reasoning (i.e., for example, Evans & Over, 1996 and Stanovich, 1999) make. 
There is evidence, for example, that the belief bias (a prototypical Type 1 process) arises in 
frontal brain areas (which are normally associated with Type 2 processes - although dual-
process theorists do not make strong claims about the localization of Type 1 and 2 
processes). Another important observation is that although Type 2 processes sometimes 
override Type 1 reasoning, most of the time Type I reasoning is in control of people's 
behaviour. A final issue is that both Type 1 and Type 2 processes seem to include a 
number of different components. In the case of Type 1 processes the following components 
have been identified; implicit learning, overleamed associations, and the modular 
processes for solving adaptive problems (Stanovich, 2008). Type 2 processes also include 
some (partially) independent components, such as working memory/fluid intelligence and 
executive function resources (i.e., the algorithmic mind) and thinking dispositions (i.e., the 
autonomous mind - see Stanovich, 2009). 
Moving on to the topic of the development of reasoning heuristics, 1 started Chapter 
2 by summarizing the existing empirical evidence regarding age-related changes in 
heuristic use. Although there is plenty of evidence that logical competence, rule use, and 
normatively correct responding generally increase with development, heuristic use can also 
increase or remain stable across age groups, which results in "messy" developmental 
trajectories in children's performance on heuristics and biases tasks. Then (in Sections 
2.1.2. and 2.1.3.) I described three developmental dual-process accounts which have 
attempted to identify the driving forces behind these changes: that of Stanovich and 
colleagues (e.g., ICokis et al., 2002), Klaczynski and colleagues (e.g., Klaczynski & 
Cottrell, 2004), and the fiizzy trace theory (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 1992). Although these 
theories show marked differences, there is still some consistency in the claims that they 
make (other than proposing that two separate processes form the basis of human 
reasoning). First of all, these theorists agree that both types of process are available at all 
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points of development, although they go through changes, especially between early 
childhood and adolescence. These theorists are also in agreement that heuristics are 
independent of cognitive capacity, and that they work outside conscious control. In 
addition, they propose that Type 1 (i.e., quick, contextualised, automatic) processing is the 
default, but slow and effortful Type 2 processes can override or suppress them. Finally, 
they all agree that Type 2 reasoning requires the decontextualization of problems (by 
means of decoupling, metacognitive operations, or by relying on the actual stimuli, and 
suppressing automatic inferences and personal interpretations of problems). 
In Section 2.1.2. I also described a taxonomy of heuristics and biases proposed by 
Stanovich et al. (2008; see also Table 2.1.). Based on this taxonomy, it is possible to make 
predictions about the relationships between performance on the actual tasks that we used in 
our experiments, and participants* cognitive capacity and thinking styles. According to 
Stanovich et al. these predictions should equally hold in the case of children and adults. 
The first two categories of bias that they identified were the "cognitive miser" and 
"override failures". These include the tendency to default to effortless (Type I) processing, 
to focus on some salient (but often irrelevant) aspects of problems, or to fail to engage in 
sustained decoupling in order to apply a normative rule. Examples for these include the 
representativeness heuristic (i.e., the positive/negative recency effect, and the engineers 
and lawyers problem with a representative description), framing effects (such as the sunk 
cost and the if-only fallacy), and the belief bias in syllogistic reasoning. In the case of all of 
these biases (that is, virtually all heuristics and biases that we looked at in our studies) we 
can expect that people with higher cognitive ability and higher need for cognition (or 
people who are instructed to reason logically) should respond more normatively. By 
contrast, in the case of biases which stem from "mindware gaps" (i.e., missing probability 
knowledge), such as the conjunction fallacy, there should be no relationship between 
people's performance and their cognitive abilities and the instructions they are given. 
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Finally, in Section 2.3. 1 summarized the predictions of these theorists in a table 
(Table 2.2.) that I reproduce here in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1. Developmental trajectories predicted by developmental dual-process theories, 
and the cognitive foundations of these changes (a reproduction of Table 2.2.) 
Developmental Normative responding Heuristic Development is driven by... 
theories of responding 
reasoning 
Stanovich Steadily increases Decreases or increases in cognitive abilit> 
etal. with age, or remains stable although thinking 
remains stable with age dispositions and relevant 
knowledge play a 
role as well 
Klaczynski Can increase, decrease or Can increase. the development of 
et al. remain stable with age, decrease or metacognitive 
although it is expected to remain stable abilities, and thinking 
increase during adolescence with age dispositions, together with 
real-life experiences 
Reyna Increases with age. inverted changes in representations 
et al. or U-shaped U-shaped as a result o f experiences; 
pattern pattern increasing reliance on gist 
processing 
7.7.2. Contrasting our experimental findings with the predictions of dual-process theories. 
1 consider the evidence for age-related changes in heuristic reasoning first, and then I 
move on to discuss the possible driving forces behind these changes. It is important to note 
that, as our results show, even in the case of the same heuristic, different developmental 
patterns can be expected depending on the age groups that we look at. Nevertheless, it 
seems that initially (that is, in eariy and mid-childhood) the use of reasoning heuristics 
steadily increases. In fact, in Experiment 1 we found this to be the case for the conjunction 
fallacy, the if-only fallacy, and the belief bias in syllogistic reasoning in the case of 
children between the age of 5 and 11. In Experiment 2 we administered the same tasks to a 
group of adolescents between the age of 11 and 16. In this experiment we found little 
evidence for age-related changes in any of the heuristics, apart from an increase in the 
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conjunction fallacy. However, i f we look at the changes between the age of 5 and 16, and 
we collapse overall heuristic, normative and "other" responding across tasks, there seem to 
be some recognizable patterns in the way children respond (see Figure 7.1.). 
•heuristic 
•normative 
•other 
Syoars? SyoarsS lOycarsS 12vcars9 14yeors9 
months months months months months 
Figure 7.1. Age-related changes in the overall proportion of heuristic, normative and 
"other*' responses on four typical heuristics and biases tasks between the age of 5 and 16 
(based on Experiments I and 2.) 
First of all, heuristic responding is dominant in all age groups (as predicted by all 
dual-process theories), apart from in the youngest age group where giving normative 
responses is as likely as giving heuristic responses. Although this could be interpreted as a 
sign of random responding, looking at the response patterns on the individual tasks shows 
that even the youngest children have preferred responses on all of these problems (see 
Table 3.3.). Going back to the developmental pattems, there seems to be a clear trend for 
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"other" responses to decrease with age. By contrast, normative responding shows a U-
shaped pattern, and heuristic responding shows an inverted U-shaped pattern, just as the 
fuzzy-trace theory would predict. The point in time where heuristic responding starts to 
decrease and normative responding starts to increase appears to be around age 10 or 11 
which roughly corresponds to the Piagetian notion (e.g., Piaget, 1976) that this is the time 
when children reach the formal operational stage. Nevertheless, it is also the time when 
heuristic reasoning is at its highest. It is also worth mentioning that after an initial increase, 
very soon the level of normative responding reaches a plateau, or at least the increase 
seems to slow down. In addition, even at the age of 15 normative responding is at the same 
level as at 7 years, which is clearly not what traditional theories of cognitive development 
would predict. 
These age-related changes are also informative regarding the literature on the 
development of reasoning heuristics. Whereas some authors have reported an age-related 
increase in heuristic use (e.g., Davidson, 1995), others have found the opposite pattern 
(e.g., Kokis et al., 2002), and yet others have found no change (e.g., Klaczynski, 2001). 
Looking at the pattems in our sample, we can find evidence for all of these pattems, 
depending on which age groups we compare (we could actually expect these pattems to 
also differ for the individual heuristics that we examined in these studies, but I am not 
going to discuss this here). Interestingly, our general pattern fits well with the findings 
reported by the above authors, although there are some differences as well. Davidson 
(1995) found an increase in heuristic responding during the primary school years, and we 
have found the same, Kokis et al. (2002) reported that heuristic responding generally 
decreased between the age of 10 and 12, and we have found a similar pattem between 11 
and 13 years (an independent samples / test indicated a significant decrease in heuristic 
responding between age groups 3 and 4 on Figure 7.1.; /(56)=3.5l,/?<.01). However, in 
contrast with Kokis et al. (2002) who reported a positive relationship between nomiative 
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responding and cognitive capacity, we have found no relationship between general 
intelligence (as indexed by the short form of the WlSC) and normative or heuristic 
responding in this age group. On the other hand, heuristic responding was positively 
correlated with verbal working memory scores (r(56)=.50,p<,001). Finally, looking at the 
early to mid-adolescent age groups (i.e., age groups 4 and 5), we have found (similariy to 
Klaczysnki, 2001) no change in heuristic responding, although, in contrast with the results 
of Klaczynski (2001) there was no overall increase in normative responding. However, this 
might be because in our experiment children did not get strong instructions to reason 
logically. 
So what could be the driving forces behind these age-related changes? The steady 
decrease in "other" responses (which are atypical responses that do not seem to make 
sense) in Experiments 1 and 2 could not be directly related to the steady increase in 
cognitive capacity with development, although they are probably related to children's 
increasing knowledge (however, this was not measured separately). These responses 
should probably be considered as random noise. 
In Experiment 2 we employed tasks to measure the three main aspects of executive 
functioning (i.e., working memory, inhibition and set-shifting). Al l of these tended to 
increase with age. Although working memory was unrelated to heuristic responding in the 
case of adolescent participants (at least when we controlled for the effects of age), there 
was a negative correlation between heuristic responding and inhibition in the case of the 
belief bias and the sunk cost problems. By contrast, the if-only fallacy was positively 
correlated with inhibition skills. Finally, overall normative responding was positively 
correlated with participants' set-shifting ability. In Experiment 3 we employed an index of 
analogical reasoning ability as a measure of executive functioning, and we used a new set 
of heuristics and biases problems. Analogical reasoning, especially when it requires 
resistance to interference (which can be semantic, perceptual or relational) is a pure 
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measure of the ability to decouple representations. It is noteworthy that analogical 
reasoning ability was mostly unrelated to susceptibility to heuristics, or i f there was a 
relationship, this was positive (in the case of the engineers and lawyers problem with a 
representative description). The correlations between the measures of cognitive capacity 
and heuristic reasoning were also mixed, with more evidence for positive than for negative 
relationships. These results are clearly in contrast with Stanovich et al. (2008) who predict 
a negative relationship between heuristic reasoning and cognitive capacity, apart from in 
the case of the conjunction fallacy where they expect no relationship. Note that although in 
these experiments we did not take into account the effects of relevant knowledge, 
according to Stanovich et al. (2008) knowledge has no effect on reasoning in the case of 
the tasks that we employed here, apart from the conjunction fallacy task, which is 
attributed to mindware gaps in probability knowledge. 
Those researchers who report inverted U-shaped developmental pattems (e.g., 
Brainerd et al., 2004; De Neys & Everaerts, 2008) tend to attribute this to the interaction of 
two separate processes, where the later developing process inhibits/suppresses the output 
of the primary process. For example, Brainerd et al. (2004) claim that gist (i.e., 
contextualised) processing increases most profoundly between the age of 7 and 11, 
whereas verbatim processing (i.e., decontextualised, fact-based processing) shows a 
marked increase between the age of 11 and 14. This fits well with the age trends that we 
found, and also with the idea that the increase in heuristic processing is attributed to the 
primary (contextualised) system, whereas the decrease in heuristic processing is related to 
the secondary (decontextualised) system. However, there are still some intriguing details. 
For example, the primary (i.e., gist-based) system is best indexed by working memory (and 
probably the ability to retrieve stored knowledge - see also Section 2.2. for the evidence 
from the area of contextual reasoning). However, as 1 noted above, it is hard to identify the 
decontextualisation process with any measure of cognitive capacity or executive 
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functioning due to the mixed relationships between these and heuristic/normative 
reasoning. The explanation that fuzzy-trace theorists give for these mixed correlations is 
that the secondary system is a memory system that cannot be indexed by any single 
measure of cognitive capacity. I f this conjecture is right, future research on the 
development of heuristics and biases should focus more on the relationships between 
memory performance and reasoning. The phenomena that could be interesting in this 
respect involve the ease of generating associates for words, and the frequency of source 
monitoring errors (e.g., attributing self-generated word associates to others; for example, 
when participants mistakenly believe that a stereotype which was activated by task content 
was included in the description of a task). A potential way of investigating these questions 
could be to apply the DRM (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) paradigm. The 
relationship between children's susceptibility to false memories (i.e., their ability to 
automatically activate the critical concept on the DRM task) and their tendency to reason 
heuristically could be investigated. 
1.1.3. Our findings regarding heuristics and biases, and executive fiinctioning in 
autism 
Probably the most relevant cognitive theory of autism for the investigation of 
heuristic reasoning is the Weak Central Coherence (WCC) theory (Frith & Happe, 1994; 
Happe, 1999 -see also Section 4.1.2). The WCC theory proposes that typically developing 
individuals tend to engage in global processing, building up a gist-based representation, 
whereas autistic individuals engage in more detailed, local or piecemeal processing. As a 
result, autistic people are less able to process information in context (e.g., Jolliffe & Baron-
Cohen, 1999). From this it seems to follow that autistic children should be able to avoid 
some reasoning heuristics. According to Stanovich (1999, 2006) decoupling or 
decontextualisation is probably the most important function of the analytic system. If 
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contextualisation does not take place in autism (or it takes place to much less extent than in 
typical development) we can expect that autistic people wi l l perform better in situations 
when a decontextualised representation is required for a logical/normative response. A 
recent version of the WCC theory (Happe & Frith, 2006) proposes that individuals with 
autism might be able to contextualise representations as much as typically developing 
individuals. However, in this case the contextualisation process is expected to be effortful. 
Looking at our results, although most of the findings regarding heuristic reasoning 
can be interpreted in terms of reduced contextualisation/contextualisation through effort in 
autism, this is clearly not the whole story. Although one of the strongest and most 
consistent pieces of evidence for the WCC theory is the superior performance of autistic 
participants on the block design task, we found no evidence for this in either of our studies 
(see Experiments 4 and 5). Additionally, although analogical reasoning requires 
contextualised processing, autistic participants showed no impairment on any of the 
measures of analogical reasoning. Moreover, the underiying processes of analogical 
reasoning also seemed to be the same across groups, as reflected by the high correlations 
between item difficulty for autistic and control participants. This shows that participants 
with autism were able to contextualise non-verbal materials, and they were also able to 
process complex non-verbal materials similarly to the control group. Finally, autistic 
participants were able to use their background knowledge when making judgments about 
the representativeness of a single item (based on a description). That is, they were cleariy 
able to contextualise simple verbal materials. These results seem to suggest that problems 
with contextualisation in our sample were only evident in the case of complex verbal 
materials (see also Lopez & Leekam, 2003). Overall these findings are more in line with 
Bowler et al.'s (2004) task support hypothesis than the WCC theory. According to the task 
support hypothesis, autistic individuals often show difficulty in retrieving and integrating 
their background knowledge with a problem context when the task provides little support 
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for memory retrieval (i.e., when concepts are not directly presented or cued, or when no 
explicit instructions are given to search for a concept - see also McCroy et al., 2007). 
Another relevant cognitive theory of autism is the executive dysfunction account 
(e.g., Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1991). This theory was based on the observation that 
some symptoms of autism (i.e., the need for sameness, the tendency to perseverate, the 
need to be prompted in order to initiate certain behaviours or to switch set, and autistic 
individuals' problems with impulse control) are very similar to those shown by individuals 
with Dysexecutive Syndrome (Baddeley & Wilson, 1988). In our studies we have 
employed a number of different measures of executive functioning (EF). In Experiment 4 
these measures included verbal working memory, inhibition and set-shifting ability (which, 
according to Miyake et al., 2000 tap into the three main aspects of EF). In Experiment 5 we 
investigated both verbal and non-verbal working memory capacity, as well as analogical 
reasoning ability. We examined analogical reasoning using three different non-verbal 
analogy tests, which differed in terms of the abstractness of the materials, the complexity 
of the relations that had to be mapped and the presence/absence of distraction. 
Although we have found a consistent deficit (or at least a tendency for this) in the 
verbal domain (in terms of vocabulary, and verbal working memory scores) autistic 
participants performed just as well as the control group on all other measures of cognitive 
capacity and executive functioning. This suggests that EF deficits might not be as common 
in the case of high functioning autistic participants as one might expect based on the EF 
dysftinction account. Another interesting finding is the relationship between verbal 
working memory scores and other aspects of EF which were only present in the autistic 
sample. In Experiment 4 set-shifting scores were significantly (moderately) correlated with 
verbal working memory scores, and in Experiment 5 there was a significant (strong) 
correlation between verbal working memory and the backward version of the Corsi blocks 
task (which is a measure of both non-verbal working memory and central executive 
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resources - see Vandierendonck et al., 2004). Both the set-shifting task and the backward 
recall version of the Corsi blocks task are non-verbal measures. However, both tasks 
require the strategic organization and possibly the labelling of materials in working 
memory (see e.g., Miyake et al., 2004), I f this process breaks down due to verbal working 
memory impairments, we can expect problems in autism in the case of certain EF skills 
(whether verbal or non-verbal), such as mental flexibility and strategic retrieval of 
knowledge. A better understanding of these processes would be useful, and could be the 
subject of future studies. This could also lead to a better understanding of the performance 
of autistic individuals on higher order reasoning tasks, such as the heuristics and biases 
tasks we investigated in the present experiments. 
In summary, although our studies have not yielded a clear conclusion as to whether 
autistic participants are more or less biased than typically developing individuals, this is no 
surprise i f we consider the complexity of the development of reasoning heuristics in the 
general population. It is more important that we have found consistent evidence that 
complex verbal processing is atypical in autism, and there is also some indication that this 
might be related to some aspects of executive functioning (such as the strategic retrieval of 
procedures and the organization of knowledge). We have also found convincing evidence 
that the basic ability to reason analogically is intact in autism (which is in contrast with the 
predictions of both the EF deficit theory and the WCC theory). 
7.1.4. The role of knowledge and thinking dispositions in reasoning. 
In Experiments 6, 7 and 8 we investigated the role of knowledge (i.e., education) in 
probabilistic reasoning. We also looked at the effect of thinking styles and instructions on 
reasoning. Participants with a higher need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) are 
dispositionally inclined to think harder about problems, and to enjoy effortful cognitive 
activity in general. Instructing participants to reason logically, however, reduces the effect 
258 
of individual differences in thinking styles, resulting in a higher level of mental effort in all 
participants. 
The fact that the available knowledge base changes rapidly with age and education 
is recognized by dual-process theories, and this has also been used to explain why 
cognitive capacity is not a good indicator of children's reasoning performance in many 
cases (see Sections 2.1.2. and 2.1.3). For example, according to ICIaczynski and colleagues 
(e.g., Jacobs & ICIaczynski, 2002; ICIaczynski, 2001; Klaczynski, 2009) social, 
motivational, and affective influences, as well as prior beliefs, greatly affect the way 
people reason about problems. ICIaczynski and colleagues also emphasize that an 
increasing number of heuristics is acquired over the course of development, and the use of 
these heuristics becomes more prevalent with age. Another developmental dual-process 
account that emphasizes the central role of knowledge and experiences is the fuzzy-trace 
theory (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2001; Reyna & Breinerd, 1992; Reyna & Ellis, 1994; 
Reyna & Farley, 2006). The "gist" memory system is considered to be the primary 
(default) system which generates automatic inferences based on the relational and semantic 
properties of problems. This system flexibly changes with age, as individuals extract new 
meanings and structures all the time from the stimuli they encounter. Importantly, not only 
the contents of long-term memory change with development, but also the reasoning 
processes based on these fuzzy traces. This is why reasoning performance cannot be 
reliably linked to cognitive capacity. 
As these examples show, developmental dual-process theories recognize the 
importance of knowledge in reasoning performance. However, they propose that 
performance can increase, decrease or remain stable with development, and no specific 
prediction can be made about the relationships between development, knowledge, 
cognitive ability and reasoning performance due to the great individual differences 
between people's experiences. Thus, none of the above theorists tried to incorporate the 
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role of knowledge in a detailed model, and no attempt has been made to explore 
systematically the interactions between knowledge and individual differences in age, 
cognitive capacity and melacognitive skills. 
As we described in Section 1.3.1., in two recent theoretical papers Stanovich and 
colleagues (Stanovich & West, 2008; Stanovich et al., 2008) discussed the way in which 
knowledge ("mindware") and participants' abilities interact. These authors have suggested 
that cognitive capacity wil l only predict reasoning performance i f the following conditions 
are satisfied. Participants have to have the necessary "mindware" (i.e., relevant 
knowledge), they have to detect the need to override the default heuristic response, and 
sustained inhibition or decoupling has to be necessary to solve the problem. I f any of these 
is not present then there wil l be no relationship between people's performance on a task, 
and their cognitive abilities. In addition, it is more likely that people will detect the conflict 
between heuristics and normative reasoning i f they are given instructions to think logically, 
i f there are cues in the task that make the conflict salient (e.g., when a within-subjects 
design is used as opposed to a between-subjects design), and when people are predisposed 
to reason carefully, and to invest mental effort into solving problems (see Figure 1.4. for a 
summary of the model). 
Probabilistic reasoning is appropriate for the investigation of the role of knowledge 
in heuristic reasoning for two reasons. First o f all, many theorists (e.g., Fischbein, 1987) 
emphasize that the rules of probabilistic reasoning are virtually impossible to infer from 
our everyday experiences which are hopelessly "messy", or the actual patterns of 
probabilistic outcomes, given that observable sequences of events are always finite, 
resemble more what could be predicted based on the fallacies of probabilistic reasoning 
than on the relevant normative rules (similarly to the situation when somebody is waiting 
at a bus stop and instead of three buses coming at five-minute intervals, all three arrive at 
the same time, after 15 minutes - see Hahn & Warren, 2009). Thus, we can expect that the 
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normative rules of probability are acquired through education. Moreover, most traditional 
heuristics and biases tasks examine the conflict between a rule of probabilistic reasoning, 
and the effect of vivid, distracting information. Thus, heuristic reasoning on these tasks 
usually implies the violation of a rule of probability. 
Looking at the results of the experiments in Chapter 6, the data do seem to show a 
good fit with some of the predictions of traditional dual-process theories (e.g., Evans & 
Over, 1996; Stanovich, 1999). Students with higher cognitive abilities and with higher 
need for cognition were less susceptible to biases. At least incorrect equiprobability 
responses were mostly given by students with lower cognitive abilities. In addition, 
students with higher need for cognition (in Experiment 6) and with higher normative 
potential and given logical instructions (in Experiment 8) were less sensitive to content 
effects. This suggests that students with higher normative potential are more able to 
extract the logical structure of problems, regardless of problem content. 
Other aspects of our results, however, are in contrast with the predictions of dual-
process theories. For example, the above theorists would not predict a simultaneous 
increase and decrease in heuristic responding, depending on the type of problem (in this 
case the representativeness heuristic and the equiprobability bias). There was also no 
relationship between participants' reliance on the representativeness heuristic and their 
cognitive abilities and cognitive styles. The latter result can be explained based on 
Stanovich and West (2008), i f we assume that participants relying on the 
representativeness heuristic lack the knowledge of the relevant normative rules (i.e., they 
have mindware gaps). This interpretation is supported by the evidence that after learning 
about various tasks that elicit the representativeness heuristic as part of their education in 
critical thinking, British psychology students were able to resist this heuristic. On the other 
hand, the equiprobability bias increased with education. This shows that relevant 
knowledge can not only be used appropriately, but it can also be used to justify/rationalize 
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non-normative responses, leading to a counterintuitive increase in reasoning errors. 
However, this was most likely to happen in the case of participants with a lower 
"normative potential" (i.e., cognitive capacity and need for cognition), and when 
participants were not given strong instructions to reason logically. Nevertheless, neither 
education nor logical instructions increased the overall number of normative responses. 
Dual-process theories (at least default-interventionist dual-process theories) do not 
predict simultaneous increase and decrease in heuristic responding within the same 
population, and do not expect heuristics to appear or significantly increase in adult 
populations. Although Stanovich et al. (2008) acknowledge that beliefs and knowledge can 
have both positive and negative effects on reasoning (i.e., by providing mindware and 
contaminated mindware) they do not discuss the possibility of how the same knowledge 
can form the basis of both mindware and contaminated mindware in the case of different 
individuals. Overall, these results show that the processes that underiie performance on 
these well-known heuristics and biases tasks are not very well understood even in the case 
of adults. In the next section I review the intuitive rules research programme, and I also 
contrast our findings with the claims of this approach. 
12. Are hvo systems better than one? 
This section explores the question o f whether dual-process theories offer the best 
explanation for our findings, or whether single process theories (such as the intuitive rules 
model - see Section 2.1.4.) could account for the present results as well. 
7.2.1. Are the results of our studies in line with the intuitive rules approach? 
In Section 2.1.4.1 described a single system account of reasoning development, the 
intuitive rules research program (Stavy & Tirosh, 2000). In two recent publications Osman 
(2004) and Osman and Stavy (2006) criticized dual-process theories on the basis that they 
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cannot account for typical patterns of reasoning performance in developmental samples. 
Additionally, these theorists claim that the representations and the procedures in reasoning, 
whether they are used implicitly, explicitly or automatically, are always the same. In this 
section I review our empirical findings, and contrast the explanations offered by dual-, and 
single-process theories. 
The intuitive rules approach deals with the development of certain heuristics (i.e., 
intuitive rules) which are defined as self-evident and self-consistent cognitions (based on 
Fischbein, 1987). These rules are retrieved without conscious intention and they are 
activated by certain aspects of tasks. One of the characteristics of this theory is a focus on 
the importance of saliency, and a distinction between bottom-up and top-down saliency. 
Another interesting aspect of the intuitive rules approach is the distinction between 
implicit, explicit and automatic forms of reasoning. In dual-process theories implicit and 
automatic reasoning would both be categorised as Type 1 processes. By contrast, according 
to the intuitive rules approach implicit and automatic processing correspond to the two 
extremes of the same continuum, which is characterized by different degrees of 
representational strength and stability. Automatic representations are considered to be the 
final products of cognitive development, and they form the basis of skill-based reasoning, 
and mental fiexibility. Although the representations change with individuals' experiences, 
the ways that they can be utilized remain the same, and for this reason implicit, explicit and 
automatic representations are attributed to a single system. 
According to Osman and Stavy (2006), experiencing conflict during reasoning is not 
necessarily evidence that the competing responses are generated by two independent 
reasoning systems. For example, in the case of bottom-up saliency, reducing the 
discriminability between salient and non-salient features leads to conflict at the perceptual 
level. However, it is also possible to create a conflict at the level of explicit, top-down 
reasoning by presenting students with counterexamples. Finally, two intuitive rules can get 
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activated simultaneously by different aspects of the same problem, and these can cue 
conflicting responses. Additionally, in the case of many tasks there are U-shaped 
developmental pattems, where young children and adults respond similarly, although for 
different reasons. U-shaped developmental pattems are usually considered to provide 
evidence for the interaction between two systems (i.e., the gist and the verbatim system in 
the case of the fuzzy-trace theory, and automatic retrieval and effortfxil inhibition processes 
in the case of conditional reasoning - see Sections 2.1 and 2.2.). By contrast, according to 
the intuitive rules program, these pattems are explained by changes in children's 
perceptions of tasks, and in their tendency to rely on particular intuitive rules which 
changes with age. 
Finally, the application of intuitive mies can be both positively and negatively related 
to cognitive capacity. For example Babai and Alon (2004) reported that the application of 
the "more A-more B" mle decreased with cognitive capacity. On the other hand, the use of 
the "same A-same B" rule (i.e., the equiprobability bias) and the "everything can be 
divided" mle increased with cognitive capacity. Given that the application of these mles 
can lead to both correct and incorrect responses, depending on the task, there is no set 
relationship between cognitive capacity and normative responding. In addition, responding 
on a particular task can show U-shaped and inverted U-shaped pattems which is 
uninterpretable with regard to the monotonic increase of cognitive capacity throughout 
childhood and adolescence. 
I f we contrast these claims with our experimental findings, it seems that there is a 
much better fit for the intuitive mles approach, than for dual-process theories. Although the 
fuzzy trace theory can account for U-shaped and inverted U-shaped developmental 
pattems, they predict no interpretable relationships between cognitive ability and heuristic 
use, as the latter is considered to be related to the development of the gist memory system. 
By contrast, the intuitive rules program discusses the possibility of any sort of relationship 
264 
between heuristics and cognitive ability. Osman and Stavy (2006) also discuss the role of 
knowledge in reasoning, and how different intuitive rules can show different 
developmental trajectories (with simultaneous increase and decrease in heuristic use in 
different areas). These authors acknowledge that the application of the same rule can lead 
to both normative and non-normative responses, depending on the problem that students 
are trying to solve. Finally, these theorists also consider primary heuristics/bottom-up 
saliency (such as the "more A - more B" rule) and secondary heuristics/top-down saliency 
(such as the "same A - same B'* rule; i.e., the equiprobability bias). 
Although the intuitive rules research program was developed to account for students' 
intuitions in the domain of learning about science (Stavy & Tirosh, 2000) many of the 
claims about intuitive rules seem to apply for the tasks typically used in the heuristics and 
biases research program. For example, the distinction between bottom-up and top-down 
heuristics could be applied to representativeness-based and equiprobability responses. 
Despite the obvious correspondences between the two approaches, in order to be able to 
make clear predictions regarding the development of heuristics and biases, a systematic 
investigation of the claims of the intuitive rules program would be necessary, using 
heuristics and biases problems. Thus, although our findings are in line with the general 
predictions of the intuitive rules program, a more thorough investigation would be 
necessary, and possibly a new taxonomy of heuristics and biases (for example, on the basis 
of which heuristics are triggered by bottom-up and which ones are triggered by top-down 
saliency). This could also provide us with some ideas on which aspects of these tasks are 
crucial in eliciting a heuristic response. For example, we could expect that presenting the 
ratio bias problem (e.g., Brecher, 2005) in a non-pictorial form should elicit different 
responses from when the task is presented in a verbal format. More specifically, whereas 
pictorial presentation is affected by the discriminability of the number of different 
categories of items (e.g., black vs. white counters), this should not play a role in 
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participants' judgments when they are presented with stimuli in a numerical format (e.g., 4 
black counters out of 6). A numerical presentation might also increase the overall top-
down contributions to reasoning. On the other hand, the effects of perceptual saliency 
(when participants are presented with stimuli in a pictorial format) should be present even 
when they are instructed to reason on the basis of normative considerations. By contrast, 
when a heuristic is based primarily on top-down saliency, interventions to reduce the 
availability of the dominant inappropriate rule, or to encourage students to think critically 
and to expect conflicts between their intuitions and normative considerations (such as 
when participants are instructed to think "like a perfectly logical person") should decrease 
the inappropriate use of rules. A direct lest of these and similar claims based on the 
intuitive rules program could be another possible future line of research. 
7.2.2. Some theoretical issues regarding dual-process theories of reasoning. 
Dual-process theories have not only been criticized on the basis that they cannot 
always account for empirical findings. There are also some other, more theoretical, 
considerations that 1 would like to briefly discuss. Keren and Schul (in press) raised a 
number of issues regarding the scientific merit, and theoretical soundness of two-system 
approaches to higher order cognition. These authors propose that complex higher order 
mental phenomena (such as reasoning) are unlikely to be based on two non-overiapping 
systems, because such systems are unlikely to be either isolable or complete. Keren and 
Schul (in press) claim that dual-process theorists commit a fallacy when they assume that 
all the mental processes that require minimal contribution of cognitive resources (and 
especially working memory capacity) are necessarily the part of a single system. This is 
similar to saying that the body consists of two organs: the liver and everything else (i.e., 
"not-the-liver" - see Bedford, 2003). I f we consider our findings with children, where 
working memory capacity was positively correlated with "heuristic" responses the question 
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arises whether we should say that children produce heuristics effortfully (i.e., relying on 
Type 2 processes), or whether this should be considered as evidence that children are 
unable to use reasoning heuristics (at least when solving some typical heuristics and biases 
problems). However, considering the claim that heuristics are basic and primary processes 
which is implicitly or explicitly assumed by all dual-process theorists (apart from the 
fuzzy-trace theorists) both conclusions seem quite problematic. 
According to Schachter and Tulving (1994) systems should be distinguishable based 
on the kind of information that they use, their rules of operation, and their neural 
substrates. In addition, to demonstrate that two systems exist, it is not enough to show that 
there are two feature sets (such as quick, automatic, effortless, vs. slow, conscious and 
effortful), but it is also necessary to demonstrate that other combinations do not tend to 
appear together. For example, the fact that conscious behaviour can be automatic seems 
very problematic for dual-process accounts. Additionally, a system should not depend on 
another system in carrying out its operations. For example, in the case of default-
interventionist dual-process theories (e.g., Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), and the 
heuristic-analytic theory of Evans (2006) it is clear that System 2 could not operate without 
continuous input from System I . Although this would still be reconcilable with the idea of 
two separate systems ( i f there was a strict hierarchy where one system provides the input 
for the other - see e.g., Carruthers, 2005) this idea is in conflict with recent findings 
regarding the role of goals and intentions on various automatic processes (e.g., Eitam, 
Hassin & Schul, 2008), for example the fact that emotional responses (such as sadness and 
anger) are not generated automatically (see Feldman, Barrett, Ochsner & Gross, 2007 for a 
review). 
ICeren and Schul (in press) also discuss the issue of conflict between competing 
responses. One possibility is that although reasoners experience simultaneity in the 
emergence of two conflicting responses, this does not mean that the two responses were 
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generated at the same time. We could also refer to our findings here with adolescents. 
Dual-process theorists, such as Stanovich and West (2008), for example, assume that when 
conflict arises between Type 1 and 2 processes reasoners try and inhibit Type 1 response 
tendencies, although this override process can fail. In Experiment 2 we found that 
participants' scores on a measure of inhibition skills (the stop signal task) was negatively 
correlated with their tendency to give heuristic responses on the sunk cost and syllogistic 
reasoning tasks. Although correlational evidence should be taken with caution, this seems 
to support Stanovich and West's (2008) notion of the relationship between inhibition and 
less reliance on heuristics. However, within the same sample, but using a different task, we 
have found evidence for the opposite pattern as well (i.e., a positive correlation between 
inhibition skills, and the if-only fallacy). I f we consider inhibition as one o f the indices of 
Type 2 reasoning capacity, these results seem to suggest that different components of Type 
2 reasoning can function in conflict with each other (i.e., it is possible that inhibition was 
needed to suppress the normative response in the case of the if-only task), or that some 
"heuristic" responses are actually generated by Type 2 processes (which is what we 
actually found in Experiment 1). 
In addition, contradictory mental slates can be expected on a theoretical basis in any 
sufficiently complex system (see Kelso & Engstrom, 2006). For example, Evans and 
Curtis-Holmes (2005) found that the belief bias in syllogistic reasoning increases under 
lime pressure. This could be taken as a supporting evidence for a dual-process model. 
However, it is also compatible with the idea that there is a single system, which can 
process representations based on different criteria (such as validity and believability). 
Evaluating logical validity might take longer than generating a belief-based response. This 
is, however, not even necessarily the case. For example, Evans, Handley and Bacon (2009) 
found that time pressure did not influence the tendency of participants to give belief-based 
responses to conditional reasoning problems. Handley and Newstead (in submission) even 
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found that producing logic-based responses to modus ponens inference took less time (and 
was less prone to error) than producing belief-based responses to the same problems. The 
bottom line is that even i f the evidence for a default belief-based processing was stronger, 
this fact would still be compatible with both single and dual-process accounts. 
Finally, although dual-process theorists like to emphasize the family resemblance 
across different dual-process models (see e.g., Stanovich & West, 2000), different theorists 
actually make very different claims about the nature of the proposed systems (as noted by 
Newstead, 2000). For example, whereas some theorists equate System 2 with general 
intelligence (e.g., Evans & Over, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000) or working memory 
capacity (e.g., De Neys, 2006; Kokis et al., 2002), other theorists explicitly claim that there 
is no clear relationship between cognitive capacity and decontextualised/rational thinking 
(see Klaczynski, 2009; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). In his latest book Stanovich (2009) also 
claims that heuristics and biases tasks measure "the thinking (i.e., rational thinking) that IQ 
tests miss". Newstead (2000) also points out that the correlations between different 
components or measures that are supposed to index the same system are often weak or 
even absent. (This is also evident from our findings, especially from the fact that heuristic 
reasoning on different tasks was unrelated, and that the relationship between heuristic 
reasoning and cognitive capacity was very mixed). The fact that dual-process theories are 
not very well defined also makes it hard to test their predictions (see also Gigerenzer, 2008 
and Section 1.3.3.). 
In spite of all these problems, dual-process theories are very popular, and they are 
used in many different areas of psychology, such as reasoning and decision-making, and 
social psychology (see Evans, 2008 for a review). As Keren and Schul (in press) note, 
thinking in dichotomies is simple, intuitively compelling, and dual-process theories offer a 
good story. Another characteristic of dual-process research is that theorists tend to try and 
collect supporting evidence for their claims, rather than attempting to disconfirm their own 
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theories. This is also evident in dual-process theorists' focus on the differences between 
their proposed systems, rather than on the similarities (or on the possibility that their 
dichotomies actually represent the extremes of a continuum). This is, by the way, also 
characteristic of the whole discipline of psychology where results are divided into real 
effects (p<.05) and no effects (/7>.05), although there is no essential difference between an 
experimental result of p=.050 and p=.051 (see Loftus, 1996). Based on all these claims, 
Keren and Schul (in press) call for a more precise specification of the theoretical constructs 
of dual-process theories, and more rigorous empirical tests of these theories, which should 
allow not just for collecting supporting evidence for dual-process theories, but also for the 
falsification of the claims these theories make. 
7.3. Concluding comments and possible future directions 
This section discusses the issue of the rationality of heuristics and biases. I also 
outline some possible future directions of research, and I summarize my conclusions. 
7.3. J. Is "rational thinking" more rational than heuristics and biases? 
One thing that most dual-process theorists are in agreement on is that heuristic 
reasoning, although often very useftil, can lead to irrational behaviour in certain situations. 
Theorists, such as Evans and Over (1996) and Stanovich (2004) emphasize that heuristics 
are rational evolutionarily. However, they are not necessarily rational from the individual's 
point of view (for example, they might lead to bad decisions when we choose from 
different products or when we interpret legal documents). Other theorists, on the other 
hand, consider heuristics and contextualised reasoning to be examples of the most effective 
and mature (as well as the most economic) reasoning processes. One example of this is the 
concept of gist processing (see the review on the fuzzy-trace theory in Section 2.1.3). The 
gist of an event depends on people's previous experiences with situations which are similar 
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to their present experience, and it makes it possible for people to derive the meaning of 
situations using their relevant knowledge. Fuzzy-trace theorists also emphasize that 
conscious, fact-based thinking is slow, low-capacity and error-prone. Similarly, according 
to the intuitive rules approach (see Section 2.1.4.) automatic reasoning is the final stage of 
cognitive development, which forms the basis of mental flexibility. Gigerenzer and 
colleagues also emphasize that norms should not be content blind (i.e., decontextualised), 
and they also consider heuristics to be the constituents of the "adaptive toolbox" which 
enables individuals to reason in a fast and frugal way, which is also very effective. 
Our results add some interesting details to the rationality debate. One important 
finding is that in the case of young children, contextualisation was effortful, which 
demonstrates that there is not necessarily a contextualised=quick and easy; 
decontextualised=sIow and efTortful correspondence. This relationship in the case of older 
children changed, yielding no relationship between intelligence/cognitive capacity and 
either contextualised or decontextualised thinking. Probably more importantly (at least 
regarding the issue of the rationality of heuristics) it is clear from Figure 7.1. that 6 year-
olds were as "rational" (i.e., normative) on our set of tasks as 15 year-olds (with the age 
groups in between reaching even lower normative scores). Then, moving on to the results 
from the university student sample, we have found that learning new (relevant) concepts, 
such as the concept of randomness, decreased normative responding in the case of our 
sample (although it was more likely to happen in the case of low-ability students, with no 
effect of education in the case of high ability students). Then consider the finding that 
heuristic reasoning was less prevalent in our autistic sample than in the control group on a 
number of tasks, and higher ability autistic participants were more inclined to reason 
heuristically in some cases than lower ability autistic children. These results pose 
interesting questions about the adaptive value of reasoning heuristics. 
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One example of a heuristic that participants with autism were consistently less likely 
to use than the control group, and that younger children relied on less than older children is 
the conjunction fallacy. In the past 26 years around a hundred scientific papers have been 
published on the conjunction fallacy, and the "Linda problem" has been a key topic in the 
debate on human rationality. The reason for this is that, for most of us, the draw towards 
the conjunctive option is so powerfiil that even when we are aware that something is not 
quite right about our judgment, it is nevertheless very difficult to resist the powerfully 
compelling intuitive choice. Consider, for example, Gould's (1992) famous comment on 
the task: " . . . / know that the third statement is least probable, yet a little homunculus in my 
head continues to jump up and down, shouting at me—"but she can't just be a bank teller; 
read the description. " 
As Hertwig and Gigerenzer (1999) in their famous critique of the conjunction fallacy 
noted, committing the fallacy is clearly not rational according to the rules of probability 
theory and logic. However, it can be perfectly rational in a social sense. In support of this 
claim they give the following example. According to the basic principle of internal 
consistency, the preference for one choice over another should be independent of the 
availability of other alternative choices (that is, the context in which a problem is 
presented). However, imagine that you are taking part in a dinner party, and it looks like 
there are fewer pastries than there are people. Although you would normally have dessert, 
in this situation you decide that you wi l l not take the last remaining eclair f rom the tray, 
giving a chance to other people to take it. This behaviour is not rational according to 
probability theory. Nevertheless, it is polite and makes perfect sense socially. As this 
example illustrates, the relevance of contextual processing is not restricted to the domain of 
reasoning. In fact its importance is much more evident in everyday situations (and in social 
situations, especially). This example also gives a possible explanation for how problems 
with contextual processing could lead to serious problems in everyday social situations in 
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the case of individuals with autism. It would be interesting to study heuristic reasoning in 
autism in relation to the behavioural symptoms of autism (such as deficits in social 
interaction and social imagination) in the future. It is possible that although heuristics and 
biases tasks are unnatural in a certain sense, they could explain some of the problems that 
individuals with autism experience in their daily lives. 
7.3.2. Possible future lines of research and conclusions 
1 have already mentioned that looking at the relationships between the development 
of memory and reasoning performance could be a novel, theory-driven approach to 
reasoning development. Although memory retrieval, and its relationship with conditional 
reasoning has been studied before (see e.g., Markovits & Barouillet, 2002), this has not 
been done in the case of reasoning heuristics, not even by flizzy-trace theorists who expect 
a close relationship between memory development and reasoning. Exploring the 
relationships between memory development and heuristic reasoning would be interesting 
to do in the case of both typically developing and autistic children. The links between 
memory retrieval and executive functioning/working memory capacity should also be 
investigated in both populations. 
In the present experiments we have investigated the development of reasoning 
heuristics. Our youngest participants were 5 year-olds, and the oldest participants were 
young adults. This is obviously not the whole picture regarding the development of 
heuristics across the life span. We can expect that executive functioning and working 
memory capacity wil l be gradually developing from childhood into young adulthood, 
which should be followed by a decline of cognitive resources as people get older. I f we 
accept that there is a close relationship between heuristic reasoning and working memory 
and executive fiinctioning, we could expect age-related changes in heuristic use in 
adulthood as well. This is, however, a topic that has rarely been investigated so far. Not 
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surprisingly (at least, considering our own mixed findings with children) the two studies 
which have been conducted with older adults yielded opposing results. Strough, Mehta, 
McFall and Schuller (2008) have found that older adults were less susceptible to the sunk 
cost fallacy than younger adults. These authors have attributed this to the tendency of older 
adults to focus on positive information, and their mature skills in emotion regulation which 
helps them to maintain positive mood states for longer (see Cartensen, Mikels & Mather, 
2006 for a review). By contrast, De Neys and Van Gelder (2008) reported that older adults 
(and children) were more susceptible to the belief bias in syllogistic reasoning than young 
adults, and their susceptibility to the belief bias was significantly correlated with their 
performance on some typical heuristics and biases tasks (i.e., the worse they performed on 
the heuristics and biases tasks, the less they could resist the belief bias). De Neys and Van 
Gelder attributed these patterns to the "rise and fa l l" of belief inhibition across the life 
span. 
Another interesting question is whether there is a relationship between reasoning 
performance (and especially susceptibility to heuristics) and the behavioural symptoms of 
autism as measured by diagnostic tools (such as the Autism Diagnostic Interview or the 
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule). For example, Hertwig and Gigerenzer (1999) 
suggested that there is a close relationship between heuristic/contextualised reasoning and 
behaviour in social situations. There is also an interesting parallel between the 
development of reasoning heuristics and theory of mind (ToM). Although ToM reasoning 
(just as heuristics) is often considered to be a basic, or even modular mechanism, there is 
much evidence that ToM reasoning requires executive functioning resources (see e.g., 
Apperly, Samson & Humphreys, in press, for a review). However, it is possible that 
although beliefs are inferred automatically, it requires mental effort to use them 
appropriately in a particular situation (see e.g., Cohen & German, 2009). Similarly, it is 
possible that heuristics are generated automatically, but due to the fact that participants 
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have to respond to problems by choosing from multiple response options, there is some 
deliberation involved, which requires the involvement of cognitive resources. Back and 
Apperiy (in press) make an interesting distinction between spontaneous and automatic 
inferences. The idea is that people might track other's beliefs spontaneously (i.e., without 
the need for being instructed) which leads to quick responses when they are unexpectedly 
asked to report others beliefs. This, however, does not imply that these inferences are 
automatic and effortless. Similariy, it might just be that the criteria that heuristic responses 
rely on (for example, using background knowledge to answer questions, instead of relying 
on probabilistic information presented in the task) are easier and more natural to apply. 
However, individuals (for example, individuals with autism) who find it hard to rely on 
their background knowledge might prefer to rely on other criteria (in this case, to use the 
probabilistic information presented in the task) as the basis of their response. 
Another interesting parallel is that ToM reasoning seems to be related to the 
development of verbal skills, although it is only apparent in the case of young children, and 
in the case of participants with autism. This is similar to our findings in that verbal 
working memory was involved in heuristic reasoning in the case of young children and 
autistic participants, but not in the case of late adolescents and adults. Recent 
investigations into ToM could serve as a model for developing novel paradigms to 
examine heuristic reasoning. Developing non-verbal measures of heuristic reasoning (see 
Apperiy, Riggs, Simpson, Samson & Chiavarino, 2006 for an example for a non-verbal 
ToM task) would be especially useful to find out whether children and individuals with 
autism need to invest cognitive effort because of the processing demands of verbal 
reasoning problems, or whether they do not generate heuristic responses 
spontaneously/automatically in the first place. (Although unrelated to the present 
investigation, it would be also interesting to study ToM performance in autism using these 
novel methodologies to understand better the sources of their problems.) 
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Going back to the research on reasoning heuristics, adults' responses could be 
investigated using more sensitive methods, such as reaction times, eye tracking or 
physiological measures. These techniques have already been used by various researchers, 
although without conclusive results (at least the results are hard to generalize across 
different tasks). One possible reason for this is that the underlying processes of heuristics 
are actually quite diverse (this is a reasonable assumption looking at the differences 
between the developmental trajectories of heuristics that we have found in our samples). 
Another reason for this might be that the underlying processes of heuristics are not well 
understood, or well specified to enable systematic investigations into the claims of dual-
process theories. Unless we make falsifiable claims, it is not possible to rigorously evaluate 
the usefulness of dual-process theories for explaining reasoning performance. In this 
respect systematically contrasting the predictions of dual-process theories and alternative 
accounts of reasoning (such as the intuitive rules approach or the fuzzy trace theory) would 
be a very useful step forward, especially when looking at developmental samples. Claims 
about processing fluency/effort and conflict between different reasoning processes would 
also be interesting to examine using physiological measures. 
In summary, in this series of studies we have examined three main questions; the 
development of reasoning heuristics in typical populations, the development of reasoning 
heuristics in autism, and the role of education and knowledge in heuristic reasoning. I have 
discussed our findings in relation to dual-process theories, the cognitive theories of autism, 
and educational theories of reasoning heuristics. These results can inform theoretical 
debates about the appropriateness of dual-process theories and about the rationality of 
reasoning heuristics. In addition, our findings highlighted the need for more rigorous 
investigations in certain areas, and I have also outlined some possible directions for fijUire 
research. 
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APPENDIX S I : Supplementary tables for Experiment 1 
Table 1. Regression analyses on heuristic responding. 
Predictors 
Unique variance 
explained (R^) 
Weight / Value Sig-
Age and cognitive ability .29 .05 .33 .75 
entered simultaneously .52 3.55 .001 
1. Age ,19 .45 4.58 .0001 
2. Cognitive ability .29 .52 3.55 .001 
1. Cognitive ability .30 .56 6.07 .0001 
2. Age .29 .05 .33 .75 
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APPENDIX S2: Supplementary tables for Experiment 2. 
Table 1. Correlations between the individual differences measures and the three response 
types across tasks. 
age Cognitive ability Inhibition Set-shifting cost 
Syllogistic Heuristic responses -.19 -.18 -.25^ .07 
reasoning Normative responses -.03 -.03 .09 .05 
"Other" responses .30* .27^ .24^ -.17 
Sunk cost Heuristic responses -.06 -.14 -.32* .08 
fallacy Normative responses .30' .18 .22 -.27^ 
"Other" responses -.30' -.07 .07 .10 
If-only Heuristic responses .10 .18 .25^ .08 
fallacy Normative responses -.06 -.04 -.27^ -.20 
"Other" responses -.18 -.44*' .00 .33* 
Conjunction Heuristic responses .29* .30' .15 .20 
fallacy Normative responses -.29* -.30* -.15 -.20 
Total Heuristic responses .07 .09 -.08 .21 
Normative responses -.04 -.09 -.06 -.30* 
"Other" responses -.09 -.12 .15 .13 
performance.) 
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Table 2. Intercorrelations between heuristic responding on the different reasoning and 
decision making tasks. 
T 2. I 4! 
1. Belief bias ~ 
2. Sunk cost bias .05 
3. If-only fallacy -.02 -.18 
4. Conjunction fallacy .07 -.03 .13 
313 
Table 3. Intercorrelations between normative responding on the different reasoning and 
decision making tasks. 
\_ 2. 3^  
Syllogistic reasoning 
Sunk cost task .06 
If-onlyiask -.09 -.01 
Conjunction fallacy task .19 -.12 .06 
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Table 4. Regression analysis on normative responding. 
Unique variance fi Weight / Value Sig. 
Predictor explained (R^) 
Set-shifting .11 -.33 4.37 .001 
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APPENDIX S3: Supplementary tables for Experiment 3. 
Table 1. ANOVA analyses conducted on the judgment and decision-making tasks. 
F Sig^ Partial Eta Squared 
Engineers and Imiyers problem with a representative description 
Conflict 149.10 .0001 .67 
Conflict * age group .06 .81 .001 
Age group .50 .48 .01 
Engineers and lawyers problem with a non-representative description 
/normative responses 
conflict 30.51 .00 .35 
conflict * age group .20 .66 .003 
age group 6.51 .01 .10 
Engineers and lawyers problem with a non-representative description / equally 
likely responses 
conflict 16.04 .00 .22 
conflict * age group 5.38 .02 .09 
age group .18 .67 .003 
Positive/negative recency effect 
conflict 32.87 .00 .31 
conflict * age group \ .27 .26 .02 
age group 4.01 .049 .05 
Conjunction fallacy 
conflict 80.49 .0001 .59 
conflict * age group 2.13 .15 .04 
age group .37 .55 .01 
Syllogistic reasoning 
conflict 72.25 .0001 .63 
conflict * age group 1.84 .18 .04 
age group 1.70 .20 .04 
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Table 2. ANOVA analyses conducted on the picture and scene analogy tasks. 
F Sig. Partial Eta Squared 
Picture analogy problems 
distraction 100.95 .0001 .58 
distraction * age group .13 .72 .002 
age group .12 .73 .002 
Scene analogy problems 
relational complexity 22.88 .0001 .24 
relational complexity * 
.16 .69 .002 
age group 
distraction 48.92 .0001 .40 
distraction* age group .31 .58 .004 
relational complexity * 
distraction 
relational complexity * 
distarction * age group 
age group 
8.96 .004 .11 
1.75 .19 .02 
5.68 .02 .07 
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Appendix S4: Supplementary tables for Experiment 4 
Table 1. ANOVA analyses on the heuristic, normative and "other" responses on the different 
reasoning tasks. 
F Sig. Partial Eta Squared 
Syllogistic heuristic responses 
reasoning group 6.58 .01 .09 
normative responses 
group 3.91 .052 .05 
"other " responses 
group 1.99 .16 .03 
Sunk cost heuristic responses 
fallacy group .14 .71 .002 
normative responses 
group 4.89 .03 .07 
"other" responses 
group 18,13 .0001 .21 
If-only heuristic responses 
fallacy group 1.27 ,26 .02 
normative responses 
group .77 .38 .01 
"other *' responses 
group .67 .42 .01 
Conjunction heuristic/normative responses 
fallacy group 5.28 .03 .07 
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Table 2. Correlations between heuristic responding across tasks in the autistic group. 
T 2. 3^  Z 
1. belief bias 
2. sunk cost fallacy .10 
3. if-only fallacy -.05 -.08 
4. conjunction fallacy .05 -.03 .15 
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Table 3. Correlations between normative responding across tasks in the autistic group. 
T 2. 1 A. 
1. syllogistic reasoning 
2. sunk cost fallacy .02 
3. if-only fallacy -.07 .16 
4. conjunction fallacy .15 .23 .13 
320 
APPENDIX 85: Supplementary tables for Experiment 5. 
Table 1. ANOVA analyses conducted on the judgment and decision-making tasks. 
F Sig^ Partial Eta Squared 
Engineers and lawyers problem with a representative description / base rate 
responses 
Content .33 .57 .01 
Content * group .89 .35 .02 
Conflict 20.54 .0001 .29 
Conflict * group .30 .59 .01 
Conflict * age 7.01 .01 .12 
Content * conflict .01 .91 .0001 
Content * conflict * 
group .01 .92 .0001 
Group .20 .66 .004 
Engineers and lawyers problem with a non-representative description / equally 
likely responses 
Content .98 .33 .02 
Content * group 4.88 .03 .08 
Conflict 3.51 .07 .06 
Conflict * group 1.06 .31 .02 
Content * conflict .03 .86 .001 
Content * conflict * 
group .44 .51 .01 
Group .90 .35 .02 
Engineers and la\vyers problem with a non-representative description / base 
rate responses 
Content .39 .53 .01 
Content * group .03 .87 .001 
Conflict 15.47 .0001 .23 
Conflict * group 4.45 .04 .08 
Content * conflict 1.35 .25 .03 
Content * conflict * 
group .85 .36 .02 
Group 1.76 .19 .03 
Positive/negative recency / normative responses 
Content .17 .68 .003 
Content * group .17 .68 .003 
Conflict 16.12 .0001 .24 
Conflict * group .40 .53 .01 
Content * conflict 3.73 .06 .07 
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Sig. Partial Eta Squared 
Engineers and lawyers problem with a representative description / base rate 
responses 
Content .33 .57 .01 
Content * group .89 .35 .02 
Conflict 20.54 .0001 .29 
Conflict * group .30 .59 .01 
Conflict * age 7.01 .01 ,12 
Content * conflict .01 .91 .0001 
Content * conflict * 
group .01 .92 .0001 
Group .20 .66 .004 
Engineers and lawyers problem with a non-representative description / equally 
likely responses 
Content .98 .33 .02 
Content * group 4.88 .03 .08 
Conflict 3.51 .07 .06 
Conflict * group 1.06 .31 .02 
Content * conflict .03 .86 .001 
Content * conflict * 
group .44 .51 .01 
Group .90 .35 .02 
Engineers and lawyers probi em with a non-representative description /1 
rate responses 
Content .39 .53 .01 
Content * group .03 .87 .001 
Conflict 15.47 .0001 .23 
Conflict * group 4.45 .04 .08 
Content * conflict * 
group .81 .37 .02 
Group 2.38 .13 .05 
Positive recency effect 
Content 6.43 .01 .11 
Content * group 1.67 .20 .03 
Conflict 14.00 .0001 .22 
Conflict * group .84 .37 .02 
Content * conflict 17.86 .0001 .26 
Content * conflict * 
group 3.88 .06 .07 
Group .47 .50 .01 
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F Sig. Partial Eta Squared 
Negative recency effect 
Content 8.18 .006 .14 
Content * group 4.25 .04 .08 
Conflict 3.31 .08 .06 
Conflict * group .001 .98 .0001 
Content * conflict 8.13 .01 .14 
Content * conflict * 
group .97 .33 .02 
Group 2.98 .09 .06 
Conjunction fallacy / heuristic and normative responses 
Content .42 .52 .01 
Content * group 1.35 .25 .03 
Conflict 8.85 .004 .14 
Conflict * group 4.36 .04 .08 
Content * conflict 2.02 .16 .04 
Content * conflict * 
group .31 .58 .01 
Group .68 .42 .01 
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Table 2. ANOVA analyses conducted on the analogical reasoning tasks. 
F Sig. Partial Eta Squared 
Picture analogy tasks 
Distraction 88.46 .0001 .63 
Distraction * group .56 .46 .01 
Group .01 .94 .0001 
Scene analogy tasks 
Relational complexity 22.88 .0001 .31 
Relational complexity 
* group 
.12 -73 .002 
Distraction 28.77 .0001 .36 
Distraction * group .40 .53 .01 
Relational complexity 
* distraction 
10.23 .002 .17 
Relational complexity 
* distraction * group 
.40 .53 .01 
Group .30 .59 .01 
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Table 3. Analyses of error rates on the analogical reasoning tasks. 
/(53) Sig. (2-tailed) 
Picture analogy test perceptual .18 .86 
semantic .67 .51 
other .75 .46 
Scene analogy test perceptual .91 .37 
relational .11 .91 
other .06 .95 
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APPENDIX S6: Supplementary tables for Experiment 6. 
Table 1. ANOVA analyses on the representative, equiprobability and normative responses 
F Sig. Partial Eta Squared 
Representativeness content .09 .77 .0001 
heuristic content * need for .06 .81 .0001 
cognition 
content * year group 2.37 .13 .013 
content * subject group .02 .89 .0001 
content * year group * .003 .96 .0001 
subject group 
need for cognition 4.12 .044 .02 
year group 6.39 .012 .04 
subject group .001 .976 .0001 
year group * subject group 11.61 .001 .06 
Equiprobability content .41 .52 .002 
bias content * need for .02 .89 .0001 
cognition 
content * year group 3.05 .08 .02 
content * subject group 1.02 .31 .01 
content * year group * .01 ,93 .0001 
subject group 
need for cognition 6.95 .009 .04 
year group 1.43 .23 .01 
subject group .79 .38 .004 
year group * subject group 4.36 .04 .02 
Normative content 1.18 .28 .007 
responses content * need for .20 .66 .001 
cognition 
content * year group 3.80 .05 .02 
content * subject group .53 .47 .003 
content * year group * .01 .92 .0001 
subject group 
need for cognition 13.24 .0001 .07 
year group .57 .45 .003 
subject group .41 .52 .002 
year group * subject group .0001 .99 .0001 
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Table 2. Regression analyses on the representativeness-based and equiprobability responses 
Predictors 
Unique variance 
explained (R^) 
fi Weight / Value Sig. 
Analyses on the representativeness-based responses: 
First year Normative -.02 -.09 .58 .56 
psychology students potential 
Higher year Statistics marks .05 -.25 2.08 .04 
psychology students 1.Statistics marks .10 -.17 1.29 .20 
2. Normative -.21 1.62 .11 
potential 
First year biology Need for cognition .03 -.24 1.34 .19 
students 
Higher year biology Statistics marks -.03 -.08 .43 .67 
students Need for cognition -.01 -.13 .81 .42 
Analyses on the equiprobability responses: 
First year Normative -.02 -.04 .26 .79 
psychology students potential 
Higher year Statistics marks .09 -.32 2.69 .01 
psychology students 1.Statistics marks .14 -.22 1.70 .10 
2. Normative -.27 2.12 .04 
potential 
First year biology Need for cognition .03 -.08 .44 ,66 
students 
Higher year biology Statistics marks .0001 -.01 .06 .95 
students Need for cognition .02 -.20 1.31 .20 
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APPENDIX S7: Supplementary tables for Experiment 7. 
Table 1. ANOVA analyses on the representative, equiprobability and normative responses. 
F Sig. Partial Eta Squared 
Representativeness content .06 .81 .0001 
heuristic content * year group .30 .74 .01 
year group .68 .51 .01 
Equiprobability content 31.63 .0001 .20 
bias content * year group 1.11 .33 .02 
year group 3.34 .04 .05 
Normative content 15.83 .0001 .12 
responses content * year group .54 .59 .01 
year group .32 .73 .01 
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Table 2. Regression analyses on the representativeness-based and equiprobability responses. 
Predictors 
Unique variance p Weight / Value Sig. 
explained {R^) 
Analyses on the representativeness-based responses: 
First year Normative 
psychology students potential 
Higher year Statistics marks 
psychology students Normative 
potential 
Analyses on the equiprobability responses. 
First year Normative 
psychology students potential 
Higher year Statistics marks 
psychology students Normative 
potential 
.01 
.01 
.02 
.01 
.01 
.05 
10 
.12 
.13 
-.19 
.11 
-.24 
.62 .54 
.86 .39 
1,14 .26 
1.28 .21 
.82 .42 
2.22 .03 
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APPENDIX 88: Supplementary tables for Experiment 8. 
Table 1. ANOVA analyses on the representative, equiprobability and normative responses 
with need for cognition as a covariate. 
F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Representativeness content .82 .37 .01 
heuristic content * normative potential group 2.32 .13 .02 
content * instructions .004 .95 .0001 
content * normative potential group 1.61 .21 .01 
* instructions 
normative potential group .17 .68 .001 
instructions .99 .32 .01 
normative potential group * 2.707 .10 .023 
instructions 
Equiprobability content 40.72 .0001 ,26 
bias content * normative potential group 1.37 .25 .01 
content * instructions 1.71 .19 .02 
content * normative potential group 5.89 .02 .05 
* instructions 
normative potential group .98 .32 .01 
instructions .91 .34 .01 
normative potential group * .35 .55 .003 
instructions 
Normative content 17.74 .0001 .13 
responses content * normative potential group .03 .87 .0001 
content * instructions 3.74 .06 .03 
content * normative potential group .05 .83 .0001 
* instructions 
normative potential group .89 .35 .01 
instructions .30 .58 .003 
normative potential group * .55 .46 .01 
instructions 
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Table 2. ANOVA analyses on the equiprobability responses for the high and low normative 
potential groups 
F Sig. Partial Eta Squared 
Low normative Content 11.12 .002 .16 
potential Content * instructions .52 .48 .01 
Instructions .06 .80 .001 
High normative Content 36.58 .0001 .39 
potential Content * instructions 8.94 .004 .14 
Instructions 1.22 .27 .02 
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